Le Contrôle Parlementaire de la
Législation Déléguée, prepared by the Task Force on Subordinate Legislation,
National Assembly, Quebec, 1983,159 p.
Members of the National Assembly want some
control over regulations drafted to accompany legislation and are prepared to
go as far as to disallow a proposed regulation, if necessary. This is just one
of the recommendations of the Task Force on Subordinate Legislation. Co-chaired
by Messrs. Denis Vaugeois and Richard French, the Task Force included eight
other MNAs, Jacques Baril, Réjean Doyon, Maurice Dupré, Henri LeMay, Pierre
Paradis and Roland Dussault, the latter replacing Mr. Richard Guay who became
Speaker of the National Assembly in March 23, 1983. The report was made public
on August 24, 1983.
The question of subordinate legislation has
been the focus of considerable attention recently. In 1982, the National
Assembly passed seventeen new laws and thirty-seven pieces of amending
legislation, whereas the government administration adopted 350 new regulations
and 450 amending regulations. Unlike laws, these regulations, which are the
exclusive fiefdom of the administration, are adopted without public input or
knowledge. Yet, they spell out the methods, terms, rules, standards, qualities
and conditions according to which laws are implemented. In 1981, Mr. Raoul
Barbe compiled all existing regulations into ten volumes each containing 950
pages. More regulations have since been adopted. On this subject, the Task
Force notes that the impact of such a considerable number of regulations is
obvious. Some people are protected, and even overprotected by these
regulations. Others find their actions hindered and sometimes even paralyzed as
a result of them.
In a bid to resolve this dilemma, the Task
Force unanimously endorsed two main recommendations, namely that a Regulations
Act be adopted to establish a framework within which regulatory authority could
be exercised and that a specific system for exercising parliamentary control
over subordinate legislation be implemented.
Proposed legislation should provide for the
monitoring of the regulation-making process by the Ministry of Justice, their
publication at least ninety days before adoption, and an analysis of the impact
of the regulations. The main component of this legislation would be the
creation of a specialized forum, namely a committee of the National Assembly to
deal exclusively with the control of subordinate legislation. The committee
could, if necessary, delegate responsibility for this matter to a subcommittee.
Members would be appointed to the committee for the duration of the legislature
and would be supported in their duties by a staff of experts in the field.
Members of this committee or subcommittee
could select which draft regulations they would examine in depth to ascertain
their legality and/or advisability. Where necessary, the committee could
initiate a debate on the timeliness, effectiveness, merit and even necessity of
the proposed regulation. Parliamentarians would be free to hold public hearings
and to call the authors of the draft regulations to testify before the
committee.
To make the committee more than a mere
formality, the legislation would authorize it to report to the National
Assembly and eventually to report on its negotiations with the administration
about a draft regulation, to denounce practices and to initiate discussions and
debates. If negotiations to have a draft regulation amended proved fruitless,
the committee could even go as far as to request that the draft regulation be
disallowed.
The power to disallow regulations is based
on a measure in use in the Australian Parliament. A minimum of five MNAs
representing at least two political parties could table a motion of
disallowance which would be debated in the National Assembly. Unless it is put
to a vote within a reasonable period of time, the motion of disallowance would
come into effect and the draft regulation would be withdrawn. Of course a
motion of disallowance should not be viewed as a vote of non confidence in the
government. Otherwise, it would be impossible to break party ranks and this
would prevent the control system from functioning effectively. According to
Messrs. Vaugeois and French, where regulations are concerned, many MNAs would
not hesitate to take advantage of the freedom to vote according to their
conscience.
While this committee would be responsible
for exercising some control over draft regulations, each committee of the
National Assembly could assume some control over regulations already in force.
Any committee could decide to review an entire area, such as all regulations
governing construction. Their task would be to verify the timeliness,
effectiveness and merit of the regulations under review and to table a report
to the National Assembly.
The document concludes with an annotated
bibliography listing seventy-six documents on subordinate legislation from
various countries.
Yvon Thériault, Indexing and Bibliographic Service, Library of the
National Assembly, Quebec City