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David Gussow
On March 20, 2006 the Ethics Commissioner of the House of Commons issued
a report on an allegation that Prime Minister Stephen Harper contravened
the rules of conduct set out in the Conflict of Interest Code for Members
of the House of Commons by offering an inducement to David Emerson, the
newly re-elected Liberal member of Parliament for Vancouver-Kingsway, to
join the Cabinet of the new Conservative government. His conclusion was
that neither Mr. Harper nor Mr. Emerson contravened any of the specific
sections of the Members Code. And he accepted Mr. Emersons claim that
accepting Mr. Harpers offer seemed, at least to him, a way to better serve
his city, province and country. However the Ethics Commissioner stated
that the discontent expressed by Canadians on this matter cannot be attributed
merely to the machinations of partisan politics. Fairly or unfairly, this
particular instance has given many citizens a sense that their vote the
cornerstone of our democratic system was somehow devalued, if not betrayed.
Relative to the Office of the Ethics Commissioner, this disquiet is reflected
in the gap between the values underlying the principles of the Members
Code and the detailed conflict of interest rules within the Code itself.
The gap can only be addressed through rigorous political debate and the
development, through the political process, of the appropriate policies
to address it." This topic will certainly be an issue of debate in the
39th Parliament. The present article outlines how our perspective on what
constitutes a conflict of interest has changed over the years, particularly
insofar as accepting a position in the cabinet is concerned. It offers
some ideas about how to eliminate the possibility of similar situations
in the future.
One of the topical questions at the moment is whether it is a conflict
of interest for a Member of Parliament to cross the floor and become a
cabinet minister. The quick answer as far as the Parliament of Canada Act
is concerned is that it is not. The Act specifically provides an exemption
for all cabinet ministers as set out in sections 32, 33 and 35 as follows:
Division B: Conflict of Interest
32. (1) Except as specially provided in this Division
no person accepting
or holding any office, commission or employment, permanent or temporary,
in the service of the Government of Canada, at the nomination of the Crown
or at the nomination of any of the officers of the Government of Canada,
to which any salary, fee, wages, allowance emolument or profit of any kind
is attached
is eligible to be a member of the House of Commons or shall
sit or vote therein.
33. (2) Nothing in this Division renders ineligible to be a member of the
House of Commons, or disqualifies from sitting or voting therein, any member
of the Queens Privy Council for Canada by reason only that the member
is
a Minister
and receives a salary in respect of that position
if the member
is elected while holding that
position or is, at the date when nominated
by the Crown for that
position, a member of the House of Commons
35. If any member of the House of Commons accepts any office or commission
that, by virtue of this Division, renders a person incapable of being elected
to, or of sitting or voting in, the House of Commons, the seat of the member
is vacated and the members election becomes void.
As one can see the crucial words that are emphasized above provide all
members of the cabinet, including the prime minister, with a blanket exemption.
What is not generally known is that for nearly half of the time after Confederation
whenever there was a change in the political party forming the government
every cabinet minister with a salary, including the prime minister, to
avoid what is today considered a conflict of interest, vacated their seats
in the House of Commons and ran in a by-election1.
Only when the member was re-elected in a by-election was he allowed to
hold the paid position of a cabinet minister at the same time as being
a member of the House of Commons. This was the case for the ministries
of Alexander Mackenzie in 1873, Sir John A. Macdonald in 1878, Wilfrid
Laurier in 1896, Robert Borden in 1911, William L. M. King in 1921 and
1926, Arthur Meighen in 19262, and Richard B. Bennett in 1930. In the
last case this was governed by sections 10, 13, 14 and 16 of the Senate
and House of Commons Act that existed in 1927 (prior to that comparable
provisions applied). This Act provided as follows:
Independence of Parliament: Members
of the House of Commons
10. Except as hereinafter specially provided
no person accepting or holding
any office, commission or employment, permanent or temporary, in the service
of the Government of Canada, at the nomination of the Crown or at the nomination
of any of the officers of the Government of Canada, to which any salary,
fee, wages, allowance, emolument or profit of any kind is attached
shall
be eligible as a member of the House of Commons or shall sit or vote therein
13. Nothing in this Act contained shall render ineligible, as aforesaid,
any
person holding
any office
to be held by a member of the Kings Privy
Council for Canada and entitling him to be a minister of the Crown, or
shall disqualify any such person to sit or vote in the House of Commons,
if he is elected while he holds such office and is not otherwise disqualified.
14. Whenever any person, member of the Kings Privy Council holding
any
office
entitling him to be a minister of the Crown, and being at the same
time a member of the House of Commons, resigns his office, and, within
one month of his resignation, accepts any of the said offices, he shall
not thereby vacate his seat, unless the administration of which he was
a member has resigned, and a new administration has been formed and has
occupied the said offices3.
16. If any member of the House of Commons accepts any office or commission
for
which any public money of Canada is paid
the seat of such member shall
thereby be vacated, and his election shall thenceforth be null and void.
When this act was amended and the need for a by-election for all cabinet
ministers in those circumstances was dispensed with in 19314, the very
point of a member crossing the floor to become a cabinet minister was raised
by three of the six members who spoke against the bill5.
During the debate for the House to go into committee on the bill in July
1931 Fernand Rinfret suggested that in 1920 the only reason that an opposition
member had not been appointed to the cabinet was because he would have
had to run in a by-election. He pointed out that when a new minister is
called from the ranks of his own party it does not matter very much if
he has not to submit to re-election by his constituents
but when
the government
tries to seduce a member from the opposition party
to accept a portfolio,
then I do say that the necessity for the minister to be re-elected by his
constituency is a very important safeguard.6 Charles Marcil spoke on
the same motion as follows: I believe that if a member who was elected
walks
over to the other side of the house and accepts a portfolio with a different
party, it is only fair that his constituents, whose representative he is,
should be consulted on the new stand he takes.7
And when Ernest Lapointe
spoke during committee study he said the following: If a government goes
to another group in the house and invites to the cabinet a member who has
been elected by his constituents to oppose the government, and that gentleman
is willing to accept the invitation, I object to his transferring his electors
with him to the government side. That is my strongest objection to the
bill
8.
Samuel Jacobs, who supported the measure, was the last speaker on the bill
and had this to say: There has been some suggestion that members from
another side of the house might be purchased. That might be.
The electors
will deal with them in due time. Any person who sells himself for the
temporary pleasure or advantage of being a member of the cabinet, will
find he has been living, so to speak, for a short time only in a fools
paradise.9
Back to the Future?
When it comes to members crossing the floor to become Ministers as in the
case of David Emerson in 2006, Belinda Stronach in 2005 and Jack Horner
in 1977 maybe it is time to revert, in part, to the law that existed from
the time of confederation to 1931.
It could be reinstated for members that cross the floor to become cabinet
ministers. That way there would be no apparent conflict of interest. It
could entail adding a few words to sub-section (2) along with a new sub-section
(2.1) to section 33 of the Parliament of Canada Act to remove those members
from the exemption from ineligibility, possibly to read as follows:
(2) Nothing in this Division renders ineligible to be a member of the House
of Commons, or disqualifies from sitting or voting therein, any member
of the Queens Privy Council for Canada by reason only that the member
is
a Minister
and receives a salary in respect of that position
if the member
is elected with the same political affiliation on the ballot as the Prime
Minister while holding that
position or is, at the date when nominated
by the Crown for that
position, a member of the House of Commons last elected
with the same political affiliation on the ballot as the Prime Minister.
(2.1) With respect to sub-section (2), if the Prime Minister is not a member
of the House of Commons then the person recognized as the Leader of the
Government in the House of Commons is substituted therefor.10
The above provisions, if they had been in effect, would have applied to
the cases of Mr. Horner, Ms Stronach and Mr. Emerson. In the three cases,
the prerogative of the Prime Minister to invite who he would want in his
cabinet would have been unfettered, but their seats in the House of Commons
would have been vacated and they would have had to run in a by-election.
Or conversely, if they had not wanted to run in a by-election, it would
not have denied them the option of crossing the floor and remaining a member
of the House of Commons, but they would not have been able to accept a
cabinet position until they had run in the next general election.
The electors eventually pronounced on the cases of Mr. Horner and Ms Stronach.
If it is desired that the electors should be allowed to decide sooner than
a general election on the case of Mr. Emerson, then if any legislation
were contemplated a transitional provision could be included. A possible
wording would be as follows:
Thirty days following Royal Assent being given to this Act, the seat of
any member of the House of Commons not elected with the same political
affiliation on the ballot as the Prime Minister who holds any office in
the service of the Government of Canada, at the nomination of the Crown,
to which any salary, fee, wages, allowance, emolument or profit of any
kind is attached is vacated and the members election becomes void.
In drafting and debating such a change a couple of subsidiary points need
to be kept in mind. First if we ever change to Proportional Representation
and coalition governments become the norm the aforementioned change would
require any coalition members of the cabinet to run in by-elections confirming
their participation in cabinet. This could be addressed by some further
wording in the exemption such as: or any party in coalition with the
Prime Ministers party.
Secondly Parliamentary Secretaries are also receiving a salary and fall
within the ambit of the legislation. It may be desirable, for those that
cross the floor, to include some wording in their exemption as well.
Notes
1. Not counting the coalition ministry where Prime Minister Borden remained
as prime minister in 1917. In any event, the coalition ministry was formed
after a dissolution and all members of the cabinet ran in the general election.
2. The Prime Minister vacated his seat which would have resulted in a by-election
but a general election ensued almost immediately obviating the necessity
of a by-election.
3. It should be noted that when Prime Ministers Abbott and Borden resigned
in 1892 and 1920 respectively, the continuing cabinet ministers with the
new Prime Ministers Thompson and Meighen did not vacate their seats. Presumably
if there were a continuing cabinet minister with a change in the administration
to the opposition then this section would have applied.
4. Chapter 52 of the Statutes of Canada, 1931; 21-22 Geo V. Parts I-II.
An Act to remove the necessity of the re-election of Members of the House
of Commons of Canada on acceptance of office.
5. Altogether twelve members spoke on the bill (not counting questioners)
with six supporting and six against. Interestingly it started as a Private
Members' Bill introduced by a member of the official opposition and was
taken over as a Government Bill by the Minister of Justice after it was
voted off the agenda. The others who spoke in support were two members
of the U.F.A. (later joining the C.C.F.) an independent and another member
of the official opposition. The three members that spoke against the bill
for other reasons were the Leader of the Opposition, the Deputy Speaker
(a government member) and another member of the official opposition.
6. Debates of the House of Commons, July 23, 1931, p. 4089.
7. Ibid., July 23, 1931, p. 4090.
8. Ibid., July 23, 1931, p. 4091.
9. Ibid., July 23, 1931, p. 4094.
10. Parliamentary Counsel would have to confirm definitive wording and
verify whether any provision of the Constitution Act of 1982 or other Act
might apply.
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