At the time this article was
written Michel Beaupré was Assistant Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel for
the House of Commons
"Simultaneity of the use of
both English and French is required
throughout the process of enacting bills into law."
"All unilingually enacted
laws of the Manitoba Legislature are, and always have been, invalid and of no
force or effect."
With those few blunt statements,
the Supreme Court of Canada has, in the most dramatic case imaginable,
clarified the law on the legal effect of non-compliance with the constitutional
rules of legislative process by which the Canadian legislatures and Parliament
are governed. (1) We now know for a certainty that the effect of such
non-compliance is the utter nullity of the statutory product of the process.
Parliamentary Sovereignty and
Prior to the Manitoba Language
Rights case, the effect of non-compliance with procedural rules was
controversial. British courts consistently referred to Dicey's theory of
parliamentary supremacy and inevitably referred to Lord Campbell's dictum in
Edinburgh Railway Co. v. Wauchope (2)
All that a Court of Justice can do
is to look to the parliamentary roll: if from that it should appear that a bill
has passed both Houses and received the Royal assent, no Court of Justice can
inquire into the mode in which it was introduced into Parliament, nor into what
was done previous to its introduction, or what passed in Parliament during its
progress in its various stages through both Houses.
This has been called the theory of
When the same British courts turned
to Commonwealth constitutions, however, the results were uneven and, some would
even say, surprising, since such constitutions were written and provided the formal
authority to legislate. The dichotomy of opinion, however, soon suggested a
system of logic that permitted the harmonisation of Dicey's theory with the
traditional role of courts in the federal systems of other Commonwealth
Parliamentary supremacy was at
issue and was relied upon only when the procedural rules that a legislature
breached were contained in the Standing Orders of its assembly or in a statute
of the legislature. Thus mere breach of a standing order by the assembly was of
no legal consequence. Standing Orders have always been routinely overridden by
"leave" or unanimous consent of the members of an assembly. The
making and unmaking of its rules of procedure by simple order are the very
essence of the absolute privilege of a deliberative assembly4 to manage its own
internal affairs, and such action is therefore not reviewable in the courts.
Nor is failure to observe the Standing Orders. Such questions are raised by
point of order in the assembly and are finally determined by the Speaker,
unless they are appealable to the assembly.
The point was more recently
determined by the House of Lords in British Railways Board v. Pickin. Asked to
find that the Standing Orders respecting private bill procedure had been
breached, Lord Reid declared:
The function of the court is to
construe and apply the enactments of Parliament. The court has no concern with
the manner in which Parliament or its officers carrying out its Standing Orders
perform these functions. Any attempt to prove that they were misled by fraud or
otherwise would necessarily involve an inquiry into the manner in which they
had performed their functions in dealing with the Bill which became the British
Railways Act 1968.
And Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
It must be for Parliament to lay
down and to construe its Standing Orders and further to decide whether they
have been obeyed: it must be for Parliament to decide whether in any particular
case to dispense with compliance with such orders.5
When legislative process is governed
by ordinary statute, the issue of parliamentary supremacy is very real. The
result appears to be the same, although the logic is more difficult to
reconcile with the rule of law.
A mere order of the House would not
be considered in a court of law to be, strictly speaking, sufficient to
override a statute directed to the internal procedure of the House. That,
however, was the effect of the decision in Bradlaugh v. Gossett which stands
for the following proposition:6
¼ a resolution of the House of
Commons only cannot change the law of the land. ¼ and yet, if the House of
Commons is ¼ the absolute judge of its own privileges, it is obvious that it
can¼ practically change or practically supersede the law.
A further statement in the same
case reinforces the impact of parliamentary privilege on the judicial review of
non-compliance by a House of Parliament with a statutory rule of procedure:7
¼ the House of Commons is not
subject to the control of Her Majesty's Courts in its administration of that
part of the statute-law which has relation to its own internal proceedings .¼
Statutes governing legislative
process are quite rare but do exist. The controlling factor of parliamentary
privilege suggests that it is not advisable to legislate parliamentary procedure
where another avenue is available.
Constitutional Rules of
These preliminary remarks on the
unenforceability of Standing Orders and statutes that purport to bind
legislatures to a special process serve to place in stark contrast the effect of
non-compliance by legislatures with constitutionally entrenched rules of
Section 133, Constitution Act, 1867
The Manitoba Language Rights
reference has set procedural standards for the Canadian Parliament and
legislatures that they may not be honouring in every case.
For example, Standing Order 110 of
the House of Commons reads as follows:
110. All bills shall be printed
before second reading in the English and French languages.
The implication of the rule is that
bills may be introduced and receive first reading in one language, which has
occurred from time to time. That, however, would appear to amount to a
technical breach of section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 as interpreted by
the Supreme Court of Canada in the Manitoba case. Simultaneity of the use of
both languages is required throughout the process.
An earlier version of Standing
Order 110 was clearly in breach of the constitutional rule as we now understand
it. Between 1867 and 1876, the bilingual process was governed by Standing Order
93 which read as follows:
93. All Bills shall be printed,
before the Second Reading, in both languages, with the exception of Bills
exclusively relating to any one or more Provinces other than the Province of
Quebec, which may be printed in English only, unless otherwise required by The
House; or Bills merely continuing Acts, or other short Bills of minor
importance, with the printing of which The Speaker or the House may dispense.
Presumably, an Act that went
through the entire process in English only, although in conformity with
Standing Order 93, is and always has been invalid and of no force or effect. On
the other hand, a bill that was introduced and received first reading in
English only but that cleared every subsequent stage of the process in both
languages presents a more difficult question. One could argue that in the
latter case, there has been substantial compliance with section 133 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, particularly in the light of its rather general language:
133. Either the English or the
French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the
Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both
those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those
Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any
Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under
this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec.
The Acts of the Parliament of Canada
and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both those
Languages. [Emphasis added].
A very recent case that opens the
door to the recognition of a doctrine of substantial compliance is the case of
Waite v. The Queen, a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal rendered on May
27, 1987 that turned on the interpretation of section 23 of the Manitoba Act,
1870, the Manitoba equivalent of section 133.
Under consideration was the scope
of the expression "the process of enacting bills into law" used by
the Supreme Court of Canada in the Manitoba Language Reference case when it
Simultaneity of the use of both
English and French is¼ required throughout the process of enacting bills into
law. [Emphasis added].
The facts of the case indicated
that the Order Paper and Notices, Votes and Proceedings and other documents of
record were not entirely bilingual. The court found as a matter of law that
there had not been full compliance with the requirement of the Supreme Court of
simultaneity of the use of both English and French throughout the enactment of
a bill into law.8
As for the language of the bill at
the various stages of the enactment process, the court found as a fact that royal
assent had been given to the bill in both languages and that it was so recorded
and signed by the Lieutenant-Governor and the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly
respectively. The three readings, however, were "recorded" or
endorsed in English only, and the court was not certain that the notation must
be endorsed in both languages.9
The Court of Appeal was unclear as
to whether or not the bill had actually been submitted to the Legislature in
both languages and whether both versions had been read three times. The court
appeared to attach less importance to this essential point than to the fact
that the Act was available to the public from the Queen's Printer in bill form
in both English and French as of July 2, 1985, several days after royal assent,
which took place on June 26, 1985.10
The court ruled that although there
were some deficiencies in the enactment process, the record pointed to
substantial compliance with s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, and that the
requirements of the section had therefore been met.11 One can only wonder what
the Supreme Court would say on similar facts.
One wonders also about the
importance of simultaneity of the use of both languages. Back in 1906 there was
apparently a problem with the federal statute revision and specifically with
the preparation of the French version. According to a recent article,12 and
according to Pigeon J.13, the 1906 Revised Statutes of Canada were brought into
force at first in the English version only. An Act respecting the Revised
Statutes, 1906, assented to on January 30, 1907, purported to ratify in section
3 what had already been proclaimed as the Revised Statutes under a 1903 Act,
which was the usual Act establishing the commission, their powers and the
enactment procedure (proclamation).
With the statutory ratification by
the Act of 1907 of the proclaimed English version and of a non-existent French
version, which had yet to be prepared and deposited with the Clerk of the
Parliaments,14 it is clear that there was a substantial hiatus between the
enactment of the English version and that of the French version of the Revised
Statutes of Canada, 1906. The implications of such a breach of the simultaneity
rule intended by section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 may be fully
realised when one considers another statement of the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Manitoba Language Reference case:15
The heart of the 1980 Act is s.
4(1), which authorises the bilingual promulgation of legislation in two stages:
(i) the enactment of a statute in one official language only; and (ii)
subsequent translation into the other official language. The translation, once
certified and deposited with the Clerk of the House, is deemed "valid and
of the same effect" as the formally enacted version.
This procedure is insufficient to
satisfy s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870. Bilingual enactment is required by s.
23 and unilingual enactment, followed by the later deposit of a translation, is
not bilingual enactment.
Other Constitutional Rules
The problems presented by section
133 and its sister provision, section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, are
manifold. However, other sections of the Constitution Act, 1867 may become
subject to judicial scrutiny as well. Sections 53 and 54 are the most obvious
candidates. Earlier courts, believing themselves bound by the dictum of Lord
Campbell, did not see these provisions as enforceable. They have since been
proved wrong, and not solely on the basis of the supremacy provision in section
52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Ranasinghe, which the Supreme Court followed
in the Manitoba Language Rights reference, established the common law rule that
courts would strike down "legislation" which on its face had not been
enacted in compliance with the rules of process prescribed by a written constitution.16
Eminent jurists have been confused
by the implications of the rule of conclusiveness, an offshoot of Dicey's
theory of supremacy. In his celebrated article entitled "Money Bills and
the Senate", Elmer Driedger characterizes sections 53 and 54 as follows:
Section 53 deals particularly with
an exclusive privilege of the Commons in relation to the Senate, and it is
reasonable to assume that section 18 does not deal with the kind of privilege
under discussion. Section 54 is a limitation on the House of Commons and not a
On the issue of a breach of those
provisions, he invokes conventional wisdom that did not see any scope for
On occasion, the Senate has amended
money bills and the question arises whether this can constitutionally be done.
In England the Lords have made amendments to money bills and the amendments
have been accepted by the Commons. This is regarded as a waiver of their
privilege. But can the Commons in Canada waive the privilege conferred by
section 53? It could hardly be contended that the Commons could confer a power
on the Senate in violation of the B.N.A. Act. But non-compliance with either
section 53 or 54 would apparently not affect the validity of the statute. Once
an act of Parliament has passed, it must be taken as the law so that when a
statute appears on its face to have been duly passed the courts must assume
that all things in respect of its passage have been rightly done.
If the validity of the statute
cannot be questioned then it would seem that the Commons could accept any
Senate amendment, and the statute, when it receives royal assent, must take
effect according to its terms. The enforcement of sections 53 and 54 would
therefore appear to be a matter for Parliament rather than the courts.17
In making his assertion, Driedger
referred to Edinburgh Railway v. Wauchope which, however, was a standing order,
not a constitutional, case. He also referred to the Canadian case of The King
v. Irwin. The court in that case decided that the Act in question did not fall
within the ambit of section 54 of the B.N.A. Act because it imposed fees for
service rather than a charge on public revenue; nevertheless, it repeated the
conventional wisdom of the English courts in respect to the legal effect of standing
orders and ordinary statutes embodying procedural rules, applying it to written
constitutions as well:18
¼ it is no part of the business of
the Court in construing a statute to enquire as to whether the legislature in
passing it did or did not proceed according to the lex parliamenti. It is a
matter of elementary law that when a statute appears on its face to have been
duly passed by a competent legislature, the courts must assume that all things
have been rightly done in respect of its passage through the legislature, and
cannot entertain any argument that there is a defect of parliamentary procedure
lying behind the Act as a matter of fact. It is a case where the maxim Omnia
praesumuntur rite esse acta applies with great force and rigour. It is for Parliament
to decide how they will proceed to legislate and it is only the concrete
embodiment of such legislation -- the statute itself -- that the Court is
called upon to construe.
An earlier case had asserted much
the same thing. In Powell v. Apollo Candle Co. Ltd., the Privy Council held
that an Australian constitutional provision similar to our section 53 was
directory in nature and that a failure to observe it did not have the effect of
rendering the bill or part of the bill ultra vires. The Court reiterated
that it was impossible to hold that the words of an Act, which do no more than
prescribe the mode of procedure with respect to certain bills, should have the
effect of limiting the operation of those bills.19
The most recent case prior to Re
Manitoba Language Rights was Re Agricultural Products Marketing,  2
S.C.R. 1198. One of the issues was the effect of a breach by Parliament of
section 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Laskin C.J. for a minority of four
judges avoided the issue by declining to characterize the levies or charges
imposed on the marketing of eggs as taxes:20
In the present case, I need not
come to any definite conclusion as to whether ss. 53 and 54 lay down
prescriptions which are cognizable in the Courts. In my opinion, for reasons
that follow, I do not agree that the levies authorised by s. 2(2) can be
characterized as taxes, having regard especially to the context in which
authority to impose or exact them is given. They are merely ingredients of a
regulatory scheme and fall to be considered as elements thereof.
Laskin's reasons are, however, of
some interest for their treatment of the British precedents, particularly of
the cases of Wauchope and Pickin, referred to above, that had been relied on by
the Ontario Court of Appeal:21
British precedents were relied upon
by the respondents although not based upon the terms of a fundamental written
constitution, and they were relied upon by MacKinnon J.A. in his holding that
conformity to s. 54 was not reviewable by the Courts once the legislation was
enacted. Reliance was also placed upon the preamble to the British North
America Act , referring to a "constitution similar in principle to that of
the United Kingdom". I do not think that this carries any force against express
enactment. It may help to identify constitutional elements just as the British
precedents may help to determine what is meant by any of the terms used in ss.
53 and 54, but I do not agree that they can control the determination of the
question whether obedience to the prescriptions of those sections is judicially
Pigeon J., writing for a majority
of five judges, agreed with Laskin's point that the levies could not be
characterized as taxes for the purposes of sections 53 and 54, but added the
Furthermore, ss. 53 and 54 are not
entrenched provisions of the constitution, they are clearly within those parts
which the Parliament of Canada is empowered to amend by s. 91(1). Absent a
special requirement such as in s. 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights , nothing
prevents Parliament from indirectly amending ss. 53 and 54 by providing for the
levy and appropriation of taxes in such manner as it sees fit, by delegation or
Although section 91(1) has been
repealed with the enactment of the amending procedure in Part V of the
Constitution Act, 1982, section 44 of that Part appears to be in the same
position as section 91(1) had been. One therefore wonders whether Pigeon J.
would be of the same view today whereby he would deem any breach of sections 53
or 54 to be an indirect amendment of those sections.
Because of the rule of law, to
which the Supreme Court attached such considerable importance in Re Manitoba
Language Rights, one wonders how, particularly in light of the primacy of the
constitution (section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982), a statute that is in
breach of the legislative process prescribed by the constitution can be deemed
to be a law amending it. One suspects that the Court today would have to
distinguish the dicta of the above-cited cases on the basis of its rejection in
Re Manitoba Language Rights of the existence of "directory"
provisions in the constitution23 and its clear and unanimous statement of
principle that legislation which had not been enacted in compliance with the
appropriate constitutional "manner and form" requirements was
invalid.24 What is interesting about the Court's most recent statement of
principle, which seems to put to rest the dicta referred to above, is that the
Court asserted the legal rule to be the same after 1982 as it had been
Section 52 of the Constitution Act,
1982 does not alter the principles which have provided the foundation for
judicial review over the years. In a case where constitutional manner and form
requirements have not been complied with, the consequence of such
non-compliance continues to be invalidity. The words "of no force or
effect" mean that a law thus inconsistent with the Constitution has no
force or effect because it is invalid.
While the case of Bribery
Commissioner v. Ranasinghe received only the briefest comment by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Re Manitoba Language Rights, it was approved by the Court
for its main proposition of the supremacy of the constitutional rules of the
legislative process. The case is therefore of signal importance to our
appreciation of the potential scope for judicial review of the legislative
process. The Ceylon constitution required a two-thirds majority vote of the
House of Representatives as certified on the bill by the Speaker in order to
validly amend the constitution in respect to the appointment of judicial
officers. Absent the Speaker's certificate, which was considered to be an
essential part of the legislative process, the Privy Council held that the
legislation was invalid and, in doing so, distinguished the earlier supremacy
cases of the British courts.26
The English authorities have taken
a narrow view of the court's power to look behind an authentic copy of the Act.
But in the Constitution of the United Kingdom there is no governing instrument
which prescribes the law-making powers and the forms which are essential to
those powers. There was, therefore, never such a necessity as arises in the
present case for the court to take any close cognisance of the process of
law-making. In Edinburgh Railway Co. v. Wauchope , however, Lord Campbell said:
"All that a court of justice can do is to look to the Parliamentary
roll." There seems no reason to doubt that in early times, if such a point
could have arisen as arises in the present case, the court would have taken the
sensible step of inspecting the original.
In a further statement, the Privy
¼ a legislature has no power to
ignore the conditions of law-making that are imposed by the instrument which
itself regulates its power to make law. This restriction exists independently
of the question whether the legislature is sovereign.¼
¼ where a legislative power is
given subject to certain manner and form, that power does not exist unless and
until the manner and form is complied with.27
Other than sections 133, 53 and 54,
additional provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 may present issues for
judicial review. Section 48 requires the presence of at least twenty members of
the House of Commons for it to exercise its powers. Section 35 requires the
presence of at least fifteen senators for the Senate to exercise its powers.
Section 55 governs the royal assent procedure.28 Finally, the entire Part V of
the Constitution Act, 1982 relates to the rules of procedure for the amendment
of the constitution itself. These latter rules, clearly, will be enforced
strictly by the courts.
The Problem of Parliamentary
A paper on judicial review of the
legislative process would hardly be complete without some comment on the
problem of parliamentary evidence.29 Much has been made in the past of the
dangers for courts to inquire into the internal affairs of a House of
Parliament. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, 1689 is pointed to as the bulwark
of parliamentary privilege that prohibits courts from embarking on such
inquiries. The theory of conclusiveness and Lord Campbell's dictum referred to
at the outset were part and parcel of judicial policy on the subject. Neatly
packaged, such policy became known as the "enrolment rule". The most
cogent explanation for the policy was given by the House of Lords in Pickin.30
For a century or more both
Parliament and the courts have been careful not to act so as to cause conflict
between them. ¼ It is well known that in the past there have been dangerous
strains between the law courts and Parliament-- dangerous because each
institution has its own particular role to play in our constitution, and
because collision between the two institutions is likely to impair their power
to vouchsafe those constitutional rights for which citizens depend on them. So
for many years Parliament and the courts have each been astute to respect the
sphere of action and the privileges of the other -- Parliament, for example, by
its sub judice rule, the courts by taking care to exclude evidence which might
amount to infringement of parliamentary privilege (for a recent example, see
Dingle v. Associated Newspapers Ltd.  2 Q.B. 405).
What should now be clear, at least
since the Manitoba Language Rights reference, is that in matters of
constitutional adjudication, the enrolment rule is dead. Whether it was ever,
strictly speaking, a rule of law, it has certainly not been part of Canadian judicial
policy for a considerable length of time. Canadian courts and, in particular,
the Supreme Court of Canada routinely read excerpts of Hansard into the
judicial record in constitutional cases. Although such practices are
technically breaches of parliamentary privilege,32 the United Kingdom and
Canadian parliaments have not insisted on that aspect of their privilege in
modern times. The problem with such a rule, which should now be considered no
more than a "dignified" area of the lex parliamenti, is that it
competes with a more compelling need for courts to fairly adjudicate
justiciable issues on the basis of all the available facts. When such issues
involve the compliance by parliaments with constitutional rules defining their
legislative processes, the application of any so-called theory of
conclusiveness or enrolment rule seems particularly inapt.
1. Re Manitoba Language Rights,
 1 S.C.R. 721 at pp. 775 and 767. A recent ruling by Speaker Carter
before the Legislative Assembly of Alberta (See Alberta Hansard, April 9, 1987,
pp. 698-701) on the legal question as to the right of a member to speak French
in the assembly appears to beg the very question suggested by our analysis
here: assuming the existence of a binding constitutional rule imposing a
bilingual legislative process or conferring a right to speak French in the
assembly, what is the effective remedy for non-compliance and what are the
limits to judicial review of the legislative process? In other words, how far
are the courts, on the one hand, and the legislatures, on the other, willing to
go to confront each other in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions?
These questions may be ultimately determined with the rendering of Supreme
Court of Canada decisions in cases such as Mercure v. A.G. of Saskatchewan
(decision reserved on November 27, 1986).
2. Edinburgh Railway Co. v.
Wauchope , (1842) 8 Cl. & F. 710, at p. 724 (H.L.).
3. See E.A. Driedger, Construction
of Statutes, (2d ed.), Butterworths (Toronto), 1983, p. 236.
4. Article 9, Bill of Rights, 1689,
1 Will. & Mary, Sess. 2, c. 2. See also May's Parliamentary Practice, 20th
ed., London, Butterworths, 1983, pp. 89-91, 212.
5. British Railways Board v.
Pickin,  A.C. 765, at pp. 787, 790. Specific approval of Lord Campbell's
dictum in Edinburgh Railway may be found at p. 790.
6. Bradlaugh v. Gossett , (1884) 12
Q.B. 271, at pp. 273-274 (Lord Coleridge, C.J.)
7. Ibid., p. 278 (Stephen J.).
8. Waite v. The Queen , unpublished
text of the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal dated May 27, 1987 at p.
9. Ibid ., p. 10.
10. Ibid ., pp. 7, 8, 9.
11. Ibid ., pp. 9, 10, 13.
12. Louis Côté, "The Federal
Statute Revision of 1906 and Section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867",
(1987) 47 Revue du Barreau 127.
13. The Queen v. Popovic,  2
S.C.R. 308, at p. 313.
14. Supra note 12, p. 136; section
10 of the 1907 Act.
15. Supra note 1, p. 776.
16. Bribery Commissioner v.
Ranasinghe ,  A.C. 172 (P.C.), approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra note 1, at pp. 742, 747.
17. E.A. Driedger, "Money
Bills and the Senate", (1968) 3 Ottawa Law Review 25, at pp. 45-46.
18. The King v. Irwin,  Ex.
C.R. 127, at p. 129.
19. Powell v. Apollo Candle Co. Ltd.,
(1885) 10 A.C. 282, at pp. 290-291.
20. Re Agricultural Products
Marketing,  2 S.C.R. 1198, at p. 1229.
21. Ibid., p. 1227.
22. Ibid ., p. 1291.
23. Supra note 1, p. 741. For an
interesting article criticizing the rigidity of the Court's views on this
point, see S.B. Horton, "The Manitoba Language Rights Reference and the
Doctrine of Mandatory and Directory Provisions", (1987), 10 Dal. L.J. 195.
24. Ibid., pp. 742, 746, 747.
25. Ibid., p. 746.
26. Bribery Commissioner v.
Ranasinghe,  A.C. 172 (P.C.) at pp. 194-195.
27. Ibid., pp. 197, 199.
28. See Gallant v. The King, 
2 D.L.R. 425 (P.E.I. S.C.), for a case of statutory invalidity based on the
legislature's failure to comply with section 55.
29. For a more comprehensive, although
now dated, look at this subject, see Katherine Swinton, "Challenging the
Validity of an Act of Parliament: The Effect of Enrolment and Parliamentary
Privilege", (1976) 14 Osgoode Hall L.J. 345.
30. Pickin v. British Railways
Board, supra note 5 at pp. 788 and 799.
31. See the recent definitive
statement of the Supreme Court in Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor
Vehicle Act, (1986) 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536, at pp. 550-555. The question of
parliamentary privilege was not mentioned. The debates and committee
proceedings were again referred to in the as yet unreported Supreme Court case
of Reference re Roman Catholic Separate High Schools, dated June 25, 1987.
32. See May's Parliamentary
Practice, supra note 4, p. 83, and Maingot, Parliamentary Privilege in Canada,
Butterworths, Toronto, 1982, pp. 116-122.