At the time this article was published
Réjean Landry was a professor in the Department of Political Science at Laval
University.
Nearly all legislation originates with the
government and is subject to little change by the National Assembly. This fact
alone, in the eyes of some, is proof of the domination of the legislative
process by the Executive. Debate on reform of parliamentary institutions
generally focuses on means of establishing a better balance between the
government and the private members in order to enable the latter to play a
larger role in the drafting of legislation and to increase their political,
administrative and financial control over the cabinet.1
An examination of proposed reforms to
legislative institutions brings to light an interesting paradox. Contrary to
what happens in other areas, ideas for legislative reform usually originate
with the parliamentary wing rather than the official platforms of the various
parties. Increasing number of suggested reforms by experts and members has not
been reflected in a dramatic increase in the number of reform proposals within
party platforms.
The purpose of this article is to compare
reform proposals contained in official party platforms with those drafted by
the parliamentarian of various parties in Quebec. We shall also examine the
nature of the reform proposals contained in party platforms and those
contemplated by members of the National Assembly.2
During the last several elections the
platforms of the Liberal Party of Quebec and the Parti Québécois have not
differed very much with respect to the relative importance they give to
parliamentary institutions. The importance of legislative reform was greatest
in both party platforms during three elections: 1970, 1976 and 1985. In the
Liberal platform proposals concerning parliamentary institutions declined in
absolute numbers and in relative importance from 1970 to 1973 as well as from
1976 and 1981. In the case of the PQ, again, we find a decrease in the relative
number of reform proposals from 1970 to 1973 and from 1976 to 1981. In absolute
terms, this constituted a reduction in the number of proposals from 1970 to
1973, and a slight increase from 1976 to 1985.
Overall, the relative importance of
proposals by parties to reform parliamentary, institutions is slightly less in
the elections from 1973 to 1985 than from 1960 to 1973. This is doubly
surprising because one would have expected that the intensification of de bate
on the political status of Quebec would have stimulated reform proposals. One
would also have expected that legislative reforms advocated by Bonenfant
(1964), Lamontagne (1975), Forget (1977), Michaud (1979), and Vaugeois (1982)
would have been reflected in the various party platforms. What, then, have been
the specific reform proposals enunciated in the various party platforms?
Percentage of Platform Proposals Relating to
Parliamentary Institutions in Quebec since 1960.
|
Liberal (%)
|
Union National (%)
|
Parti québécois (%)
|
1960
|
1.6 (2/123)
|
0 (0/17)
|
-
|
1962
|
0 (0/36)
|
3.12 (3/96)
|
-
|
1966
|
1.83 (3/164)
|
1.10 (2/182)
|
-
|
1970
|
1.96 (5/255)
|
1.51 (3/199)
|
2.27(8/352)
|
1973
|
0.78 (3/387)
|
-
|
0.87 (5/577)
|
1976
|
2.55 (11/432)
|
-
|
0.93 (6/648)
|
1981
|
0.57 (5/878)
|
-
|
0.61 (7/1146)
|
1985
|
1.36 (5/367)
|
-
|
0.80* (8/1000)
|
|
|
|
|
*estimate
|
|
|
|
If the parties resemble each other with
respect to the importance they give to reform proposals, they differ with
respect to the aims of the reforms they advocate. First, we shall examine the
proposals dealing with parliamentary control of the executive then we shall
look at proposals concerning the legislative process, and finally those that
bear on the structure of the institution itself.
The control exercised by MNAs over the
Executive was the subject of twelve proposals by the Liberal Party and the
Union nationale since 1960. Among these were proposals to give the Public Accounts
Committee a wider mandate (UN, 1962), to create a committee of representatives
from the opposition to oversee purchases, contracts and transactions involving
expenditures of public funds (UN, 1962), to create a committee to ensure
control over public finances (LPQ, 1966), to study the Auditor General's Report
by MLAs (LPQ,1976), and to study the Auditor General's Report by a
parliamentary committee (LPQ, 1981).
Other proposals concerned general control
over the Executive. The Liberals planned to reform the Cabinet Secretariat
(1970) to resort more frequently to the publication of government policy
statements prior to the tabling of bills in the National Assembly (1970), to
associate the MNAs with the exercise of the regulatory power over the public administration
(1976), to consult with the National Assembly with respect to the adoption of
new regulations (1981), to create a standing parliamentary committee on
government corporations (1981), to introduce a sunset clause for certain
regulations (1985) and finally to define the information that government
corporations must provide to the National Assembly concerning their operations.
The PQ and UN platforms contained no reforms concerning parliamentary control.
Ten of the twenty-nine reform proposals made
by the LPQ concern the role of parliamentary committees in the drafting of
bills, while one such proposal was devoted to the subject by the UN and none by
the PQ. In 1985 the Liberal Party proposed to establish a parliamentary
commission to oversee regulations after they were proclaimed. The reform of
parliamentary committees is presented as a solution which would have several
simultaneous results: the improvement of bills, the reassessment of the role of
MNAs, and an opportunity for citizens and groups to put forward their points of
view.
A second group of reform proposals dealt
with very specific matters such as the publication of the Journal des débats
(LPQ, 1960), the abolition of the Legislative Council (LPQ, 1966 and UN, 1966),
the reform of the role of parliamentary assistant (LPQ, 1976), and the creation
of a position of legal advisor to the National Assembly (LPQ, 1981). Very broad
subjects were also touched upon such as the reform of parliamentary
institutions (UN, 1962), and the granting to recognized parties the means
necessary to enable them to fully exercise their role within the Assembly (LPQ,
1976).
One subject on which the party platforms
clearly differ from each other is that of public participation in the
legislative process. While the LPQ proposes to permit individuals and
representative groups to assert their rights and points of view in
parliamentary committees (1973), to permit regional sittings of parliamentary
committees (1976) and to increase the number of individuals and groups that
could be heard in parliamentary committees (1981), the UN and the PQ give more
importance to the referendum formula. The origin of this idea goes back to the
Union nationale. In its 1962 platform it promised to consult the public through
a referendum on the nationalization of electricity. All PQ platforms (1970,
1973, 1976 and 1981) essentially promised two things: the possibility of
consulting the electorate through referendums and the adoption of an Act on the
holding of referendums. The 1981 PQ platform contained a promise to extend the
application of the Referendum Act to municipalities and, more crucially, it
promised that in the event it was impossible to reach an agreement with Canada,
that it would ask the people of Quebec for a mandate to exercise unilaterally
the powers of a sovereign State. The 1985 platform, however, made no mention of
referenda.
The structure of parliamentary institutions
was the subject of one reform proposal by the UN and twenty by the PQ, but the
topic received no mention in Liberal party platforms. The UN (1970) promised
establishment of a presidential system, while the PQ (1970, 1973, 1976, 1981 et
1985) contemplated creation of a republic with a presidential form of
government. Furthermore, the PQ platforms proposed to recognize the existence
of parties in the constitution (1970) while offering them guarantees for
equality of opportunity (1970) and freedom of action (1973,1976 1981 et 1985),
and a legislative assembly elected on a set date for four years with no
possibility of being dissolved by the president (1973, 1976, 1981). The 1985
platform referred to a five year term of office.
In summary, proposals by the various parties
differ mainly in only one area, that of public participation in the legislative
process. In other matters it is a question of emphasis. The LPQ has placed
emphasis on the role of MLAs in the drafting of bills and on parliamentary
control, while the PQ has placed strong emphasis on its proposals to reform the
structure of parliamentary institutions.
Reform As Seen By Legislators
To what extent do the considerably more
detailed reforms suggested by several members of the National Assembly develop
proposals envisaged in the platforms of the parties?
The earliest of these by Jean-Charles
Bonenfant, who was a special advisor rather than a member of the Assembly,
marked the beginning of modern reform. The report called for opportunities to
allow more initiative to legislators and to streamline procedures in both the
House and in committees to save parliamentary time.3 Ten years later
a Liberal member, Robert Lamontagne, presented a report whose principal object
was to improve the position of the government backbencher vis-à-vis the
cabinet.4 A report by Claude Forget who had been both a Minister in
the Liberal Government and an opposition member dealt with ministerial
responsibility, delegated legislation and parliamentary control of public
administration. A Committee on Parliamentary Reform chaired by Gilles Michaud6
and composed of Roland Dussault, Francois Gendron, Richard Guay and Adrien
Ouellette looked at many of the same areas and was frequently cited in the
report by Denis Vaugeois.7
A complete discussion of the complexities
and details of the proposals enunciated in these various reports lies outside the
scope of this article. However, the most ambitious of these documents, the
Vaugeois report, integrates, develops and refines all the main orientations
contemplated by its predecessors. It can be used as a reference point with
which to compare the substance of the reform proposals contained in official
platforms with the proposals contemplated in the reports drafted by the
representatives in the parliamentary wing of the various parties.
The first objective of the Vaugeois report
is to release parliament from the clutches of the government. Vaugeois then
proceeds to draw two recommendations from this objective: the replacement of
the Internal Economy Committee of the National Assembly by an office
responsible for overseeing the administration of the various services of the
assembly; and second, the organization of parliamentary work in concert with
the conference of parliamentary committee chairmen instead of leaving this in
the hands of the Leader of the Government. The official platforms of the
various parties make no mention of this type of reform.
The second and third objectives of the
Vaugeois proposal are aimed at conferring upon the National Assembly the
responsibility for control over the administration and public enterprises.
Recommendations derived from these
objectives are the following: entrust the Committee of the Assembly with the
responsibility of studying the reports of bodies directly dependent on the
Assembly, such as those of the Auditor General, the Ombudsman, and the
Committee on the Rights of the Individual; create subcommittees whose purpose
would be to question the administration and draw reform proposals; entrust the
study of reports of public enterprises to the Committee of the Assembly and to
establish one or more subcommittees to question executive officers.
Interestingly enough, these recommendations take up the essential aspects of
the two reforms contained in the LPQs 1981 official platform.
The fourth objective concerns the oversight
of regulations. The Vaugeois report recommends creation of a Committee on
Delegated Legislation responsible for overseeing the proper implementation of
regulations pursuant to Acts as well as to examine existing regulations. This
question is not broached in the PQ's official platforms, but was reflected in
the Liberal platforms of 1976 , 1981 and particularly 1985.
The fifth objective is aimed at
strengthening the role of the National Assembly with respect to the study of
the budget and control over public expenditures. According to Vaugeois, this
objective could be realized through the establishment of a committee entrusted
with studying the Government's proposals, and another committee entrusted with
examining the financial commitments of each department, It should be remembered
that the first official platform to promise the creation of a committee to
ensure control over public finances dates back to the 1966 Liberal platform.
To realize the sixth objective, i.e. the
encouragement of public debate on legislation and the improvement of the
Assembly's legislative work, the Vaugeois Report recommends that three or four
parliamentary committees specialize in the study of bills. Although this
recommendation may resemble many other proposals contained in official
platforms concerning the improvement of the role and functioning of
parliamentary committees, it differs significantly from them with respect to
the importance to be given to individuals and groups. In fact, while the
official platforms contemplate giving individuals and groups the possibility of
asserting their rights and points of view within parliamentary committees (LPQ,
1973,1976) or to consult the public through referendums (PQ, 1970, 1973, 1976
and 1981), the recommendation contained in the Vaugeois Report is aimed at
improving the quality of the information made available to the public, rather
than at increasing the participation of individuals and groups in collective
decisions.
A seventh objective is to enable National
Assembly committees to initiate ' study and investigate at their own behest.
These would then act as counterbalances to committees set up by the government.
According to Vaugeois, another objective of the reform should consist of a
clearer definition of the status of MNAs, and of parliamentary assistants. He
recommended higher salaries for MNAs, a better pension plan, improved working
conditions, and a clarification of their functions and duties. Parliamentary
assistants would be mainly entrusted with studying bills as well as drafting
and evaluating the legislation delegated to them. The official platforms of the
various parties do not contain any proposals aimed at raising the salaries of
MNAs or at improving their pension plan. As far as the MNAs' working conditions
are concerned, these too receive no mention in any of the official platforms
from 1981 to 1985. In 1976 the Liberal Party stated its intention to adopt a
new Act governing the legislature, reform the role of parliamentary assistants,
increase possibilities to enable MNAs to visit their regions and improve the
quality of the information available to them in order to facilitate their
participation in governmental proceedings.
Conclusion
The recent evolution of debate on
parliamentary reform in Quebec can be summarized as follows: first, the most
innovative and precise reform proposals have been made by the parliamentarians
rather than in the official platforms of the various parties, second, the draft
reforms drawn up by the parliamentarians aim much more than do those drawn up
by the parties at strengthening the control of parliamentarians over the
Executive; and third, 607.7contrary to what one might have expected, the debate
on the political status of Quebec has not generated any daring draft proposals
concerning parliamentary institutions.
How can we account for the fact that the
essence of the problem which, according to parliamentarians and academics, is
to re-establish a certain equilibrium between MNAs and the Executive, does not
constitute a central concern in the reform proposals contained in the official
platforms of the various parties?
Three explanations seem plausible: either
the party platforms are drawn up by persons who have a very unclear
understanding of the functioning of parliamentary institutions; or else the
process of developing official platforms is itself controlled by executives who
do not wish to see a strengthening of parliamentary control over the
government; or again, the official platforms of the various parties are
addressed to the voters while the draft reforms drawn up by the parliamentarians
are aimed solely at members and attempt to resolve problems of little interest
to the general public.
Notes
1. The information for this article is taken
from a larger study prepared with the assistance of the Social Science and
Humanities Research Council. The author acknowledges the assistance of Mme
Paule Duchesneau and François Michaud for their valuable contribution to this
project.
2. The information used in this was obtained
by analyzing the contents of the platforms of the Liberal Party of Quebec, the
Union National in the 1960s and the Parti Québécois from 1970 to 1985.
3. La réforme du travail parlementaire,
January 9, 1964, p. 36.
4. Rapport du comité sur le rôle du
député ministériel, June 26, 1975, p. 11.
5. Démocratiser le Parlement, Propositions
en vue de la réforme du parlementarisme à l'Assemblée nationale du Québec,
October 1977, p. 83.
6. Rapport d'étape du Comité sur la
réforme parlementaire, présenté au ministre État à la réforme électorale et
parlementaire, June 20, 1979, p. 17.
7. L'Assemblée nationale en devenir. Pour
un meilleur équilibre de nos institutions, January 28, 1982, p. 202.