At the time this article was
written Christopher Dun was a Professor of Political Science at Memorial
University in Newfoundland.
A recent issue of this review
contained articles by two senators who disagreed about the legal and
constitutional interpretation of the concept of responsible government as
applied to the role of the Senate. (1) This is a healthy debate; the
implications of responsible government should be explored in detail in our
parliamentary system. This article however reviews the implications of
responsible government in a wider context. It suggests that the traditional
meaning of responsible government may be too narrow and could benefit by a
rethinking.
Senator Roblin, as many others
before him have done, defines the principle of responsible government in this
way: "that the government as represented in the House of Commons has the
right to govern the country ... because ... it still retains within the House
of Commons the power to command a majority of those who sit in that chamber".(12)
(He also takes proper care to associate this principle with that of
representative government.) His definition is an example of the traditional
"elective" meaning of responsible government. A ministry is said to
owe its existence to the support of a majority of members in the Commons; the
Commons has the right to dismiss a ministry. By enforcing this convention the
House of Commons ensures the accountability of the executive to itself and
ultimately to the Canadian people.
Many observers have realised that
the "elective" definition of responsible government is no longer
sufficient. Speaking of Britain, A.H. Birch said:
The maintenance of a united front
[by Cabinet] is held in such high esteem by the general public that,
significantly, and quite recently, a new linguistic usage has developed. A
government is now commonly said to be `taking responsibility' when it takes a
collective action and uses the whips to ensure parliamentary support for it,
and to be `shedding' `evading responsibility' if it permits a free vote on the
matter. (3)
Speaking of Ontario, and by
implication the common Canadian case, Schindeler says, "It is no great
concession for a Government to accept responsibility for its deeds of omission
and commission because neither the legislature nor the general public had the
wherewithal to call it to account."(4) Furthermore "to use such terms
[individual and collective responsibility] with the intent of describing
actualities is at best anachronistic and at worst entirely misleading."(5)
Contemporary analysts have tried to
fashion a more inclusive definition of responsible government. T.A. Hockin
noted that the modern understanding of responsible government is an amalgam of
three themes.(6) There is the 1848 theme, that is, the acceptance of
Parliament's power to dismiss sitting governments. There is, secondly, the
notion of the government's duty to answer criticisms and furthermore to provide
Parliament and the opposition with timely and adequate opportunities to
scrutinise, to debate and to make detailed arguments. Thirdly, responsible
government means not the interjection of the opposition directly into the
decision-making process, as it did previous to 1848, but instead is the myth
legitimising cabinet domination. The opposition seeks the confidence of the
electorate, not of the House (7) However such insights have not found their way
into mainstream textbooks.(8)
Wide as the Hockin definition is,
however, perhaps we need to become even more inclusive, and to see responsible
government as an organising principle for executive-legislative relations.
Responsible government must imply Cabinet controls on the executive government
as well as Cabinet accountability to the House. There must be executive and
legislative aspects of responsible government, in other words. Norman Ward,
using J.E. Hodgetts as an inspiration, perhaps said it best:
responsible government means more
than the political life of the executive depends on the support of a majority
of the members of the elected legislature. Behind the executive, government
departments must be so organised that ministers can exercise a control for
which they can be held responsible.(9)
Ward's insight was the inspiration
for the gist of a commissioned research paper which the present author did for the
Macdonald Royal Commission in 1984. (10) The paper noted that the term
collective responsibility could be used in a narrow and in a broad sense. The
narrow sense was the traditional "elective" definition referred to
earlier. The broader definition included not only the elective meaning, but
executive and legislative aspects as well. The executive aspects were
"enhanced executive co-ordination and control." The legislative
aspects were the provision of "instruments to allow legislative influence
on, but not direct participation in, public decision-making." (11)
Some measures that enhance
executive co-ordination and control are those that:
involve cabinet ministers in each others portfolios in a management or
advisory role
provide for an increase in information sharing among cabinet ministers
allow cabinet staff to identify issues for collective cabinet decisions
in a formal environment
Some measures that allow legislative influence on public decision-making
are those that:
enhance the disclosure of general government plans, priorities and
records to the legislature
strengthen the role of committees of the legislature or that otherwise
give the legislature the power to check the freedom of movement of the
executive, without checkmating it.
The Macdonald Royal Commission
apparently agreed with the notion of a narrow/broad definitional dichotomy, for
it adopted one in its main Report. The narrow definition was the elective one;
the broad definition highlighted measures that enhanced the representative
role, rather than the party role of Commons members:
Responsible government is seen as
healthy to the extent that Members of Parliament bring to their assessment of
the executive's performance an adequate knowledge of the diversity of interests
extant in our national politics and an effective capacity to represent that
diversity. This in turn, requires some relaxation of party discipline in
selected areas so that the representative role of MPs can have public
expression. It also requires that Parliament serve as a central forum for the
interaction of interests groups and governments.(12)
The Royal Commission as well
appeared to adopt the notion of marrying the executive and legislative aspects
of responsible government.
Responsible government is the
fundamental basis of democracy within a parliamentary system. In Canada, this
system has two essential requirements: first, that Cabinet be effectively in
control of the federal government in all its organisational forms, and
secondly, that Cabinet be accountable to Parliament for all executive actions,
including the management of the administrative state. Logically, the latter
requirement depends on the former.(13)
Not all observers agree with
restricting responsible government to its elective sense. We conclude with a
note on the utility of a broader definition of responsible government in
Canada. The traditional elective approach has been to focus on the power of the
House to make or break ministries. However it says little of the crucial period
between the making and breaking of the quality of the relationship between the
executive and the legislature, and between the Cabinet and the bureaucracy, and
by implication between the state and its citizens. As an organising principle,
responsible government can be used to link many institutional elements. In an
era when Senate reform, Commons reform, reorganisation of the machinery of
government and general constitutional renewal are so high on the pubic agenda,
perhaps we have to go back to first principles. We may even have to notify them
if necessary! Reform without an understanding of basic objectives may be
futile. Hopefully our analysis may provoke even more discussion of the meaning
of responsible government.
Notes
1. Senator Douglas Everett and
Senator Duff Roblin, " A Question of Responsible Government," Canadian
Parliamentary Review, 11:1 (Spring 1988), pp. 14-17, at pp. 16-17.
2. Ibid., p. 16
3. A.H. Birch, Representative
and Responsible Government, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1969, p.
138.
4. F.F. Schindeler, Responsible
Government in Ontario, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1969, p. 267.
5. Ibid., pp. 268-69.
6. Thomas A. Hockin, "Flexible
and Structured Parliamentarianism: From 1848 to Contemporary Party
Government," Journal of Canadian Studies 14 (Summer 1979):18-17.
7. Ibid.
8. An exception to the general
pattern is Michael M. Atkinson, "Parliamentary Government in Canada,"
in Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams (eds.) Canadian Politics in the
1980s, Methuen, Toronto, 1984. Atkinson expertly traces the overshadowing
of traditional notions of responsibility, but he then seems to define it as
"the government facing the opposition in Parliament and two teams of party
leaders struggling for support in the electorate" (p. 337). This is a
rather weak substitute.
9. Norman Ward, The Public
Purse: A Study in Canadian Democracy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto,
1962, p. 22.
10. Christopher Dunn, Responsible
Government and the Budgetary Process in Western Canada, A Study prepared
for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for
Canada, November, 1984.
11. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
12. Canada, Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Macdonald Commission), Report
(3 volumes), Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada, 1985, Volume III, part V,
p. 36.
13. Ibid., p. 36.