Report of the Special Committee on Reform
of The House Of Commons, document tabled in the House of Commons, June 18,
1985, 124 p.
In his classic mid-nineteenth study The
English Constitution, Walter Bagehot described the British Parliament as
"nothing less than a big meeting of more or less idle people." If
this description ever rang true for the Canadian House of Commons, it would not
do so for very long after the adoption of the various changes recommended in
the Report of the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons. The role
of the individual legislator would be greatly' magnified, as a result of
variations in the nature of the confidence convention and party discipline. MPs
would actively participate in the policy, process, scrutinize order-in-council
appointments, and review the details of delegated legislation. Such tasks would
certainly counter the view of backbenchers once expressed by former Liberal MP
Phil Givens who said: "The average Liberal MP is as useless as teats on a
bull." The enhancement of MPs' roles and participation would have the
ultimate result of returning Parliament itself to centre stage in the political
process. Or so the Report would have us believe.
Crucial to an understanding and assessment
of the Report is one's view of the nature of parliamentary sovereignty,. While
few would disagree that the Canadian Parliament has lost much of its reputed
power in the modern era (at least since the development of a fairly rigid
pattern of party discipline in the House of Commons), it is more open to
challenge just how much Parliament ever really, produced legislation on its
own, that is. its centrality in policy making. This point is crucial, for the
Report is predicated on the assumption that something that has been lost
(possibly our political innocence?) can be regained through internal reforms of
the House of Commons. The following passage is illustrative of this outlook:
"The purpose of reform of the House of Commons in 1985 is to restore to
private members an effective legislative function, to give them a meaningful role
in the formation of public policy and, in so doing, to restore the House of
Commons to its rightful place in the Canadian political process" (p. 1
emphasis added).
I think it can easily be argued that
Parliament is more significant in 1985 than ever before. In comparison to
earlier times, Parliament now sits longer and passes more legislation in more
areas of social and economic policy, than ever before. Moreover, the House of
Commons played a particularly significant role in the constitutional reform battle
of 1980-1982. Similarly, we should not forget the defeat of the minority
Progressive Conservative government in December, 1979. While such actions are
obviously, not everyday occurrences, these examples should at least belie the
apparent necessity. for holding an immediate wake for parliamentary, government
in Canada. Do we really want to return to the halcyon days of Mackenzie King's
vaunted consultations of Parliament.
What has happened and been forgotten in this
Report is that power between institutions is relative. Parliament may have
declined in relative, not practical terms, while other institutions,
particularly the political executive and bureaucracy, have gained. If this
assertion is true, then internal reforms of the House of Commons will not
likely, reassert Parliament as a central actor in the policy process. For
example, MPs assumed an ombudsman role in recent decades because public
expectations of their tasks changed, not because they, were out of something to
do on Parliament Hill. The public's perception of Parliament will likely, have
more to do with institutional survival than procedural tinkerings of
parliamentarians.
As a result of its misconception about the
reality of parliamentary sovereignty, the Report has a second weakness, namely,
a rather idealized view of the potential role of the individual citizen in the
political process. Parliament is seen as a conduit through which the mass
public can participate in policy, development. However, what evidence exists
seems to suggest that the public neither cares what Parliament does nor pays
much attention to it. Parliament's attentive public seems to be excruciatingly
small. As a result, procedures designed to allow easier access of the public to
Parliament, such as the proposed changes for the receipt of public petitions
(pp. 44-45), will likely be used primarily, by special interest groups and not
the general public at all.
A supportable proposition about attitudes
toward Parliament might be phrased as follows: oppositions adore it, governments
seek to make it more efficient. As Wilfrid Laurier once put it: "Reforms
are for Oppositions. It is the business of governments to stay in office."
As the usual party of opposition in federal
politics since 1921, a pattern perhaps dramatically shifted by the September,
1984 election, the Progressive Conservative party has made a habit of
proclaiming the need to strengthen Parliament. Finding itself in power has
created a problem for the Tories: Is the political will really there to enhance
the powers of the Commons? One suspects that the longer the Conservatives are
in power, the less likely the chance for that political will to be in evidence.
After the success of the Liberal and NDP attacks on their first budget and the
reversal of the Tories on their planned de-indexing of old age pensions, the
Mulroney Government might come to the conclusion that Parliament is already
strong enough. A government or opposition perception of the value of Parliament
depends on which side of the green aisle they sit.
The real crux of parliamentary reform is how
to convince the government of the day to give up some of its own powers. There
are likely few examples in the history of government of a party in power
voluntarily relinquishing its grasp on government. To increase the power of the
average MP in policymaking and of Parliament in total is to adopt reforms which
will likely reduce, in relative terms, the pow6rs of the Prime Minister and
cabinet. It seems unlikely that the trends of recent decades toward "presidentializing"
Canadian parliamentary practice can be reversed by good intentions and more
active backbenchers.
The Report stresses attitudinal changes on
the part of the government, opposition, and individual MPs in relation to two
key areas: confidence motions and party discipline. Attitudinal change is
necessary, but not likely sufficient, in this respect. The proposals do not
explain, for example, how we are to get out of the practice of rigid party
discipline in the first place. Which develops first: a relaxation of party
discipline or attitudinal change? Good intentions do not necessarily make
either good politics or adequate reforms.
As long as party discipline remains a
government decision, effective parliamentary reform will be illusory. For
example, even under present practices, a free vote does not automatically mean
that party discipline is not implicitly involved. Thus, the suggestion that the
Speaker of the House of Commons should be chosen by a secret ballot (Report, p.
100) may not be effective in taking the real power of choice away, from the
Prime Minister and returning it to the House. After reading the report one is
left in agreement with a current assessment of parliamentary reform in Britain.
"The history of parliamentary reform is littered with good intentions left
unfulfilled ......
Ron Landes, Department of Political Science, Saint Mary's
University, Halifax