At the time this article was
written Clyde Wells was Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador. This article is
based on his statement to the Special Joint Committee on the Processing of
Amending the Constitution on April 9, 1991.
While our current constitutional
problems have a variety of facets they reflect two essential problems, both of
which require us to focus on the constitutional amending process:
First, there is a substantial
degree of dissatisfaction with many of our existing constitutional provisions
particularly in Quebec but also in Western Canada and Atlantic Canada. There
are also widely divergent views as to what constitutional changes are
appropriate to address the present dissatisfaction. The differences are
substantial and reflect disagreement as to the fundamental nature of the
Second, the existing amending
formula is not adequate to deal with the problem. Unanimity is not achievable
for those kinds of amendments requiring the agreement of all provinces, and
there is a reluctance to use the general amending formula for those amendments
that do not require unanimity because of Quebec's position that it would
neither negotiate nor participate in the process. There is no formal provision
in the Constitution at the moment that would provide for the use of a
constitutional convention, or a national referendum.
While it is not impossible, it is
improbable that acceptable constitutional changes can be negotiated and
implemented under our present amending procedures. As matters now stand alteration
of those amending procedures will require the unanimous approval of all of the
provinces and that too is improbable in the present circumstances.
It is therefore important to
re-examine the current amending procedures in our Constitution as part of the
ongoing constitutional debate. Indeed, the drafters of the 1982 Constitution
Act recognized that such a re-examination would be necessary and provided
in section 49 for a constitutional conference of first ministers to be convened
by the Prime Minister within fifteen years of 1982 to review the provisions
dealing with constitutional amendment...
Unanimity found its way into the
Constitution as a means of avoiding special status for Quebec. In lieu of
giving only Quebec a constitutional veto, one was given to all provinces by
requiring unanimity. Neither special status nor unanimity is appropriate
because each is capable of producing constitutional paralysis. In the case of
special status it can result from the intransigent position of the particular province
having the right of veto and in the case of unanimity from the intransigence of
any one province.
My personal view is that the
requirement for unanimity should be eliminated entirely. Our amending formula
is absurd insofar as it allows a single province to hold up important reforms.
That absurdity would have been exacerbated under the Meech Lake Accord which
would have extended the unanimity requirement to even more areas.
No one province, whether it is as
large as Ontario or as small as Prince Edward Island, should be in a position,
ever, to hold up the constitutional development of the nation. The general
amending formula should be used for all amendments.
Just how ludicrous the requirement
for unanimity is was obvious in the case of the Meech Lake Accord. The citizens
and governments of Newfoundland and Manitoba were castigated by some as
nation-wreckers when, acting in accord with the sincere conviction of the
overwhelming majority of their people, they did not approve of the
constitutional changes proposed in the Meech Lake Accord thereby denying the
unanimity required. Yet, if the amendments in the Meech Lake Accord had
required only the general amending formula, the actions of Manitoba and
Newfoundland in refusing to approve would have been entirely acceptable. It is
an absurdity to suggest that all provinces have a right to approve or refuse
approval, as their people in conscience see fit, but small provinces dare not
withhold approval in cases where unanimity is required and the larger provinces
have approved. I cannot think of a position more offensive to the democratic
process than that.
While there is no justification for
unanimity, I believe there is justification for a limited constitutional veto
for Quebec. Even while recognizing that our aboriginal people were the first
citizens of this land, and that Canada is today, as it will be in the future,
the beneficiary of contributions of people from a variety of cultural and
ethnic backgrounds, we cannot ignore the historical fact that the Canadian
nation was founded on the basis of an understanding between the French and
English- speaking peoples of the colonies in North America, then administered
by Britain, to build a nation encompassing their two cultures and using their
two languages and two legal systems. If that understanding is to be honoured
today, I believe that it can only be fully honoured by a commitment to promote
those two cultures, accommodate the two legal systems and build, in the decades
ahead, a bilingual nation from coast to coast. If this is accepted as the
constitutional precept I believe it to be, then it must also be appropriately
reflected in Parliament and the functioning of our national institutions, and
appropriately accommodated in our constitutional amending formula.
That accommodation can be achieved
through the implementation in a reformed Senate or even in the existing Senate,
of a mechanism of separate linguistic voting on constitutional changes
affecting language, culture, and the civil law system. Such changes would
require the approval of the majority of senators from Quebec separately from,
and in addition to, the approval of the majority of the senators from the other
provinces collectively. This double majority principle could also be extended
in appropriate cases to certain types of federal legislation specifically
altering language or cultural rights.
If the ideal were being pursued,
the Senate would be divided into two divisions with all Senators declaring themselves
to be francophone in one division and all Senators declaring themselves to be
anglophone in the other division, without regard to province or territory of
origin. However, one must recognize that Quebec with eighty-five percent of its
population living and working in the French language is the primary repository
of the French language and culture. As well, only Quebec has the civil law
system. These facts, together with a desire to resolve the constitutional
dilemma facing the country today, justify establishing a limited double
majority veto in the Senate by dividing the Senate into Quebec and non-Quebec
A reformed Senate and the
linguistic voting divisions could be used as well to approve appointments to
the Supreme Court of Canada with an effective veto over appointment of civil
law judges given to Quebec senators and over appointment of common law judges
given collectively to the senators from the other provinces.
Other than amendments affecting
culture, language and the civil law system, I believe every amendment to the
Constitution should become effective upon receiving the approval of the Senate,
the House of Commons and the legislatures of seven of the ten provinces having
fifty percent of the population. Our constitutional development should never be
held captive by the straightjacket that results from either unanimity or a
special status right of veto for a particular province.
It has also been suggested that if
there had been a one-year time limit, the Meech Lake constitutional changes
would have been approved. Many others would say that is in itself the soundest
possible argument against a shorter time limit. Those who blame the changes in
provincial governments within the three-year period for the failure of the
Meech Lake Accord avoid facing the real reason. The truth is that the impact
and nature of the constitutional changes proposed in the Meech Lake Accord
became known to, and sufficiently if not perfectly understood by, the Canadian
people during those three years, and by the end of the period the proposed
changes were totally unacceptably to an overwhelming majority of Canadians. One
can only marvel at the insensitivity to democratic rights displayed by those
who would suggest the time limit should be shortened in order to avoid a
similar opportunity to assess and understand major or complex amendments in the
Whether we have unanimity for some
amendments and the general amending formula for others or the general amending
formula for all, proposed changes should be implemented if, as and when the
appropriate level of approval is achieved. If any legislature thinks the
proposal is outstanding for an undue length of time, it can take action to
rescind its resolution of approval. Either the House of Commons or Senate could
do likewise. The United States, the original federal state, has never had any
difficulty with an amending formula without such a constitutional time limit.
On occasion, the congressional resolution to amend has itself incorporated a
time limit, and this has served very well in any circumstance where a time
limit may for some reason have been desirable. Thus, instead of being
shortened, I would suggest the time limit should be eliminated. It serves no
purpose and could be detrimental.
I do not think there is any merit
whatsoever in suggesting that our existing legislative procedure could be
replaced with either a constitutional convention or a referendum procedure or
even with both. The three methods have different functions. The legislative
procedure provides a means of approving or rejecting a proposal to issue a
proclamation to amend the constitution. A referendum is primarily a means of
ascertaining the wishes of the people but it can also be used as a means of
directly approving or rejecting approval for the issue of the proclamation. A
constitutional convention is a gathering of representatives of the people,
either appointed or elected, or a combination of both, whose mandate it is to
consider all of the alternatives and put forward a specific proposal or
alternative proposals for approval or rejection by either the legislatures or
the people directly in a referendum.
A constitutional convention cannot
be used for an approval process because it would amount to a delegation of authority
to "actually amend" the Constitution without regard to the wishes of
the people or the legislatures, and without being answerable for its actions.
Its function is to develop proposals or achieve a compromise that can
subsequently be submitted either to the legislatures or to the people directly
in a referendum for approval. While a referendum can be used to directly
approve or reject a proposal, in my view it is unwise to eliminate the existing
legislative process and replace it with a referendum process because a
referendum is inappropriate to deal with routine or ordinary amendments where
there is no real doubt or strong opposition. Instead, the legislative model
should remain the basic constitutional amending process with a referendum or
constitutional convention being used to supplement the normal legislative
process where circumstances are such that the legislative process cannot
adequately deal with the magnitude of the proposed changes or the divergence of
opinion on the issue.
A referendum might be called where
there is great controversy as to whether or not a particular proposal should be
accepted. A constitutional convention might be used where major issues might be
involved and there is great divergence of opinion as to what proposal should be
put to the legislatures or the people for approval, in a referendum.
In the current debate, a
constitutional convention would provide the two things essential to achieve a
legitimate and enduring compromise that could then be presented to Parliament and
the Legislatures for entrenchment or submitted to a referendum. Those two
things are: first, a means of exchange of views and adjustment of positions
that could lead to development of a compromise between Quebec and the other
provinces of Canada and amongst Canadians generally and, second, the legitimacy
that can only come from a compromise identified after open public debate of
issues, positions and proposals where the debaters will be aware of and feel
the pressures of public opinion.
Neither the Spicer Commission nor
individual provincial commissions can provide those two essential elements. In
fact, the provincial commissions not only will not provide an opportunity for
such dialogue, their focus will tend to be on matters that are exclusively or
predominantly of concern to the particular province.
Clearly the outstanding
constitutional issues in Canada today are of such a magnitude that they cannot
be dealt with on a simple amendment basis. As well as all of the major issues
involved in responding to Quebec's proposals to address its legitimate concerns
and the amending formula issues set out in the discussion paper, there is also
the major question of Senate reform. When you add to this the fact that there
are strong differences as to the basic concept of the nation as a federal
state, and recognize that a level of acrimony does exist, it is difficult to
imagine any other process that could be used to resolve such problems and
achieve an acceptable compromise.
Our Constitution, at the moment,
takes no provision for a constitutional convention but that should not be an
impediment. The current amending procedures do not specify what process is to
be pursued in arriving at the wording of constitutional amendments to be
submitted to the legislatures and Parliament. It could just as well come from a
constitutional convention as from a first ministers' conference. Any proposal
coming out of the convention would still require the approval of Parliament and
either seven or all ten legislatures to be effective. Even if a compromise were
achieved, feelings are running so high and opinion so divided, a referendum may
still be necessary in order to determine if the proposal would meet with an
acceptable level of approval across the country.
One difficulty that might arise is
in achieving agreement on the manner in which the convention should be
constituted. Because it would have no jurisdiction to enact or implement a
recommendation or decision, the voting of its members would only be a factor in
determining the final recommendations it would put forward. An argument cold be
made for having equal representation for each province but then again an
argument could be made to have representation weighted to take into account
population. Perhaps a fair solution might be to have one half of the membership
divided equally amongst the provinces and the other half based on population.
There would remain the question of whether they should be elected or appointed
by the provincial governments. Perhaps they should be partly appointed and
partly elected. In our present circumstances I would suggest that at least half
should be elected in order to enhance credibility and chances of public
acceptance of the results of their deliberations. The following is one possible
model but I emphasize that any one of a variety of possible models may be
The number of members of a national constituent assembly should be not
less than 100 and not more than 200. At least half of the members should be
elected in order to ensure the credibility of the assembly, and the
acceptability to the electorate of its recommendations.
About half of the elected component should be elected in equal numbers
from each province. The other half should be elected on the basis of
population. Assuming approximately one hundred elected members, this means that
each province could elect 5 members for a total of 50. Each territory could
elect one member. The distribution of elected members on the basis of
population could be as follows: Newfoundland 1, Prince Edward Island 1, Nova
Scotia 2, New Brunswick 2, Quebec 13, Ontario 18, Manitoba 3, Saskatchewan 2,
Alberta 5, British Columbia 6, Yukon 1, Northwest Territories 1, for a total of
54. Under such a proposal the total elected members would be 106.
The remainder of the members could be appointed by the governments and
legislatures. Particular effort should be made to ensure adequate
representation of aboriginal Canadians. Each provincial government and the
federal government could appoint its first minister or attorney-general or an
alternate, together with two other government appointees.
Similarly, each territorial government could appoint its leader or
attorney-general or an alternate. This would add thirty-two provincial and
territorial appointed members.
Thirty-five other members could be appointed on the basis of population
by the provincial legislatures. The distribution could be as follows:
Newfoundland 1, Prince Edward Island 1, Nova Scotia 1, New Brunswick 1, Quebec
9, Ontario 12, Manitoba 2, Saskatchewan 1, Alberta 3 and British Columbia 4.
Each legislature would determine its own rules for such appointees provided
that they should not be members of the provincial cabinet and that they need
not be legislators.
Finally, twenty other members should be appointed by the federal
government. Again, the federal government would determine its own rules for
these appointees and would of course have to satisfy Parliament.
These issues should be able to be
resolved. In the event that agreement could not be reached the matter could be
resolved by Parliament. Clearly, as matters now stand Parliament would have
jurisdiction to establish and set the groundrules for such a convention in any
In conclusion, I suggest that it is
vitally important to establish a constitutional amending process, for the long
term, which is more sensitive to the views and opinions of the people of Canada
than our existing procedures.