At the time this article was written Guy
Chevrette represented Joliette-Montcalm in the Quebec National Assembly. This article
is an abridged version of an address delivered to the 6th seminar of' the
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association held in Ottawa in November 1980.
In both the federal legislature and in
several provincial houses more members are becoming fulltime parliamentarians.
One consequence of this has been increased demand by private members from all
sides of the legislature to have their voices heard in the policymaking
process. This need can be met either by reforming the committee system or, in
the case of government members, through a working relationship between caucus
and cabinet. In this article a member of the Quebec National Assembly outlines
the situation of government backbenchers in Quebec.
In Quebec, the caucus system has improved
considerably in recent years. Whereas Maurice Duplessis used to call his
members together about three times a year for information purposes since 1960
the practice has evolved of holding regular caucus meetings outside the
session. One innovation has been to arrange meetings between party leaders and
cabinet. Since 1970 there has been a growing trend toward the establishment of
the regional caucuses and of special committees of government members entrusted
with matters concerning particular regions, legislative sectors or special
problems.
I could cite a whole series of cases
beginning in 1976 where bills, prior to being tabled in the National Assembly,
have been referred to groups of government members for clause-by-clause study.
I am thinking in particular of the bills dealing with automobile insurance,
land management, occupational health and safety, and the government's policy on
day care centres. We have also seen draft regulations, drawn up by government
officials and approved in principle by the ministers concerned, amended as the
result of recommendations by groups of private Members. Two examples come to
mind the regulation on bulk transport and the regulation on hiring in the
construction industry.
The present Prime Minister of Québec, Mr.
René Lévesque, will often take considerable trouble to outline his decisions
and explain them to members of his caucus. This procedure was particularly
useful during the recent negotiations between the government and the employees
of the civil service. In our parliamentary system frankness, on the part of the
Prime Minister to wards his caucus can only favour a healthy equilibrium
between Parliament and the executive branch.
Another recent innovation was the
establishment of caucus research in 1971. Through these services, members have
been provided with very valuable documents and often with sound advice. We also
have opportunities to travel and to communicate with our electors and be
available to them.
Caucus Cabinet Relations: Some
Shortcomings
Despite these improvements, relations
between caucus and cabinet remain fairly shaky and are at the root of a certain
discontent among government members. This situation can be attributed to
several factors.
First, everyone will agree that, although
members are elected, they by no means constitute the most influential or the
most privileged segment of the government apparatus. That apparatus is
dominated by the ministers, the senior civil servants, and various interest
groups. Because these groups have the know how, the specialization and the information,
they logically have more influence than the ordinary member of the legislature.
In this regard, it would appear that within
the government machinery in both Canada and Quebec, the decision-making process
is not much different from that which French and American authors have noted in
their own countries. The process is generally set in motion at the instigation
of spokesmen who represent the interests of certain groups. In the face of
changes, or possible future changes, these groups seek, at every stage, to sway
those in power to their side. Those in power are usually divided, and while
formal authority may be vested in a certain body, close study of the facts will
show a major division within the government machinery, according to functions, sectors
and territories. All these different factors and variables enhance the feelings
of frustration experienced by the members, particularly the government
backbenchers.
A backbencher colleague of mine once dropped
a remark which provides a good illustration of the discontent felt by a good
number of members: "A member has a better chance than anyone else to get
fed up ... I can't help wondering whether in the long run Parliament with the
way it's set up, won't end up blinding its members to reality.
In our own party, the problem was compounded
at the outset since a great majority of our members are sitting in the Assembly
for the first time. Their background had accustomed them to doing something
other than just providing opinions when decisions were to be made. I myself
have had a number of jobs in the teaching sector, and have been involved in
decision-making in the union and hospital sectors. The transition to political
life was not an easy one. A new member must have the patience of Job if he is
to follow all the stages of a particular project. If called upon to make a
decision which will affect his region or his electors, he needs even more
patience than old Job could muster. No matter what question interests you, and
no matter how pressing it may be, things will never go the way you want them
to. Sometimes, the decision-making process becomes so slow that when the time
comes to implement a solution it is outmoded.
But there are more reasons behind what the
journalists call the "Backbenchers' Revolt. Some members blame individual
ministers for the deterioration of the members' influence in the political
process. In particular, they accuse cabinet members of unduly broadening their
field of action, of treating their individual departments as fiefdoms, and of
too frequently taking refuge behind the principle of' confidentiality of
executive files to justify voluntarily withholding information. These
complaints are not new and they apply equally well in Quebec, in Canada and in
parliamentary systems similar to ours.
In a study submitted to the École nationale
d'administration publique, two former Quebec liberal members, Mark Assad and
Yves Tardif, turned up sonic interesting facts. Of all the ministers
interviewed within the framework of their study 60% had never consulted any
backbenchers before making a decision. This figure rose to 95% for government
members. The survey also revealed that ministers are virtually never all
present at caucus meetings. Out of a possible twenty-five or thirty sometimes
three or four or possibly a dozen will show up. A member who wishes to obtain
specific information or who makes known his observations on a given subject or
questions a departmental policy or submits a recommendation, will often find
that the minister involved is nowhere to be seen. Even if that minister is
there and gives a prompt answer, the meeting will immediately move on to study
the next item which, of course, will in no way be related to the first. Another
finding of this study was that ministers who had sat as members for at least
two years were more apt to inform and consult government members.
Recently, the commission inquiring into the
cost of Montreal's Olympic Games strongly criticized the fact that the cabinet
was able to prepare bills, and have them approved by the National Assembly,
without any assistance from the people's elected representatives.
The same conclusions can be seen in the
recent Report of the Royal Commission on Financial Management and
Accountability and in a report of the Business Council on National Issues where
we read that the caucus is insufficiently structured, that the ordinary
member's role is belittled, and that people occupying key positions in cabinet
and government never show any spirit of collaboration. The attitude shown by
these people is described as secretive, elitist and condescending. Information
is short-circuited and the machinery for accountability is weak. Professors
Robert Jackson and Michael Atkinson in a very detailed study, also observed
that, when it came to preparing legislation, ministers enjoyed too great an
independence not only with regard to Parliament but also notwithstanding the
efforts made by the Privy Council office with regard to cabinet. In particular,
they regretted that there was no machinery allowing caucuses and members to
supply any input government policy.
These various testimonies emphasize the
dilemma which I pointed out at the beginning: the need for democratically
elected governments to govern effectively, with the conviction that they are going
to last, and the need for us, as elected agents of the people, to exercise
adequate control over the executive without endlessly embarrassing and
threatening it. There are no easy solutions. If our system of government is to
be effective and productive, government must be strong, and founded on
ministerial discretion and solidarity. The repercussions of excessively rigid
control of the government must never be underestimated. But all that is another
story.
Increasing The Government Member's
Influence
The search for new ways to give ordinary
members more influence continues with each new legislature. In April 1970, the
Liberals came to power in Quebec. Two months later, aware that the
responsibilities and powers of the elected representatives of the people had
been weakened, they instituted a committee on the role of the private member.
Another task force headed by Robert Lamontagne was set up after the 1973
election. Its report on government members, better known in Quebec City as the
Lamontagne Report was submitted in 1975. In November 1973, the Minister of
Communications, Jean-Paul L'Allier, also made a suggestion to Prime Minister
Robert Bourassa regarding the situation created by the election of 102 Liberal
Members to the National Assembly. In 1976, the newly-elected Parti québécois
created a Ministry of State for electoral and parliamentary reform. One of the
ministry's objectives was to outline new duties for ordinary members.
After the 1968 federal election, the
Liberals under Prime Minister Trudeau attempted to facilitate communication
between caucus and cabinet. In 1979, the Conservative government's Throne
Speech contained well-defined measures to facilitate parliamentary initiative
and to involve backbenchers in certain advisory study groups.
Let me conclude with a survey of some of the
principal ideas brought up in discussions on parliamentary and caucus reform?
- that regional caucus be formally created within the government
caucus, and that members be allowed to select subjects for study, according
to their own concerns;
- that each member be officially entitled to take part in the
preparation of policy, at all levels, concerning his riding and his
region:
- that parliamentary assistants or members be especially assigned to
the government corporations, with a view to maintaining closer, more
direct relations with these corporations. (Since I have already acted in
that position, I would like to make a personal observation on this point.
Parliamentary assistants could be even more closely integrated with the
departments concerned. They could become a sort of spokesman for the
caucus within the departments a liaison officer if you like between them
and the ordinary Members, who could answer their questions in the absence
of the minister);
- that the Chief Whip and I hope I am not in a conflict-of-interest
situation here. be authorized and empowered to meet every month with the
members of cabinet or to attend a cabinet meeting;
- that the principle of the "free vote" be abolished for
government Members, but that the leaders of the party in power recognize
and adopt a more flexible method on the matter of party discipline.
- that no administrative regulation issued by any department take
effect until it is submitted to a caucus committee expressly appointed for
the purpose;
- that the principles of every bill be discussed in caucus before
that bill is tabled for first reading;
- that the role of the parliamentary assistant be defined by law and
that greater government responsibilities be attached to the position;
- that whenever at least 2/3 of the government caucus agrees that a
matter is worthy of discussion. a committee be created for the purpose, or
an already existing committee be entrusted with studying the matter.,
- that anew theory on the administrative responsibility of deputy
ministers be thought out, to specify the obligations of senior civil
servants in this regard, particularly the obligation to testify before
parliamentary Committees on matters of administration:
- that certain members who are not in cabinet be chosen, both from
the party in power and from the opposition party, to act as watch dogs
over the economy.
Conclusion
So there's no dearth of ideas. But, as you
know, there's many a slip between theory and practice, and the least that can
be said is that implementing all these changes will not be easy. The question
is frequently asked as to whether the British-type parliamentary system is
becoming increasingly anachronistic"
There are those who maintain that we should
favour the presidential system, like that in the United States, over the
parliamentary system derived from Westminster. But, there is no sense in
believing that we can enjoy all the advantages of the American system and none
of its inconveniences.
Surely there is some kind of middle ground
between the presidential system and the British-type parliamentary system. To
close, I would add that while members may often gripe about their working
conditions, they have nothing to say against government stability which allows
them to carry on their work at the service of their electors. And if every four
or five years they seek a new term, it is certainly not because of the
Stockholm Syndrome.