At the time this article was published
John Reid was the Member of Parliament for Kenora Rainy River. He served as
Minister of State for Federal-Provincial Relations from 1978-1979.
Federal provincial conferences have become a
quasi institutional part of our system of government. It is sometimes argued
that these conferences leave federal and provincial parliamentarians with the
largely perfunctory role of debating decisions which have already been taken.
In this article a former minister responsible for federal-provincial relations
tries to separate fact from fiction regarding federal-provincial conferences
and their implications for politics in this country.
I want to advance three propositions about
the use of federal-provincial conferences in Canada and discuss them in the
light of my experience on Parliament Hill. The first proposition is that the
rapid increase in what is essentially an ad hoc mechanism has serious
consequences for members of federal and provincial legislatures who may be
asked to approve, in a rubberstamp fashion, decisions of the eleven
governments. A second proposition is that members of the opposition, in voicing
their disapproval of government action, may well take on the role as
"defenders of the provinces" and thereby weaken their position as
"speaking for all of Canada" and as a government in waiting". I
do not mean that provincial governments do not need defenders in Parliament or
the federal government in provincial legislatures, but we should recognize that
this is a problem.
The third proposition is that political
party distinctions decrease in significance when debating federal-provincial
problems and that regionalism becomes of greater import than party differences.
The Nature of Federal Provincial
Proposals
Following a federal-provincial conference,
parliament and the legislatures are often asked to approve measures which have
originated outside their respective jurisdictions. Matters such as energy
pricing, the economy. the constitution, pensions and other issues are clearly
of such importance that federal and provincial members will argue that their
direct participation in the formulation and approval of legislation on these
subjects is imperative. Alternatively, governments may take action within their
own authority, perhaps through the use of regulatory powers, to Implement
agreements without the necessity of parliament or the provincial legislatures
being asked to give their consent. Like the iceberg, some 95% of
federal-provincial meetings between governments are not reported at all, since
they take place between officials. The results of those deliberations, however,
often show up in regulatory decisions as well as legislative initiatives
without any formal link to the federal-provincial relations process.
Since such events clearly do take place, can
it be argued that the federal parliament or the provincial legislatures are
being weakened? Is the quick passage of measures originating elsewhere
tantamount to "rubberstamping"? I am, at the very least, reluctant to
say "yes". After all quick passage, or slow passage, of a bill is by
no means unique to federal-provincial legislative matters. Whether there is a
majority or minority government parliament, when dealing with government
proposals, invariably makes a decision, either actively or passively. This is
not to say, however. that legislative proposals stemming from
federal-provincial discussions are not in origin different from government
initiatives.
Federal-provincial proposals may be a
response to issues which occur at a time when the government of the day has not
the advantage of using its resources as it normally would. That is to say
external factors may determine when the central government has to bring forward
certain measures. The subject matter brought forward for parliament's approval
may not be a part of the government's legislative intentions as outlined in a
Throne Speech. The subject matter may not have received the ruling party's
approbation as evidenced through the mechanism of regional and national policy
conventions. If expenditures are contemplated, or tax increases envisioned,
such proposals may not be a part of the government's anticipated expenses as announced
in the estimates or indicated in a budget speech.
But none of these considerations are unique
to measures stemming from federal-provincial discussions. Parliament and
legislatures may, well be called upon to give their approval to government
measures during the course of a session, or a parliament, about which they had
no previous notice.
Furthermore not all legislation emanating
from federal-provincial discussions raises more wrath in the House than that
originating from the government. It is quite clear that the public and private
deliberations of such meetings can generate a great deal of controversy. Anyone
who has watched even one federal-provincial conference on television is aware
of the acts of intransigence, the forceful protection of interests, the
shameless parochial speeches, and even at times, actions which threaten the
very fabric of the federal state. Consider the forum, the panopoly of experts,
the armada of media people. a round table, a "U" table ... all enough
to make an admirer of the United Nations at its most acrimonious, feel at home.
Such conferences have become a "big show" and conflict is the name of
the game.
When the results of such turbulent affairs
reach the floor of the House of Commons in the form of a bill. It is something
of an anticlimax. Wounds have been suffered and bound up, sides taken,
compromises made. all before a bill appears on the Order Paper. Remember, most
legislation of a federal-provincial nature is a compromise between the federal
government and the provincial governments. While this is not to say, that
controversy is absent the roots of which can be traced to prior
federal-provincial conferences, there is little to rival the sexless nature of
such a bill.
One reason for this state of affairs is that
the federal-provincial forum contains the entire spectrum of political parties
found throughout the country. They include those who may not have
representation in Ottawa, such as the Social Credit Party in British Columbia.
If the bill has resulted from a federal-provincial compromise, then there is
very little for the parties in parliament to say. Such a bill goes through with
little intense debate.
Since all federal political parties are
usually represented at federal-provincial conferences in one way or another,
all parties have a stake In the discussions. If an agreement is reached, the
necessity of implementing it usually extends to all parties In parliament and
in other legislatures. In effect, the house is more anxious "to do the
right thing" with federal-provincial legislation than it is with other
legislative initiatives.
Regionalism and the Central Government
There is another aspect to legislation of a
federal-provincial nature. What I have discussed so far is legislation coming
from a conference in which the governments all agreed. Now I shall look at
federal-provincial legislation where there may be a division between the
federal government and the provinces, or a split between some provinces and the
federal government.
In the unbalanced political situation we now
have, with the federal government drawing its support from three of the four
regions of the country, but having no provincial governments held by, its
provincial wings, some provincial initiatives may be seen as the voices of
those parts who have no government representation other than from members of
the opposition. Of course, the federal government will claim with equal
certainty that it governs for all the country. When the parliamentary process
works well, the opposition is able to articulate its views and in turn the
government can take due cognizance of the views espoused.
But what of the view that the opposition may
tend to become defenders of the provinces" and thereby, minimize their
role as federal legislators?
When we have a bill that effects
federal-provincial relations and where there is no agreement between the
federal and provincial governments, then we have a situation which causes many,
problems for parties represented in parliament. Since most parties have sister
parties in the provinces, the conflict between what may be seen in the national
interest" and what may be seen as a "provincial interest", or
regional interests puts parties and individual members on the spot. We have
seen this problem in the constitutional debate as well as the debate on the
National Energy! Policy. I shall not spend any, time reviewing the specific
impact of these two federal-provincial questions on the various parties in
parliament except to say that they have caused a greal deal of pain and anguish
to those caught in the middle. But I will dram, some conclusions in general
terms about the problem I raised earlier, the position of parties in the
federal house defending provincial governments, and of course, the opposite
situation in provincial legislatures.
If a party wishes to assume the mantle of
defender of the provinces, it brings into question its assumed role as a
"government-in-waiting". The opposition it presents would not be on
its own terms but rather on those chosen by the provincial governments and
usually amended somewhat by the party involved. The party's freedom of
manoeuvre becomes less and, to some extent, it gives up its own national
vision. If that happens, then the party finds it difficult to make decisions on
other policy issues as well. One does try to keep ones allies satisfied. Such a
system puts more pressure on a party seeking to present alternative national
points of view. It can lead to parties ending up with a shifting regional point
of view. I want to emphasize that this can happen to a party whether it forms
the government or sits in opposition.
In addition to the advantage of the
political affinities the opposition may have with its provincial counterparts,
there is currently one parliamentary mechanism which enables the opposition to
focus on initiatives coming from intergovernmental talks denied to the
government backbencher. I refer to the concept of supply days. These days are
in the control of opposition, permitting them to discuss a subject of their
choice on 25 sitting days a year. These days can be used to champion, or
otherwise, the views of the provincial governments, or an alternative view of
federal-provincial relations. There is considerable scope for the opposition in
their field but it does not seem to be used significantly to discuss
federal-provincial affairs except in a peripheral way.
Implications for Parliament and
Legislatures
The growth in federal-provincial conferences
cannot be neatly divided into consequences for the government and/or consequences
for the rest of the members of the house. Rather cause for concern exists In
terms of the implications for parliament and legislatures and in particular for
those who are not a part of the cabinet, but members of the opposition as well
as supporters of the government. Ministers ought to be able to protect
themselves.
There is enough hue and cry that members of
parliament cannot cope with existing bureaucratic structures. In
federal-provincial relations there is another growth of bureaucracy. This new
growth is much more difficult for members to penetrate because parts of it are
once removed from most departments. At the federal level it is more frustrating
for members because the practice has been not to centralize federal-provincial
decision-making at any level, even when the experiment with ministers of state
for federal-provincial relations was tried. At the federal level, each
department makes its own accommodations with provincial governments; we do not
have the equivalent of a minister responsible for federal-provincial relations,
with a relationship similar to that of the Secretary of State for External
Affairs in Canada's relations with other countries, in the way that some
provinces have organized their federal-provincial affairs.
So, as I see it, parliamentarians
collectively are confronted with a new federal-provincial bureaucracy in their
role as ombudsmen. Backbenchers collectively are faced with a level of
governmental intricacy unknown and unassailable to most. It is a marvellous labyrinth,
designed to confuse, confound and sap the energies of all but the most
single-minded and persistent adventurers. Over the past twenty years, we have
specialized in making federal-provincial agreements to get around the
constitution, and the result is the present maze of federal-provincial
confusion.
Some Suggestions for the Future
Governments should not ignore the legitimate
concerns of members of all sides in their desire to participate in the
increasing number of federal-provincial discussions while at the same time
seeking parliamentarians' approval of measures stemming from such talks.
Insofar as the Parliament of Canada is concerned there should be a
federal-provincial committee with a permanent reference. The government has
proposed and Parliament has created a Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal
Arrangements. When that Committee completes its work its terms of reference
should be renewed with a new mandate to look into all aspects of
federal-provincial activities. When I was a Minister of State for
Federal-Provincial Relations, I was astounded to discover there was no
committee to which I could report.
The federal cabinet should ensure a
mechanism exists enabling those members who wish to participate in
federal-provincial deliberations to do so; either formally or informally, by
having space available, providing documents including the agenda, and by
identifying officials of the federal-provincial bureaucracy whose task it would
be to assist members.
The federal and provincial governments should
review their dealings with each other to diminish the prevailing sense of
conflict with the Canadian structure. From the federal point of view, both the
political and administrative structures require re-examination which might be
accomplished by a vigorous, yet understanding committee responsible for
federal-provincial relations and their provincial counterparts. Such a
committee would, however, have to earn power within the parliamentary system to
develop an ability to influence policy in this field. An example worth looking
at would be the Danish Committee on the Common Market. There is also the very
good example of the Quebec National Assembly Committee on Intergovernmental
Relations.
At the present time, there is no formal
mechanism within the federal parliament for discussion of federal-provincial
affairs in a systematic way. This situation is not the result of a plot of the
government. There has been little pressure by parliament to engage itself in
this field. I believe the parties see the political problem presented to
themselves because most parties have and expect to have their provincial
counterpart become the government of some of the provinces some day, just as
they see themselves as becoming the majority party in parliament. These
interrelationships can make life difficult for parties, as happened during the
constitutional debate. It has been the result of this insight which has led the
parties in parliament to soft peddle the question of federal-provincial
relations. But I feel that parliament must inject itself more into this field,
however painful it may be to individuals and parties. It is too important to he
left to marauding bureaucrats and jealous governments.
There is little doubt that a new, and
important, dimension of government has entered the lives of Canadians in the
form of federal-provincial consultations. Legislators at the federal and
provincial levels of government should legitimize this process by sharing
control with the various cabinets and their officials.
Driven as we are by, regional and
inter-governmental conflict of an alarming level, imaginative measures are
called for. Members of all legislatures can well play an important and
conciliatory role as they perform their functions as members of the various
legislative assemblies of Canada. The problem is not caused by only one level
of government, and solutions should not he sought in only one place either.
Members of parliament can do this only if
they demand to participate more extensively in the federal-provincial deliberations
in their own legislative assemblies, if they are given the opportunity, to
learn the of provincial confreres and if they develop a full understanding of
our federal system. This may well mean. because of the changing nature of our
society, an acceptance that tension in the Federal system may well be a result
of those changes. We do not live in a static society.