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Rebecca Sciarra
Variations among democratic governments are endless but a common characteristic
is the way control of the public purse is exercised. This is particularly
true in Westminster style legislatures based on principles of responsible
government. Even in democratic states where the confidence convention does
not apply governmental disarray abounds when a government is exposed for
inappropriately spending funds. Too often, when trying to measure the
health of a democracy we look for indicators such as gross national product
levels, mortality rates, and the extent to which individual, collective
and human rights are protected. Seldom is the focus upon the sphere of
fiscal spending and the level of fiscal accountability contained within
a political regime when attempting to posit an evaluative analysis on any
given governments worth, health, or extent to which it is democratic.
This article examines the Office of the Provincial Auditor in Ontario and
its role in examining the spending of public funds. It also reviews the
evolution of legislative auditing in that province and recent changes to
the offices legislation.
The first session of the sixth parliament in Ontario marked the official
birth of Ontarios first officer of the legislature, with the introduction
of the Audit Act, 1886. Edward Blakes warnings and predictions regarding
the potential for fiscal mismanagement among the executive and within the
public service materialized when a discrepancy of $14,680 was highlighted
in the Treasury Departments financial books in 1885. The then Auditor,
Charles Hood Sproule had noted the discrepancy and had reported it to the
Treasurer of the time but had made no statement to the legislature, as
he had no authority to do so. Additionally, the investigation of the fiscal
discrepancy revealed that fraudulent activity had occurred.1
The introduction of the Audit Act in 1886 envisioned a Provincial Auditor
as part watchdog; part in-house expert on good financial management.
The watchdog function was indicated by removal from executive control.
The Provincial Auditor2 and all his or her staff would be appointed by
the Lieutenant Governor. Further, the Provincial Auditor was vested with
the authority to examine any person on oath in connection with any account
audited and to report all public accounts and expenditures to the Legislative
Assembly.
Refining the Audit Act 1949-2004
The mandate and organizational structure of legislative auditing in Ontario,
which we know today is quite different from the provisions outlined in
the original Audit Act of 1886. The Office of the Provincial Auditors
mission is to report to the legislative assembly objective information
and recommendations resulting from independent audits of the governments
program, its Crown agencies, and corporations.3 According to the legislation,
the Auditor shall be appointed as an officer of the Assembly by the Lieutenant
Governor, after consultation with the chair of the all-party standing Public
Accounts Committee of the Assembly (PAC). However, since 1992 an open competition
has taken place when the Auditors position has been vacant, in which all
three parties represented on the Committee participate in interviewing
worthy candidates and then recommending to the government the preferred
candidate for the position of Auditor. The Auditor and all staff are independent
of the government and its administration and are authorized to access all
relevant information and records necessary to the performance of Auditors
duties. The chief mandate of the office, according to its 2004 Annual Report,
is to assist the Legislative Assembly in holding the government and its
administrators accountable for the quality of the administrations stewardship
of public funds and for the achievement of value for money in government
operations.4
This function of providing elected representatives with thorough
and objective information to use to assess the extent to which the executive
has been fiscally responsible has been, up until recently, executed through
three types of audits. The Office examines the receipt and disbursement
of public money, the financial statements of the province and agencies
of the crown, and examines the administration of government programs carried
out by ministries and agencies.
There have been three pivotal amendments to the Audit Act. The removal
of the Provincial Auditor from the authority of the Treasury Department
in the 1950s; a phasing out of the Auditors office performing pre-audit
activities and conducting post-audits of government expenditures in the
1970s, and the entrenchment in the late 1970s of the Provincial Auditor
conducting value-for-money audits were significant legislative changes
made to the mandate of the office. These changes were the product of a
number of forces such as Provincial Auditors of the day, various Provincial
Treasurers, and individual MPPs working together to alter the function
of this legislative institution.
The separation of the Provincial Auditor from the Treasury Department was
spurred by the PAC in March 1949. In particular, an opposition member of
the PAC, Liberal MPP for Waterloo North, Mr. Brown, clearly criticized
the incestuous relationship between the Treasurer and the Provincial Auditor
and how this compromised the explicit duty of the office. As a result
of discussions led by Mr. Brown in the PAC, the committee passed a motion
recommending that the Act be amended in order to effect greater fiscal
accountability. By March 1950, the bill to amend the Audit Act passed second
reading. The amendment to the
Audit Act reflected the spirit of the discussions
in the PAC, as Mr. Brown commented after the act received royal assent,
The strength of the entire Act is summed up in section 25 of the Act,
outlining the annual report of the Auditor, to whom he must report and
on what he must report.5
The next significant change to the scope of legislative audit in Ontario
was realized through a shift from the office performing pre-audits of government
expenditures to post-audit expenditures. How this change was enacted varied
somewhat from the previous process through which amendments to the Audit
Act were made in the 1950s. The pre to post audit amendments took substantially
longer to be adopted by government.
As early as the mid 1950s, the real-world application of pre-audit practices
became harder as budget sizes and expenditures grew. As the province of
Ontario boomed in the 1950s, spheres of provincial responsibility began
to supersede those controlled by Ottawa, and the size and scope of government
dramatically increased. As a result, conducting pre-audits were identified
as practically impossible by the then Provincial Auditor. The Auditors
Annual Report in 1956-57, called attention to the fact that not only were
pre-audits logistically unfeasible, they were also ill-suited to sufficiently
act as a control and review mechanism on government expenditures. The sheer
volume of transactions made by government combined with the monetary size
of these transactions made the performance of pre-audit functions a deficient
tool of legislative auditing.
Despite acknowledgement by the Provincial Auditor in the 1950s regarding
the inevitable paralysis of legislative auditing if it continued to perform
only pre-audits, a response by government was not heard until the 1970s.
It was only when the Committee on Government Productivity began looking
at the Audit Act in 1970 that the warnings effaced in the early 1950s found
their way through the legislative process.
In 1971, the first reading of the bill to amend the Audit Act reflected
the instrumental role, which the Committee on Government Productivity played
in enacting amendments to the Audit Act. New amendments to the Audit Act
established that legislative auditing would be performed through performing
post-audit activities, rather than through pre-audit activities. The committee
reasoned that in addition to pre-audits becoming a virtual impossibility
with the sheer size of government spending, the act of the Auditor being
involved in a spending control function, in fact compromised his role as
a servant of parliament. The committee argued that to maintain a system
of legislative auditing, where the Auditor performed a pre-audit function
as a service to the executive, in fact perverted the motives of government
and made legislative auditing a tool used by the executive rather than
as an accountability tool designed to keep the executive in check.
The widening of the Auditors mandate in combination with the birth of
media, as a tool of politicians, and the longevity of the Progressive Conservative
rule in Ontario, perhaps resulted in a significant perspective put forth
by the official opposition in regards to legislative auditing. In particular,
in the mid 1970s, members of PAC who were members of the official opposition
began to stress the need for every measure to be taken to ensure that now
the Auditor had the power to comment on the governments fiscal management,
it was in fact an entity responsible solely to parliament and therefore
the citizenry and was not under the thumb of the Treasury. Recommendations
from PAC and the Leader of the Official Opposition in the early 1970s led
to the adoption of value-for-money audits when amendments to the Audit
Act were passed in 1978.
The 1978 amendments were, up until November 2004; the most recent revisions
made to the mandate and structure of the Provincial Auditors office in
Ontario and to the implications of legislative auditing as a tool designed
to serve parliament. As a result of the 1978 amendments, the Provincial
Auditor not only acted as a source of information for how and where public
moneys were being spent but also provided an evaluative judgment on government
expenditures. The Auditor was now empowered to comment upon the economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness of government programs, examine the accounting
records of recipients of provincial transfer payments, and to audit agencies
of the crown and crown controlled corporations.
Until 1978, the legislation defining the mandate of the Provincial Auditor
in Ontario and the scope of legislative auditing was a work in progress
that was prodded along by the work and authority of legislative committees;
with the PAC being the most influential. When provincial governments grew
to be very relevant and big spending machines in the 1960s and 1970s, the
scope of legislative auditing was revised to both reflect and respond to
these changes. The birth of agencies of the crown and crown controlled
corporations, the extent of provincial transfer payments, and increases
in governmental programming demanded that the legislative auditing regime
be made more congruent with the behaviour and evolution of government.
The 2004 Amendments
On November 30, 2004, a new mandate was established for the Office of the
Provincial Auditor, as Bill 18, the Audit Statute Amendment Act, 2004 received
Royal Assent. At first blush, a mandate review, adoption of legislative
amendments and a parliamentary consent to expand the powers entrusted to
the Provincial Auditor in Ontario, appear to have occurred quickly and
smoothly. A mere two months after the 2003 General Election, the Minister
of Finance, Gregory Sorbara, introduced Bill 18.
The passing of the Audit Statute Law Amendment Act 2004 saw the Provincial
Auditor of Ontario become the Auditor General of Ontario.
It also marked the adoption of an expanded scope of legislative auditing
which suggested that in order for parliament to have a clear and accurate
sense of how the government is spending tax payer dollars, the mandate
of legislative auditing must include value-for-money audits of grant recipients.
When the Audit Statute Law Amendment Act, 2004 received Royal Assent, a
substantial amount of media commentary abounded. One newspaper article
in particular encapsulated the main provisions included in the amendments
with its headline of Ontarios Auditor gets new title, more clout; Can
investigate colleges, hospitals, crown companies; All three parties approve
changes in unanimous vote.6
According to the current Auditor, Jim McCarter, the fundamental shift in
mandate scope includes an expansion of value- for money auditing to organizations
in the broader public sector, such as hospitals, colleges, universities
and school boards and any other organization meeting the definition of
grant recipient and includes an expansion of value-for-money auditing to
the electricity sector corporations and other Crown controlled corporations.
The expanded mandate; however, does not apply in the case of municipalities.7
As these amendments have now passed into law, with the broader public sector
audit mandate effective on April 1, 2005, the adaptation of the legislative
auditing mandate in Ontario appears to be healthy. That the Legislative
Assembly of Ontario, with all party support, endorsed legislative amendments
to allow value-for-money audits by the Auditor of broader public sector
organizations that receive government grants is a positive indicator of
ensuring fiscal accountability and a system of checks and balances on the
executive level of government. Allowing the Provincial Auditor to report
on transfer payments to grant recipients and to comment upon the economy
and efficiency of how taxpayer dollars are spent are spent in the broader
public sector is certainly progressive. As a result, Ontarios officer
of parliament responsible for exacting fiscal accountability, Ontarios
political institutions, and Ontarios legislators appear to emerge as actors
who are effective, adaptable, and committed to governmental accountability
and transparency.
Origins of the 2004 Amendments
How were the 2004 amendments to the Audit Act adopted and devised? Did
the PAC pass a motion, which led to the government introducing a bill to
amend the Audit Act? Did the Provincial Auditor act as an advocate for
the adoption of new amendments? To answer these questions interviews were
conducted with the previous Provincial Auditor, Erik Peters, and senior
staff members from the Provincial Auditors office. Secondly, Annual Reports
published by the Provincial Auditors office between 1990 and 2004 and
Hansard Debates from 1996 through to 2004 were studied to conceptualize
how the legislative arena responded to possible mandate reviews.
As early as 1989, amendments to the Audit Act, of the nature that were
passed in Bill 18 in November 2004, were discussed as part of public hearings
held by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts. The then Provincial
Auditor, Douglas Archer, had suggested at these hearings that there needed
to be an evolution of how legislative auditing was conducted in regards
to grant recipients. At that time, the Provincial Auditors office was
only permitted to conduct an examination of accounting records of provincial
grant recipients. Simply put, the Provincial Auditors office was only
allowed to examine financial records of broader public sector institutions
that received government grants. It was fairly clear to the Provincial
Auditors office at the time that about 50% of provincial expenditures
were allotted to transfer payment agencies. Consequently, there was a view
that suggested there was a certain level of inanity inherent in the Provincial
Auditors office acting as an authority on the fiscal accountability of
the province. Without being able to conduct value-for-money audits in the
agencies that received a substantial portion of the provincial budget,
the Provincial Auditors office highlighted in the PAC hearings that their
ability to provide accurate and useful information to members of the legislature
regarding the fiscal responsibility of the government, was severely impaired.
As a result, in 1990 the Standing Committee on Public Accounts supported
this principle and was of the opinion that all provincial government agencies
and all transfer payments recipients should be subject to value for money
audits by the Office of the Provincial Auditor, in an effort to enhance
accountability.
In late 1990, following the Committees report to the legislature and their
recommendation that proposed amendments to the Audit Act be drafted and
introduced for First Reading as soon as possible, Douglas Archer submitted
his draft of the legislation to the Treasurer and Minister of Economics.
Whereas, previous submissions made to the Minister responsible for the
Audit Act had resulted in the immediate introduction of legislation in
periods of mandate review; this submission resulted in a series of ministerial
consultations. Between 1991 and 1992, the government of the day explained
that before legislation that had been drafted by the Provincial Auditor
could be introduced, a series of consultations needed to be conducted with
all of the parties that would be effected by the proposed amendments; namely
the major transfer payment partners.8
As government consultations continued during the period of appointing a
new Provincial Auditor, the arrival of a new head for this office of the
legislature continued to push for a substantial mandate review of the office.
As Erik Peters commented in an interview,
when I came aboard [in 1993] we were already agitating [for a mandate review
and amendments to the Audit Act]. I held this view because I felt that
we should not be auditing into a vacuum and that was what was exactly happening,
so long as transfer payment agencies were not subject to value-for-money
audits. The point was that, about half of government spending was not done
by ministries and we therefore didnt have access to look at if those funds
were being spent prudently.9
The appointment of Erik Peters as Provincial Auditor saw an endorsement
for the same amendments suggested in 1990. Taking into consideration that
the expansion of a workable legislative auditing mandate was not only a
matter of enacting it by statute, Peters recommended that clear management
responsibilities and accountability frameworks be established for the transfer
payment agencies. The Standing Committee on Public Accounts subsequently
unanimously passed a motion in June 1993 giving approval in principle to
the Provincial Auditor to pursue the establishment of a workable legislated
accountability framework with central agencies before any amendments were
made to the Audit Act.
With this motion, the next period of mandate review was comprised of consultation
and collaboration between the then Provincial Auditor and senior officials
stationed in the various transfer payment agencies, which would be effected
by amendments made to the Act. It became clear that senior officials within
the central agencies did not agree on the need for a legislated accountability
framework.10 Ultimately, it appeared that developing a widened mandate
alongside the partners most affected was not possible at this time. The
Provincial Auditor then returned to steering the mandate review and expansion
through legislative channels and actors. Mr. Peters wrote a letter to the
Standing Committee on Public Accounts and requested that the committee
recommend to the Minister of Finance that an amendment be made to the
Audit Act which would provide the Provincial Auditor with the discretionary
authority to audit a recipient of a government grant on a basis consistent
with the full scope of the Audit Act. 11
The committee agreed and recommended
that public hearings be held. As of 1994, the status of amendments to the
Audit Act exactly mirrored the status achieved in 1990.
Upon conclusion of the public hearings in June 1996, the Provincial Auditor
submitted draft proposals for amending the Audit Act to the Standing Committee
on Public Accounts. The committee endorsed the proposals and adopted a
motion that stated that the Committee requests a response and action plan
from the Minister of Finance by the Committees first meeting following
the summer recess.12 The Minister of Finance, Ernie Eves, returned a supportive
but cautionary response by the suggested date. He wrote that the proposals
represent a significant step towards the fundamental reform of the public
sector accountability system and I agree with the principles upon which
it is based. 13
Ultimately though, the Minister of Finance responded that
despite his agreement with the principles underlying the proposed amendments,
the entrenchment of the offices mandate review would have to follow a
public policy initiative being led by the government regarding restructuring
of transfer payments in the province, otherwise known as the Who Does
What implementation during the first mandate of the Mike Harris Government.
The Minister of Finance and the Provincial Auditor finally began to communicate
directly following receipt of the Ministers response to the PAC. On October
2, 1996, the Minister of Finance, met with Erik Peters to discuss the nature
of the proposed amendments. The meeting between the Minister and the Provincial
Auditor concluded with an endorsement of the principles underlying the
proposed amendments. However, the Minister of Finance still reasoned that
it was best to await the outcome of the transfer payment restructuring
exercise that his government had initiated. It was suggested that by 1997,
the outcomes would be fully realized and the government could then turn
attention to introducing complimentary amendments to the Audit Act.
Throughout 1998 and 1999, Erik Peters continued to urge the government
to consider implementing the proposed amendments to the Audit Act, however
to no avail. Each year, the Auditors Annual Reports outlined the lack
lustre status of amendments to the Audit Act. In 2000, Erik Peters wrote
another letter to Minister of Finance, Jim Flaherty. The Minister replied
that the ministry was still examining the full range of accountability
issues, of which the proposed changes to the Audit Act form a part. Following
this unhopeful response, the Provincial Auditor continued to lobby for
a meaningful mandate review and turned strategies back towards working
through the PAC.
Examination of the Provincial Auditors Annual Reports embarrassingly illustrate
the repeated efforts of the Provincial Auditor to initiate a mandate review
and the consistency of the proposed amendments, as well as the non-response
of government. The 2001 Annual Report noted that the government announced
in its Speech from the Throne on April 19, 2001, that it would be introducing
sweeping reforms to ensure that all public sector institutions are accountable
to the citizens of Ontario and in the planned reforms was a commitment
to make amendments to the Audit Act.14 Disappointingly enough, the 2002
Annual Report explained that despite references to public sector accountability
in the 2001 throne speech, inconclusive discussions on a comprehensive
set of amendments took place during the summer and fall of 2001 between
the Provincial Auditors office and the then Minister of Finance.15
The
2003 Annual Report offers, by far, the most unsettling recounting of Ontarios
institutional adaptability and the governments regard for fiscal accountability.
The 2003 Annual Report reiterated that amendments have been proposed since
1989 without substantial response or support from government. Further,
the Provincial Auditor also referenced a letter that had been submitted
to the Premier of Ontario in April 2003 in the name of pursuing amendments
to the Audit Act. The 2003 Annual Report, states that no response from
the Premier was ever received, but nevertheless, and in spite of the repeated
setbacks we have experienced over the years in our efforts to have the
Audit Act amended, the Office remains committed to pursuing amendments
to the Act so that we may better serve the Legislative Assembly.16
Legislative Involvement
Between 1996 and 2001, a number of Private Members Bills were introduced
which almost perfectly encapsulated the recommendations that were flowing
back and forth between the Provincial Auditor of the day, the PAC and the
Ministry of Finance during the same time. In November 1996, PC member Bart
Maves introduced Bill 89, The Accountability Improvement Act. Bill 89 ironically
mirrored the explanatory note contained in Bill 18, as it explained that
it amends the
Audit Act to improve the accountability of hospitals, school
boards, universities, colleges, municipalities and other organizations
which receive payments from the government.17
This bill was eventually referred to
the Standing Committee on General Government and then ‘died’ when the house
prorogued.
Reviewing the Hansard record of the Second Reading debates of Bill 89 illustrates
a broad agreement in principle of the tenets expressed in the bill, with
the exception of the NDP member from Nickel Belt and former Minister of
Finance, Floyd Laughren. Members from the Official Opposition of the day,
the Liberal Party of Ontario, and the NDP member who participated in the
Second Reading debate agreed in principle on the bill. Ultimately though,
the political debate did not become one of accountability for taxpayer
dollars but was reduced to opposition politics and reflected partisan cohesion.18
Bill 89 resurfaced in the Ontario legislature four years later, although
under a different name and on behalf of a different party. In December
2000, the Liberal Member for Kingston and the Islands, John Gerretsen,
introduced Bill 180 as a private members bill. Upon prorogation of the
house, Bill 180 died but was re-introduced by the same member, virtually
unchanged, in April 2001. John Gerretsen introduced Bill 5, whose explanatory
note again reflected the work being conducted outside the chamber, between
the Provincial Auditor, the PAC, and the Minister of Finance, and which
was also contained in Bart Maves private members bill of 1996 and Gerretsens
earlier version with Bill 180. Bill 5, The Audit Amendment Act, contained
an explanatory note that read, an act, to insure greater accountability
of hospitals, universities and colleges, municipalities and other organizations
which receive grants or other transfer payments from the government or
agencies of the Crown.19
Once again, the introduction and Second Reading of Bill 5 and its amendments
to the Audit Act, broadening the scope of legislative auditing to allow
for value-for-money audits to be conducted on grant recipients and within
the MUSH sector, illustrated an agreement in broad principle across all
parties. Despite an opposition member bringing the bill forward, members
of both the Progressive Conservatives and the New Democrats spoke in ardent
favour. Particularly though, members of the Progressive Conservative caucus
endorsed its proposals while illustrating their own governments alleged
work conducted towards its objectives. Debate, and eventually progress,
regarding the principle of the legislative auditing mandate review became
subservient to partisan promotion.20
The fate of Bill 5 was sealed when
the bill was discharged from the Standing Committee on Public Accounts
in November 2002, a motion was put forward in the house to move third reading,
and it disappeared from the legislative books by the end of December 2002.
Finally, Bill 89, Bill 180, and Bill 5 experienced a reincarnation again
in the Ontario legislature on May 1, 2003 when John Gerretsen introduced
Bill 6, the Audit Statute Law Amendment Act, 2003, for first reading. This
bills life span was relatively short, in legislative terms. As the house
rose for the summer in June 2003 and a provincial election was called in
early September 2003, Bill 6 never made it past first reading. The Ontario
legislature was spared a fourth round of so-called debate regarding progressive
steps being taken towards enacting a higher and more modern degree of fiscal
accountability for the expenditure of taxpayer dollars.
Ultimately, this evolution of mandate review has a positive end, albeit
a very qualified one. The 2003 provincial election saw the Liberal Party
campaign on a number of promises; including amendments to the Audit Act.
Following a strong victory in October 2003, the Ministry of Finance consulted
the Office of the Provincial Auditor regarding the Ministers intention
to introduce legislation immediately. The acting Provincial Auditor, Jim
McCarter, and senior staff worked with Ministry of Finance staff to draft
legislation, incorporating the amendments flushed out between 1989 and
2003. Relatively little work was required for technical preparation. The
lawyer in the Ministry of Finance, which had been involved during the early
1990s already had a good handle on the underlying principles and the legislative
language for the amendments that were being considered. The Auditors office
signed off. The Ministry signed off. Bill 18 was introduced in December
2003 and received Royal Assent approximately one year later. The Auditors
new expanded mandate became effective on April 1, 2005.
Conclusion
Ontarios process of reviewing the mandate of its chief observer of governmental
fiscal accountability and of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness
of government operations is clearly convoluted. The sheer length of time
required to achieve amendments gives even a novice political observer pause
to worry. More importantly though, the unravelling of this institutional
development raises several very important questions.
The emergence of legislative auditing or the incorporation of an official
Provincial Auditors Office was never designed to direct government spending.
Further, this office was not designed to determine how, where, when, and
why tax dollars were allotted to particular ministries, agencies, programs,
or sectors. Rather, the process of legislative auditing since the 1970s,
anyway, has been a tool of parliament to be used after the expenditure
of money to clearly see where money is going and whether or not that money
is being spent in the most prudent manner, as defined by rigorous auditing
standards. That the evolution of legislative auditing has always occurred
a step behind the evolution of a political system or parliament makes sense.
Legislative auditing is a check on government, and by virtue of that
purpose, its functions can only be applied after government has acted.
Similarly, changes and revisions to how legislative auditing is conducted,
either provincially or federally, should always reflect changes first adopted
by the political institution or system in question.
In the 1980s and increasingly throughout the 1990s, the flow of provincial
dollars changed somewhat dramatically. As of March 31 1996, $28 billion
or 48% of government funds were spent by separately governed recipients.
By 2004, government transfers to the same recipient organizations was approaching
$37 billion. In order for a mechanism within a political institution to
remain relevant and effective, it must evolve in tandem with, or at least
shortly after, changes are experienced within that political institution.
Further, if the mechanism in question is one, which acts as a safeguard
against the tyranny of power exercised by a government and is supposed
to be a tool of parliament and ultimately the people, is unable to remain
effective, questions of institutional functionality and democratic robustness
become very serious questions.
In an interview with Erik Peters, I asked him what led him to hold the
perspective that the Auditors mandate should be expanded. He replied that,
the government was handing over money
without the government having any
sense of the quality of the services provided
were they a fat organization?
Were they delivering quality services? Did they have the same volume as
last year? All these questions had to be asked and they had to be answered
and there was only limited information
. we felt that within an accountability
framework and within an accounting regime these questions needed to be
answered.21
Further I also asked if the Audit Act or other pieces of provincial statute
clearly define how a mandate review is supposed to occur. He replied:
not really and I think that there is a very real problem in this area.
The Audit Act falls under the Minister of Finance
so what it came down
to was how keen the Minister was
. it became very clear to me in January
1993 that there was a real problem with how the province dealt with its
public accounts. In the first few years that I was the Provincial Auditor,
I had gone to the standing committee on finance and told them that I felt
the budget was problematic
I said do not budget this way
use accounting
rules. My view had always been that if we were going to be dealing with
amendments to the
Audit Act, we should deal directly with the minister
and not through the bureaucracy.22
The theory that individual parliamentarians can adequately steer a mandate
review of a legislative auditing regime within the legislative arena contains
several challenges.23 With this particular case, where locally run entities,
such as hospitals, school boards, universities, and colleges are the bodies
in question there is a normative difficulty in having MPPs stand up and
demand a higher degree of accountability of these organizations and to
sanction a provincial officer of the legislature with the authority to
conduct value-for-money audits of these organizations. Individual MPPs
face a number of challenges and objectives when standing in the legislature.
On one hand, they face an executive-steered system of government, which
they are compelled to keep in check through a series of mechanisms, where
legislative auditing is one. On the other hand though, they are there to
accomplish another job and that is one where they are to act as the voices
of groups, sectors, and individuals in their riding. Finally, individual
MPPs, increasingly so in Ontario during the 1990s and today, also face
a parliament that is characterized to some extent by fierce partisan divides.
The days of collective politicking and centre of the road politics are
gone and therefore the necessity to marry yourself to your party is paramount.
The conjecture that suggests that individual parliamentarians are certainly
compelled by wanting to hold the executive to task, regardless of what
side you sit on,24
is somewhat of an outdated thesis to apply, particularly
within Ontario over the last two decades and in regards to this specific
policy question concerning locally delivered services and locally operated
agencies.
The failures of the private members bills dealing with amendments to the
Audit Act reflect these institutional and normative challenges. They also
underscore the need to devise a more functional system of mandate review
for all legislative bodies. So long as there is not a clearly established
and formal process of mandate review required to occur between the Minister
responsible for the legislation that the officer of the legislature is
charged to administer, the legislative committee responsible (if there
is one), and the appointed head of the office of the legislature in question;
the method of last resort falls to an understandably schizophrenic group
of individual parliamentarians whose range of tools consist of the forever-destined
to fail-private members bill.
The consequences of a legislative auditing regime, which subsisted in a
state of, arrested development for the better part of fifteen years is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, the procedures used to establish,
review, and update the mandates of officers of the legislature are certainly
essential to explore. A more transparent and regularized system of mandate
review requires attention. Declaring a fixed date and an agreed upon group
of representatives would likely facilitate the process of reviewing mandates
of Ontarios legislative officers. Further, Ontarios legislature has often
been based on a model consisting of three overlapping spheres: members
of parliament, political parties, and committees.25 Analyses of officers
of the legislature, in and of themselves, and how they interact with these
three spheres, via periods of mandate review, inform our understanding
of their overall functionality. To further nuance how a legislature functions,
one might also look to other officers of the legislature and how their
mandates have been reviewed over the last two decades. Such a study would
explore the efficacy of parliamentary procedures and mechanisms, such as
the role of legislative committees, as well as the actions of legislative
actors, such as individual members and political parties. Additionally,
to further untangle the multitude of components, which form a legislature
and ultimately a democratic system, one might also look internally at officers
of the legislature and how they themselves are held accountable, either
informally or formally.
Notes
1. Office of the Provincial Auditor of Ontario, The First One Hundred Years
(Toronto: August 1986), 7.
2. This title will be used despite an official name change in the title
of the office in November 2004 to the Office of the Auditor General.
3. Office of the Provincial Auditor, 2004 Annual Report (Toronto: 2004),
Chapter 6,
http://www.Auditor.on.ca/english/reports/en04/6en04.pdf
4. Ibid.
5. Office of the Provincial Auditor of Ontario, 18.
6. Robert Benzie, Ontarios Auditor Gets More Clout in The Toronto Star,
November 23, 2004, A7.
7. Ontario Legislative Internship Programme meeting with then Acting Provincial
Auditor Jim McCarter, September 2004.
8. Interview with senior staff from the Office of the Provincial Auditor,
April 2005.
9. Interview with former Provincial Auditor Erik Peters, January 2005.
10. Interview with former Provincial Auditor Erik Peters, January 2005.
11. Office of the Provincial Auditor, 1994 Annual Report of the Office
of the Provincial Auditor of Ontario (Toronto: 1994), 226-227.
12. Office of the Provincial Auditor, 1996 Annual Report of the Office
of the Provincial Auditor of Ontario (Toronto: 1996), 19.
13. Office of the Provincial Auditor, 1998 Annual Report of the Office
of the Provincial Auditor of Ontario (Toronto: 1998), Section 2.02.
14. Office of the Provincial Auditor, 2001 Annual Report of the Office
of the Provincial Auditor of Ontario, (Toronto: 2001), Chapter 2, http://www.Auditor.on.ca/english/
reports/en01/en01fm.htm
15. Office of the Provincial Auditor, 2002 Annual Report of the Office
of the Provincial Auditor of Ontario (Toronto: 2002), 18.
16. Office of the Provincial Auditor, 2003 Annual Report of the Office
of the Provincial Auditor of Ontario (Toronto: 2003), 18.
17. Bill 89, The Accountability Improvement Act, 1996. http://www.ontla.on.ca/documents/bills/36_parliament/session1/M96089e.htm
18. See Ontario. Hansard Debates. 21 November, 1996. http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/36-
1/l126.htm
19. Bill 5, Audit Amendment Act, 2001.
http://www.ontla.on.ca/documents/Bills/37_Parliament/Session2/b005_e.htm
20.See Ontario. Hansard Debates. 20 June 2002. http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/37-
3/l024a.htm
21. Interview with former Provincial Auditor Erik Peters, January 2005.
22. Interview with former Provincial Auditor Erik Peters, January 2005.
23. See Paul G. Thomas article entitled The Past, Present, and Future
of Officers of Parliament in Canadian Public Administration, Volume 46,
No. 3 (Fall 2003).
24. See Paul G. Thomas article entitled The Past, Present, and Future
of Officers of Parliament in Canadian Public Administration, Volume 46,
No. 3 (Fall 2003).
25. See Graham Whites article entitled The Legislature: Central Symbol
of Ontario Democracy in The Government and Politics of Ontario (ed. Graham
White) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
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