At the time this article was written R.M.
Bums was the founder and former Director of the Institute of Inter-govemmental
Relations at Queen's University..
The present interest in reform of the Canadian
Senate is not a product of any newly awakened concern for parliamentary reform.
If it were we might be encouraged to hope that as a by-product we might find
some political interest in electoral reform instead of such interest being
confined to quite a small academic circle. The concern with making the Senate a
more effective body of regional representation is almost entirely the result of
the growing fragmentation of Canada as federal and provincial political leaders
vie with each other for a place on the national news. It is not that such
interest is unjustified or that regional concerns are without validity, but
rather that the whole process has become confused and misdirected. It is time
for us to seek out some first principles as well as a few essential priorities
before we commit ourselves to the future.
Originally, second chambers or upper houses
were designed to retain power for the ruling classes, faced with the growth of
the popularly elected assembly or lower house. A second chamber could forestall
the acts of the assembly when its actions were considered ill-advised or when
they trespassed upon established interests (often regarded as much the same
thing). In a federal system an additional function is brought into operation.
Given that the main legislative body is popularly elected on a basis of
national representation by population, the second chamber is seen as a means of
bringing greater political balance for the less populated units of the
federation.
With the growth of regional interests and
prejudices in modern federal systems, interest in second chamber reform has
been concentrated increasingly on the regional purpose. The function of review
or "sober second thought" has tended to fall into the background as
existing bodies have often failed to exercise this function either with
objectivity or consistency.
The problem we face is twofold. How can a
national second chamber aid in the rationalization of both regional and
national needs and of special issues while at the same time providing an objective
scrutiny of legislation fundamentally national in nature?
In their consideration of a Canadian Senate,
the Fathers of Confederation were strongly influenced by their knowledge of the
role of the British House of Lords. They were, as well, fully aware of the
importance of the second chamber in a federal system as representative of
regional interests in the national government. But they also viewed the
American Civil War as being caused by 'State rights" which made them
suspicious of too great concessions to provincial powers in matters of national
import. They attempted to reach an acceptable compromise between national and
provincial interests by way of regional divisions for second chamber
representation. But it was soon apparent that they had been more successful in
devising a chamber of review than one that could effectively reflect regional
concerns. A workable solution to this latter part of the problem remains a
constant objective.
In Canada over the years, intermittent
discussion of Senate reform has been concentrated more on the method of
selection and the consequent lack of any positive role for the Senate than on
its shortcomings as a regional (provincial) representative in the national
parliament.
Selection: The Present System
The present method of appointment by the
Governor General (actually by the Prime Minister in consultation with the party
organization) has resulted in the Senate becoming something of a house of
political refuge or retirement. Certainly this is how it is generally perceived
by the public, Geographically it is unbalanced in representation. Politically
it is unrepresentative of important elements of political belief in Canada.
This method of selection has resulted in a
body ill-suited to the understanding of the rapidly changing facets of Canadian
life. But even if such an understanding existed, the Senate would be largely
ineffective in a conflict with the policies of a government supported by a
majority in the elected House.
The end result of the present process is
that members of the present Senate generally tend to lose any continuing
character as regional representatives. They become residents of the Red Chamber
rather than of the provinces from which they came. To a large extent they are
insulated from most influences beyond their immediate political scene. They owe
no political loyalties and party lines are not as tight as they are in the
Commons. But these loyalties, nevertheless remain and are a greater force than
any regional attachments. Even if this were not so, the lack of an active
political base would make members ill-equipped to oppose the House effectively
on issues of real importance, regional or otherwise. While the Senate has acted
on occasion with distinction in special situations and even sometimes as a body
of "sober second thought", its impact as a house of regional
representation has been minimal.
Selection: Alternative Methods
There are some other obvious alternatives
available to the present system of federal appointment in which the essence of
the present dissatisfaction is found:
By Joint Power of Appointment
It has been argued that what is needed is a
voice representative of provincial interests. Proposals have been made for
equal sharing of the power of appointment by the two levels of government.
Various methods have been offered as in the original federal plan in Bill C60.
While the system of joint appointment might be the most easily adaptable to
existing conditions, many observers question whether the sharing of the power
of appointment would accomplish much in providing more effective regional
representation. In actual practice we might merely substitute confusion for
inaction. Varied provincial interests might move in and out of floating
coalitions among themselves and/or the federal appointees. True, there would be
a greater regional voice but it would often be distorted and ill-expressed.
There is neither reason to expect a higher calibre of appointments from such a
process nor an elimination of the shortcomings of the present institution.
Joint appointment does not seem likely to provide any useful answers.
By Exclusive Provincial Appointment
Many of the same judgments apply to
exclusive provincial appointment. Choice by the premiers instead of by the
Prime Minister might result in a greater concern for regional interests, at
least until the appointees were acclimatized to the atmosphere of the Red
Chamber. But unless the appointments were of a higher calibre (which there is
no reason to expect) the problems now experienced with a politically appointed
second chamber would remain.
In the search for alternatives, the example
of the Federal Republic of Germany in its selection of the Bundesrat has
attracted considerable interest. Here the (states) are directly represented in
the second chamber by their executives. Insofar as matters of fundamental
concern to the land governments are involved such representation by direct
governmental participation has much to recommend it. In this way the desired
criterion of popular election is also present, if indirectly. A line of
responsibility is provided which is a direct link between those responsible for
the affairs of the regions and those who hold the legislative powers in the
national government.
But because a system works in one country is
no reason to guarantee that it will work in another, even though there is much
that can be learned by example. Historical, political, geographic and national
characteristics tend to be more homogeneous and better disciplined in West
Germany than in a fluid and diverse society such as ours. The public attitudes
which in the past have made for effective co-operation between the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat certainly do not now exist in Canada.
In the post-war years of its new existence,
the Federal Republic experienced a political climate which made co-operation
essential. A similar need, although much less urgent, made federal-provincial
co-operation much easier in Canada in the 1940s and 1950s than it has been
since. The current situation in West Germany, however, appears to have
deteriorated as the problems of opposing political aims in the two houses have
resulted in a breakdown of the former harmony. With Canada's current regional
fragmentation a continuing harmony between a provincially controlled second
chamber and the national government cannot be taken for granted.
Various attempts have been made to adapt the
German system to Canadian conditions. While the proposals vary in detail,
essentially they provide for provincial representation through direct appointment
to the second chamber of representatives of the provincial government. They
would vote en bloc on matters of direct provincial concern over which they held
an absolute veto. Other matters would, in most cases, be governed by a
suspensive veto only. The terms of provincial government representatives would
generally coincide with that of the government appointing them.
When a proposal along these lines was made
by British Columbia in 1978, the Government of Canada showed some interest.
Other provinces received the idea more coolly. Since that time provincial
interest has increased substantially, but there is now reason to wonder whether
the national government can consent to such provincial control of its
constitutional powers. Some consider the procedure inconsistent with basic
federal principles. And while it can be argued that a limited provincial voice
in the second chamber is necessary. to many there can be little justification
for giving power to the provinces over matters specifically national in
character.
Consent might be more easily forthcoming if
the role of a provincially controlled second chamber was limited to specified
areas of direct provincial involvement such as the use of the discretionary
power, the spending power, federal legislation in matters under provincial
administration. etc. These are often referred to as Category A powers.
Responsibility for matters primarily of national interest (known as Category B
powers) could be left exclusively to the Federal Parliament or alternatively as
the British Columbia revised proposal suggested, to a jointly appointed body.
This situation was tacitly recognized in a
report of the Continuing Committee of Ministers on a New Upper House dated
September 812, 1980. In it a new institution was proposed representative of all
provinces equally, with the Government of Canada having the right to appear
before it, but not to vote.
The powers of this institution, to be known
as the "Council of Provinces", would cover a limited field,
essentially of Category A items, with other related interests. A two-thirds
majority would be necessary for approval of matters coming before it. Those
concerned with French language or culture would require the acquiescence of
Quebec.
An important aspect of the report was the limitation
it proposed for provincial powers. No mention was made of any power of review
of Category B matters that is those primarily of national responsibility and
concern.
No further action appears to have been taken
with respect to these proposals by the first ministers. Its importance lies in
its recognition of the limits of provincial interest. There is also a strong
similarity to certain existing institutions in its "Council of
Provinces", such as the First Ministers' Conferences and those of the provincial
premiers.
In considering the various ways in which a
second chamber might be formed, it is essential to remember that it is an
integral part of the national governmental structure. The confidence of the
elected members (at least a majority of them) is necessary to the life of a
government. While the second chamber cannot directly affect a government's
claim to office, any system of selection which imperils that necessary
confidence and which fertilizes dispute, must be regarded with concern. Even though
there is no direct effect there can be important indirect pressures. The extent
to which these will operate will depend on the breadth of the powers involved.
If these are limited to acts of the central government which directly affect
the provinces (Category A), the authority of Parliament, while constrained,
will not usually be seriously infringed upon. It is a practical acknowledgement
of the complex nature of the federal system under which we operate.
But if the powers of a provincially
appointed second chamber, particularly one that is directly representative of
the provincial government, go beyond this (even if only to a suspensive veto on
Category B powers), one might well question the real extent of the national
government's powers to initiate and implement policies which might be contrary
to the wishes of some, at least, of the provinces.
The British Columbia proposal of 1978
attempted to meet this by making any second chamber vote on Category B matters
a free vote, unfettered by the controlled bloc voting of Category A. But, given
the nature of appointment, it is questionable how effective this freedom could
be on matters contrary to the policies of the provincial government which made
the appointments. To some extent the situation could be remedied by making
provision for tenure for a specific period for members who were not of the
provincial government itself. The area of government influence would remain. A
revised British Columbia proposal for equal federal representation on Category
B matters would increase federal authority but might also provide an added
opportunity for friction, if past experience is to be relied upon.
By Direct Popular Election
There is a good deal of support for the
direct election of the second chamber under some form of popular franchise.
More often than not, this seems based more on democratic sentiment than on any
base of functional understanding. What has not yet been clarified or perhaps
even considered sufficiently in this debate is whether we are seeking to develop
another level of representative government or what is essentially an instrument
of control within the governmental structure that is already in place.
Insofar as Category A matters are concerned
we are looking for an informed influence in the protection of certain basic
provincial interests not some new elected legislative body. It may be that this
influence could be more effectively exercised by those who have some direct
link to the responsibility (such as members or appointees of the provincial
governments) rather than by those whose election could be based on other and
often unrelated considerations. The influence of party loyalties cannot be
ignored. We might sometimes find a lack of political harmony between provincial
governments and those elected to protect provincial interests. The results
could add to the paralysis that often now seems to pervade federal and
provincial relationships.
This is a problem of no small significance
in our parliamentary form of government. We have only to consider experience
with the Australian Senate to cause us to wonder whether popular election to
the second chamber can provide any useful answers. In the Australian case, some
of the delegates to the original Constitutional Committee saw the development
of partisan political influences as overriding the regional responsibilities.
Experience has borne them out, for a recent study shows that on nearly all
occasions elected Senators have voted according to their party affiliations
rather than according to their states. How serious this can be for effective
operation of the national government was illustrated by the crisis in Australia
of November 1975. On that occasion the Senate refused to pass supply on the
basis of considerations largely of a partisan nature. Given the fragmented
nature of Canadian party politics, such a situation here is not hard to
envisage. The life of a government could be one of continuing uncertainty, if
it were to be responsible to two elected houses.
There are a number of side influences which must
also be considered. From the Federal Government's point of view, an elected
second chamber has some positive attractions despite its dangers for the
effective operation of the parliamentary system. Emphasis on its popular
democratic form could diffuse the growing regional drive for important direct
provincial power over areas of federal authority. Much would, of course, depend
on how the elections turned out, whether on the side of the government or of
its opponents.
From the provincial side it is hard to see
what attractions an elected chamber might have. Regardless of how it was
elected and regardless of where the political control lay, the provincial voice
would be beyond the direct control of the provincial government and often
beyond its influence. Even the activities of the federal-provincial conference
structure could be seriously weakened by the existence of an elected second
chamber.
By Means of An Electoral College
An electoral college, or some such
institution, which would be charged with the selection of the best people
available from the community at large, has been suggested as a way of
insulating the second chamber from direct partisan influences. It could be
selected in a number of different ways: by unilateral federal appointment, by
joint appointment or by popular election. Aside from the opportunity for
increased objectivity, an important consideration, most of the same factors
would apply as in direct election. However, in the case of popular election of
the electoral college, any political challenge to the supremacy of the lower
house by a second chamber so chosen would be less evident than where direct
election of members had taken place.
Conclusions
Many will question the wisdom of giving
provincial governments any extensive powers over national government
activities, These are regarded as a proper responsibility of Parliament which
does ' in fact, enjoy a legitimate claim to regional representation in areas of
its constitutional interests. Admittedly such a claim might be more persuasive
if necessary electoral reforms to provide a better balanced representation in
the House were to be undertaken. It might make more sense to remove from the
Constitution any federal powers which infringe upon basic provincial rights.
There does not appear to be any easy answer.
A second chamber that can perform as a satisfactory agency of review is not
likely to be appropriate to the exercise of regional representation ' Perhaps
the answer lies in not asking one body to perform the two tasks. The solution
may lie in limiting provincial participation to Category A matters. If a body
representative of provincial governments were to be empowered with an absolute
veto under some prearranged majority requirement such as two-thirds of the
provinces representing fifty per cent of the population the basic needs of the
provinces would be met. Such ancillary powers over appointments, as have been
discussed, could be added as necessary.
There will be difficulties in defining what
should constitute Category A matters. But these would seem to be quite few in
number and the answer should not be beyond us if we want to find it. Perhaps if
these matters could be clearly defined and entrenched in the Constitution,
there would be less need for a special body to oversee the protection of
provincial rights. Until a body of law is built up, however, some judicial body
would have to be empowered to decide disputes. Whether this should be the
Supreme Court of Canada or some form of constitutional court would have to be
decided.
If we look more closely at what we already
have, we may discover that a new body to protect provincial interests is not
really required at all. One may already exist in the ongoing system of
federal-provincial conferences at various levels of authority. If given
constitutional recognition and provided with the proper support structure, the
Federal-Provincial Conference of First Ministers could fill the role at least
as effectively as any newly established chamber. It would have the additional
advantage of having established federal and provincial governmental
participation in the discussion and resolution of matters at hand. The powers
and voting procedures would have to be worked out and there would undoubtedly
be difficulties, particularly in the fixing of the extent of federal voting
powers. But matters that would be before the conference would be of national
impact and an active federal role rather than a purely advisory one would be
essential to success. If such federal participation cannot be agreed upon, the
rules could be so ordered that federal participation would be limited to where
matters of purely national concern were involved.
Such an arrangement might appear to require
extensive bureaucratic organization, but that is unlikely to be any more extensive
than that needed by any new parliamentary body. It should be remembered that
the German Bundesrat, on whose example so much of current thinking rests, has
an extensive structure of bureaucracy. The basic activities of the Bundesrat
itself are largely concerned with the approval of the recommendations of its
support organization (other than on purely political questions). Some observers
have suggested that the Bundesrat is really more a branch of the executive
government than a true legislative body.
Under such a system, responsibility for
Sober second thought" could be left to the present Senate, to some
modification of it, or in case of its abolition, the Commons itself could
assume such responsibilities through a modernization of its procedures. This is
an area in which provinces need have no direct involvement. For while they are
obviously concerned in the results of national policies, it is in protection
against federal actions in areas infringing upon their basic interests that
they are most concerned. If that is not the case the whole concept of the
federal division of powers is called into question.
If there is any lesson to be learned from
our search of an acceptable solution, it is that there are no final or perfect
answers to the problems of a federal system. Simplicity and clarity are
essential assets and far too many of the proposals for second chamber reform
are so complex that there is no way of knowing just what their effect will be
in actual practice. The best we can hope for is a system that will work if we
really want it to. "For forms of government let fools contest; whate'er is
best administered is best" (Alexander Pope)