The close relationship between parliamentarians and residents of the geographic
district they represent is an essential element of the electoral system
in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Debates on electoral
reform in these countries have typically accepted the importance of the
relationship without question. This essay looks at the basis for the continuing
attachment to geographic representation. It concludes that there is evidence
to support the importance of the role played by directly elected constituency
representatives but suggests that the attachment to geography comes at
a cost, by restricting electoral reformers in their choice of alternative
options and constraining parties and representatives from exploring the
full potential of new electoral systems.
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand share a tradition
of single-member districts with plurality or majority electoral formulas.
Due to their common history as British colonies, the modern political systems
of Canada, Australia and New Zealand are all derived from the Westminster
model of parliamentary democracy. However, there is some variation between
the systems. The first-past-the-post plurality electoral system is currently
used in the United Kingdom and Canada, and was used in New Zealand from
1946-1993. Under this formula, the candidate in a single-member constituency
need only win a plurality of the votes to be elected. In contrast, the
majoritarian Alternative Vote system used to elect members of the Australian
House of Representatives requires candidates to win an absolute majority
of the vote. Since 1996, just more than half of the members of the New
Zealand parliament have been elected using the traditional plurality system
in single-member districts, while the remainder are indirectly elected
via party lists in proportion to the nation-wide support for their party.
All four countries currently elect one candidate per geographic constituency,
although various forms of multi-member districts have been used in the
past in the Canadian provinces, and two- and three- member districts for
national elections existed in the United Kingdom until 1950.
Vernon Bogdanor describes the plurality system as it developed in Britain
and the British colonies as being profoundly linked to the notion of territorial
representation.1 As representatives of constituencies, MPs were attorneys
seeking the redress of grievances before committing their constituencies
to the payment of the expenses of government. The concept of parliament
as an assembly for the representation of constituency interests was later
eclipsed by Burkes notion of the parliament as a deliberative assembly
of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes,
not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from
the general reason of the whole.2 Rather than acting as a delegate
for the will of the constituency, the representative is a trustee, elected
by their constituents in recognition of their wisdom, to exercise their
judgment as they see best. The rise of modern cohesive political parties
has further challenged the concept of representation. A description of
representation in Australia is equally applicable to the other three countries
studied in this paper: Within major parties, the popular images of elected
representatives are neither as trustees nor delegates of their voters,
but as partisans.3
Even in an era of party dominance, the perception of the representative
as a delegate for their constituency persists.
Eulau and Karp define the modern understanding of representation as comprising
four possible components of responsiveness. In addition to policy responsiveness
and symbolic responsiveness, they include service responsiveness
the efforts of the representative to secure particular benefits for individuals
or groups in his constituency and allocation responsiveness the
representatives effort to obtain benefits for individuals or groups in
his constituency through pork-barrel exchanges in the appropriations process
or through administrative interventions. 4 Similarly, Searing describes
MPs in the United Kingdom performing two tasks in their constituency service
role, acting as welfare officers for individual constituents or as a
local promoters for the collective interests of their constituency. 5
Representatives in Canada, the United Kingdom Australia and New Zealand
now identify with three broad representational roles, defined by Studlar
and McAllister as locals, who focus on articulating local concerns and
interests; partisans, who see their role in party political terms; and
legislators, who emphasise the parliamentary role of an elected representative.
The constituency casework performed by representatives, assisting their
constituents with specific problems and interceding on their behalf when
necessary, is regarded as an essential part of the job of an MP in Canada,
the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Fenno defines the core activity
of constituent service as providing help to individuals, groups and localities
in coping with the federal government. 7 This role is regarded as the
most important, and also the most enjoyable aspect of their job by MPs
in all four countries. As one Canadian MP has commented, once you realise
that [constituents] have no place else to turn to, then after you help
them, you understand it is the most vital service we provide. 8
Some scholars have questioned the effectiveness of MPs casework role,
given the small proportion of their constituency that uses their services,
and the availability of other agencies for assistance.
Only a small minority seek assistance in the first place, and at least
some go away frustrated. The numbers feeling they have been helped as a
proportion of the entire constituency inevitably turn out to be tiny: 6
per cent according to the Kilbrandon Commission, 5 per cent in the Granada
study, 7 per cent in the Attitudes to Government survey. Thus the overall
impact and reputation of the MP as a source of assistance looks modest
in comparison with other agencies, in particular those with deeper local
roots, such as councillors, neighbourhood groups and associations, and
even the family doctor. The MP does not loom large in the electorates
mind as a source of help; he is an institution of last resort.9
In defence of the casework role played by representatives in the US and
the UK, others have argued that, regardless of whether constituents actually
use the casework service provided by their representative, having the option
to do so, should the need arise, is important to citizens. The sheer number
of constituents who have personally received assistance from their representative
may not be the crucial consideration. Because of differences in their sociodemographic
composition, some constituencies may have a much greater basic demand for
assistance than others, but constituents without current need might still
believe that, should the need arise, their representative would be there
to help. 10 According to Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, constituents appreciation
for this service is demonstrated by the additional personal vote that rewards
dedicated representatives. In the United Kingdom, variations in constituency
work apparently account for swings of something between 1.5 and 2 per cent
for Conservatives and between 3 and 3.5 per cent for Labour.
The electoral benefits of constituency service are contested in Australia.
Studlar and McAllister demonstrate that local constituency work reduces
an MPs vote at a rate of 0.09% per hour for each extra hour of work per
month, other things being equal. For example, an MP who said that he or
she worked 40 hours per month dealing with constituents problems and attending
local functions could expect to be short 1.8% of the vote compared with
an MP who devoted 20 hours per month, net of other things. They attribute
the negative relationship between constituency work and vote to the displacement
of other more electorally beneficial activities, such as working for the
national party in the capital, or developing a national media profile,
that occurs when MPs are devoting their time to casework.
It appears that the casework role played by representatives may be neither
as effective, nor as valued by voters as has been traditionally assumed.
The existence of alternative agencies for the redress of constituents
grievances such as community centres, welfare rights groups and local law
centres or Ombudsmen reduces the MPs casework role to an avenue of last
resort. In 2004, the Law Commission of Canada concluded that the limited
research on geographic representation suggests that the link between constituents
and their elected representatives may not be as important as we initially
Direct Election and Accountability
The direct election of a representative enables the constituency to hold
them accountable for their actions during the parliamentary term. If constituents
consider the performance of their incumbent MP to have been inadequate,
or believe that they would be better represented by a challenger, they
have the electoral power to replace their representative. The indispensable
condition for an MPs ultimate accountability to his electors and for close
ties between citizen, locality and Parliament is the single-member constituency.11
For electors accustomed to directly electing their representatives in
geographic districts, the indirect election of representatives via a party
list in closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems, appears to
undermine the capacity of voters to hold their representatives to account.
During the campaign preceding the 1993 referendum on electoral reform in
New Zealand, the pro-FPP lobby group, the Campaign for Better Government,
exploited this fear in order to weaken support for MMP. Television advertisements
claimed that party list members would be unaccountable to public opinion,
being in effect appointed by their respective parties. 12 While campaign
advertisement portrayals of list MPs as faceless, suited party apparatchiks
have not been borne out, it has become standard practice for senior members
of the party caucus to be placed high on the party list as a back-up
in the event that they lose their electorate seats, effectively denying
voters the capacity to directly prevent the re-election of particular representatives.
In this situation, an MPs re-election becomes dependent on the success
of their party in the separate party vote.
However, the accountability of representatives in plurality single-member
districts has also been questioned. In the UK, Crewe has argued that the
large majority of seats are impregnable: consecutive landslides of 1945
proportions for Labour and 1983 proportions for the Conservatives would
still leave 70 per cent of seats in the same party hands. The safe seat
increases the Members incentive to neglect his constituency and deprives
constituents of an effective electoral sanction if he does. In a party-dominated
political system, safe seats will nearly always be won by the same party,
regardless of the performance of the individual representative. In addition,
pre-selection of candidates in safe seats may depend more on the party
selection committees perception of candidates loyalty to the party than
their dedication to the constituency. Bogdanor argues that the MPs career
depends more upon his party than upon his constituency. An MP can often
survive unpopularity in his constituency provided that relations with his
local party remain good; but, if he loses the support of his local party,
his political career will usually be at an end.
In Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and pre-1996 New Zealand, the
nature of the electoral system requires voters to express both their constituency
candidate preference and their party government preference in the one vote.
Voters cannot separate their choice of member from their choice of government.
Where these preferences differ the voters preferred candidate is not
a representative of the preferred party the voters desire to vote for
their government of choice may prevent them from holding their representative
to account. In Westminster-derived democracies, where party identification
is the pre-eminent attitudinal influence on voting behaviour, the probability
that voters will use their vote to reprimand an unpopular MP or reward
a popular one is diminished.
Party Dominance and the Personal Vote
The influence of party identification, attitudes to party leaders and attitudes
to constituency candidates on voting behaviour has been measured in all
four countries. Although it is accepted that party identification dominates
voters electoral decisions, scholars argue over the extent to which a
personal vote for candidates exists independent of party preference.
In one of the seminal texts on the topic, The Personal Vote, Cain, Ferejohn
and Fiorina define the personal vote as:
that portion of a candidates electoral support which originates in his
or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record. The
part of the vote that is not personal includes support for the candidate
based on his or her partisan affiliation, fixed voter characteristics such
as class, religion and ethnicity, reactions to national conditions such
as the state of the economy, and performance evaluations centred on the
head of the governing party.14
The influence of a candidates personal qualities and activities on mass
voting behaviour in parliamentary democracies has traditionally been considered
to be small. In 1955, Milne and MacKenzie described the belief that the
personal qualities of a candidate are of little importance in winning votes,
as so widespread that it was no longer a paradox but a platitude.15
Similarly, Cross argues that Canadian MPs lack a personal mandate. All
studies of Canadian political behaviour tell us that the vast majority
of voters use their single ballot to express their preference for a governing
party (and preferred Prime Minister) even though the only names appearing
on the ballot are those of the candidates for the their local riding.
However, a number of scholars have demonstrated that the personal vote
does exist in parliamentary democracies, and that while it may be small,
it can play a significant role in marginal constituencies. In their comparison
of the personal vote in the US and the UK, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina conclude
that although the electoral advantage which accrues to a hard-working
congressman is far greater than that occurring to a similarly hard-working
MP, the efforts of the MP do have a discernible effect
which may be
growing in importance. In Australia, Bean has demonstrated that the personal
vote is a real, if modest, component in the mix of factors that combine
to determine party choice in Australian federal elections in the lower
house, with an impact of between 2 and 3 per cent of the vote. Similarly,
Ferejohn and Gains have found some evidence of the development of the
personal vote in Canada, where the opportunity for incumbent MPs to develop
a favourable personal reputation in their constituencies can affect their
electoral success. Docherty estimates that the effects of incumbency average
between 3% and 5% in Canada, which may provide the winning margin in
a close race.
Electoral reform has provided a rare opportunity to examine the extent
to which the support for electorate MPs is independent of support for their
party. In an MMP system, each voter casts two votes: one for their preferred
candidate and one for their preferred party. Three elections in New Zealand
using this system have established a pattern where the two major parties,
Labour and National, win most of the electorate seats, while the minor
parties win most of their seats via the party vote. In 1996, 37 per cent
of voters split their vote, dropping to 35 per cent in 1999 and rising
to 39 per cent in 2002. In practice, this means that the majority of Labour
and National electorate MPs win more votes than their parties in each electorate.
Particularly popular MPs may win twice as many votes as their parties.
In most Western democracies, with the notable exception of the United States,
representative government is party government.
However, the high proportion of split-ticket voting is by no means all
about personal voting. A large proportion of split votes are due to tactical
voting where voters recognise that a minor party candidate is unlikely
to win in their local district so split their votes between a minor party
and a major party candidate.
Despite evidence to support the existence of a personal vote in Canada,
the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, it is important to be reminded
of the dominant influence of party identification plays on voting behaviour.
For example, in Beans test of variables influencing voting in the 1987
Australian Federal Election, the influence of party identification on voting
was over six times stronger than the effect of attitudes towards local
Implications for Electoral Reform
Over the past decade, the electoral reform debate has entered the mainstream
political agenda in Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. In Canada,
five provinces and one territory are currently considering electoral reform.
The federal government has also pledged to investigate reform options at
the national level. In the United Kingdom, the Independent Commission on
the Voting System recommended electoral system reform in 1998. In New
Zealand, a majority of voters in the 1993 referendum on electoral reform
supported changing from the existing FPP plurality system to the more proportional
MMP system. Australia has been the exception to this trend. Arguably,
the lack of salience of this issue in Australia may be due to introduction
of a PR electoral system for the Australian Senate in 1948, which has facilitated
the representation of minor parties in the upper house and tempered the
major party dominance of the political system that has contributed to calls
for electoral reform in the other three countries.
The desire to maintain the close relationship between representatives and
their constituencies has influenced the electoral system options that have
been considered. In British Columbia, the Citizens Assembly on Electoral
Reform selected local representation as one of its three key criteria for
assessing potential reform options for the province. The Assemblys interim
report states that:
Our tradition has long valued a system of representation that provides
for local representation for its politicians to speak for and answer
to distinctive communities that make up the whole province. Citizens believe
it is important that the interests of their particular communities be represented
in public debate and policy-making. This is accomplished when MLAs have
an intimate knowledge of the communities they represent and the concerns
of the people in them. 17
In particular, members of the Assembly from large, rural ridings were wary
of any electoral system that would increase the size of their electoral
districts. The Assemblys decision to recommend a Single Transferable Vote
(STV) system, rather than a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system was
partly based on the fact that an STV system, despite having multi-member
districts, would maintain the same ratio of representatives to constituents
as the current system. In contrast, under MMP, district MLAs would each
represent a larger number of constituents in significantly expanded ridings.
Assembly members hope that MLAs in multi-member districts would continue
to act as local representatives. Since the adoption of STV for national
elections in Ireland in 1922, a majority of Irish voters have twice voted
to retain the electoral system in referenda held in 1959 and 1968. Members
of the Dáil are renowned for their emphasis on local constituency issues,
although scholars remain divided over the extent to which this is due to
the electoral system or the localism of Irish political culture.
The need to maintain local representation also influenced the decision
of the Prince Edward Island Reform Commission in 2003. Like British Columbia,
the Commission narrowed the final choice for a reform option to the STV
and MMP systems. However, the small geographic size of the province facilitated
the Commissions final recommendation in favour of MMP. The Carruthers
Report identifies the desire of Prince Edward Islanders to maintain a single,
local representative as a key factor influencing this decision. The one
thing that did come across loud and clear at the public meetings was the
request to keep District Members of the Legislative Assembly even though
their number may be reduced. Islanders want to be able to identify with
their District MLA and the Commission respects this fact. 18
Recommendations to introduce MMP in both Quebec and New Brunswick not only
strive to maintain geographic representation by retaining a smaller number
of single member constituencies but also by advocating the use of regional
party lists. Rather than allocating compensatory list seats on the basis
of a partys support throughout the entire province, distributing list
seats on the basis of the partys strength in smaller regional districts
sacrifices an element of the electoral systems proportionality in order
to ensure that all representatives, whether elected directly in a constituency
or via the party list, serve a geographically defined region. Massicotte
acknowledges that province-wide list seat allocation reduces the level
of distortion involved in translating votes to seats but argues that that
this solution will seem undesirable to most Quebec citizens. Deep down,
they are accustomed to linking an MNA [Member of the National Assembly]
to an identifiable territory. 19 Similarly, the New Brunswick Commission
on Legislative Democracy envisages that regional list MLAs will also act
as geographic representatives. List MLAs would undertake constituency service,
and provide voters who did not support their constituency MLA with an alternative
local representative. The Commission predicts that this may spawn competition
among MLAs from the same region to provide better constituency service,
something voters would likely appreciate.20
tension between constituency and regional list members in Wales has recently
prompted the Richard Commission to recommend replacing the Welsh mixed system
with STV, proponents of regional lists for mixed systems in Canadian provinces
remain confident that such competition will benefit voters, if not politicians.
The Law Commission of Canada has also recommended the introduction of MMP
at the national level. In order to maintain the current number of seats
in Parliament while creating a number of party list seats to compensate
parties that do not win a number of ridings that is proportionate to their
share of the votes, the number of ridings must be reduced by increasing
the size of riding boundaries. However, diluting the link between MPs and
their constituents through larger ridings was of less concern to the Law
Commission than to provincial reformers. The Commission explained:
at various points throughout the Commissions consultation process, we
heard from citizens who suggested that although the link between constituents
and Members of Parliament is important, this concept might not fully reflect
contemporary Canadian values and experiences. Todays highly mobile and
diverse citizens often identify themselves with communities of interest
that are not geographically determined, or that lie outside their community
of residence. It may therefore be somewhat limiting to conceptualise our
electoral system primarily on the basis of territorial constituencies.
Electoral reform commissions in the United Kingdom and New Zealand have
wrestled with similar concerns. Crewe argues that the 1976 Hansard Society
Commission rejected the traditional reform option in the United Kingdom,
the Single Transferable Vote (STV), in favour of a mixed system, in deference
to a strong feeling for the single-member constituency. In 1998, the Jenkins
Commission also recommended a two vote mixed-system as the best alternative
for Britain. The Commission recommended that 80-85 per cent of MPs should
continue to be elected on an individual constituency basis, although using
the majoritarian Alternative Vote system rather than the current FPP method,
while the remaining top-up members should be elected with a second vote
for an open party list. Rather than using a more proportional nation-wide
constituency for the election of top-up members, as is the case in Germany
and New Zealand, the Commission recommended that in the interests of local
accountability and providing additional members with a broad constituency
link, additional members should be elected using small top-up areas, such
as the existing counties or equivalently sized metropolitan districts.
In New Zealand, the Royal Commission on the Electoral System also recommended
a mixed system in 1986, in order to combine proportional representation
with the traditional representation of constituents using geographically
defined electorates. The Commission noted that, the ability of constituents
to take up their concerns through an MP with specific responsibilities
to the local community is a healthy feature of our system which protects
the rights of citizens and enhances the specific role of Parliament in
attending to grievances.
Evaluating electoral systems according to their capacity to maintain geographic
representation restricts the options that can be considered, excluding,
for example, the list-PR systems used in much of continental Europe. It
also changes the nature of the inevitable trade-off that is involved when
assessing alternative systems. Geographic representation can often only
be achieved at a cost. For example, more women are elected to the legislature
in list-PR electoral systems than in systems based on single member first
past the post districts.22 This is because closed party lists can be
used to increase the representation of women or members of minority ethnic
groups through mechanisms such as quotas or zipping, where parties attempt
to balance the representation of demographic groups in their selection
of list candidates. In contrast, Carty has documented the resistance of
decentralised Canadian constituency associations to national party reforms
designed to increase the social representativeness of Canadian MPs. Over
eighty per cent of both Conservative and Liberal constituency association
presidents agreed with a survey statement that, Complaints about a lack
of opportunities for women are exaggerated. They could easily get ahead
in our riding if they just got more involved. 23
Carty concludes that
the constituency-based structure of Canadian parties has made it more difficult
for parties to respond to wider societal pressures, such as calls to address
the under-representation of women and ethnic minorities.
Arguably, geographic representation may come at the cost of greater social
diversity within the legislature.
In addition, as discussed above, the emphasis on geographic representation
in New Zealand, Quebec and New Brunswick precludes the consideration of
alternative representational roles for list members. Barker and Levine
argue that the introduction of MMP in New Zealand provided an opportunity
for list MPs to develop a distinctive parliamentary role.
This new group of MPs could articulate the philosophy of their party; act
on behalf of the interests of a particular sector of society; focus exclusively
on a particular issue; or seek to exercise their judgement on behalf of
the national interest. The existence of parliamentarians concentrating
solely on the development of policy expertise could enable parties to utilise
their resources MPs better in parliament and so carry out more efficiently
their various parliamentary functions.24
Instead, New Zealand list MPs function as shadow electorate representatives
and are described as 55 MPs in search of a constituency. Reform proposals
in New Brunswick and Quebec explicitly identify list members as representatives
of specific regions within each province.
Geographic representation has traditionally defined the link between MPs
and their constituents in Westminster parliamentary systems. However, this
essay has demonstrated that there is legitimate cause to question the cultural
attachment to single-member constituencies in Westminster democracies.
The close relationship between representatives and their constituencies
is exaggerated. Alternative agencies exist to redress constituents grievances
and it is questionable whether the majority of voters value the casework
role undertaken by their local MP. The link between the vote for a Member
of Parliament and the vote for the government in FPP and Alternative Vote
systems limits the ability of voters to hold their representatives accountable,
unless they are willing to sacrifice their opportunity to express their
preference for the party of government.
The desire to preserve the close relationship between representatives and
their constituencies has influenced the electoral reform process in Canada,
the United Kingdom and New Zealand by limiting potential options to electoral
systems that are compatible with geographic representation. In New Zealand,
the potential for list MPs to fulfil alternative representative roles by
representing group interests or dedicating their work to particular policy
issues, has not been investigated due to the dominant conception of representation
as tied to a geographic constituency. Crewe has described the attachment
to single-member constituencies in the United Kingdom as based on sentiment
rather than evidence.25 The idea of a close relationship between the
representative and their constituents is a key component of the political
culture in Canada, the United Kingdom Australia and New Zealand, regardless
of the reality of party politics in all four countries. Is geographic representation
still a sufficiently important feature of Westminster parliamentary systems
to justify restricting the options for electoral system reform?
1. Vernon Bogdanor, Introduction, in Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler
(eds), Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and their Political Consequences,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 2.
2. Edmund Burke, Speech to the electors of Bristol, Works, London: S
& C Rivington, 1774.
3. Donley Studlar and Ian McAllister, Constituency Activity and Representative
Roles among Australian Legislators, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 58,
no. 1, February 1996, pp. 73.
4. Heinz Eulau and Paul Karps, The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying
Components of Responsiveness, in Heinz Eulau and John Wahlke, The Politics
of Representation: Continuities in Theory and Research, London: Sage Publications,
1987, p. 62.
5. Donald Searing, The Role of the Good Constituency Member and the Practice
of Representation in Great Britain, Journal of Politics, Vol. 47, 1985,
6. Donley Studlar and Ian McAllister, The Electoral Connection in Australia:
Candidates Roles, Campaign Activity, and the Popular Vote, in Political
Behaviour, Vol. 16, no. 3, 1994, p. 385.
7. Richard Fenno, Jr., Home Style: House Members in their Districts, Boston:
Little Brown, 1978.
8. See David Docherty, Mr Smith Goes to Ottawa: Life in the House of Commons,
Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997, p. 195.
9. Ivor Crewe, MPs and their Constituents in Britain: How Strong are the
Links?, in Vernon Bogdanor (ed), Representatives of the People? Parliamentarians
and Constituents in Western Democracies, Aldershot: Gower, 1985, p. 57.
10. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency
Service and Electoral Independence, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1987. p. 54.
11. Ivor Crewe, MPs and their Constituents in Britain: How Strong are
the Links?, in Vernon Bogdanor (ed), Representatives of the People? Parliamentarians
and Constituents in Western Democracies, Aldershot: Gower, 1985, p. 44.
12. Jack Vowles, The Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand, International
Political Science Review, Vol. 16, no. 1, 1995, p. 110.
13. Jonathan Boston, Elizabeth McLeay, Stephen Levine and Nigel Roberts,
New Zealand Under MMP, Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1996.
14. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency
Service and Electoral Independence, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1987, p. 9.
15. R.S. Milne and H.C. MacKenzie, Straight Fight: A Study of Voting Behaviour
in the Constituency of Bristol North-East at the General Election of 1951,
London: The Hansard Society, 1954, p 121.
16. Bill Cross, Members of Parliament, Voters and Democracy in the Canadian
House of Commons, Parliamentary Perspectives, Ottawa: Canadian Study of
Parliament Group, Number 3, October 2000, pp. 9-10.
17. Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform, A Preliminary Statement to
the People of British Columbia, Vancouver, Spring 2004, p. 5.
18. The Hon. Norman H. Carruthers, 2003 Prince Edward Island Electoral
Reform Commission Report, Charlottetown, 18 December 2003, p. 83.
19. Louis Massicotte, In Search of a Compensatory Mixed Electoral System
for Québec, Working Document, Montreal, 2004, p. 164.
20. Commission on Legislative Democracy, Final Report and Recommendations,
Fredericton, New Brunswick, 31 December 2004, p. 35.
21. Law Commission of Canada, Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada,
Ottawa, 2004, p. 65.
22. David Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction, Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2001, pp. 165-66.
23. R.K. Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, Royal
Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Research Studies Volume
23, Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991, p. 231.
24. Fiona Barker and Stephen Levine, The Individual Parliamentary Member
and Institutional Change: The Changing Role of the New Zealand Member of
Parliament, in Lawrence Longley and Reuven Hazan (eds), The Uneasy Relationships
between Parliamentary Members and Leaders, London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp.
25. Crewe, 1985, p. 22.