At
the time this article was written John Mark Keyes was Senior Counsel, Legislation Section, Department of Justice. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author personally and are not
made on behalf of the Department of Justice.
In a previous issue of the
Review (Vol. 20, No. 4) an article by the same author appeared on the requirement
of a royal recommendation for bills that involve the spending of public money.
Shortly after its publication, the Speaker of the House of Commons ruled on two
points of order relating to this requirement. These rulings are significant
because they suggest a more critical approach to the application of the
requirement as well as a shift away from applying it to indirect appropriations
of public money. There have also been developments on the question of what
constitutes a tax. This question affects the royal recommendation when a
bill not only requires amounts to be paid, but also authorizes the proceeds to
be spent. The Speakers of both Houses have recently reached opposite
conclusions on this issue in relation to the same bill (S-13). In
addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has also ruled on this question in
relation to section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which requires money
bills to originate in the House of Commons. A majority of the Court held
that the courts have jurisdiction to enforce this section and, by implication,
section 54, which deals with the royal recommendation.
Bill S-3: An Act to
amend the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 and the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act
Bill S-3 was introduced in and passed
by the Senate before its introduction in the House of Commons. It would
have enhanced the regulatory powers of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions in relation to pension plans. For example, clause 5 would
have added a provision authorizing the Superintendent to require and
participate in meetings with pension administrators and beneficiaries.
In his ruling of February 10,
1998, the Speaker of the House of Commons accepted that “it may well be that
additional expenditures would be incurred because of those enhanced powers of
the Superintendent.” However, he ruled that this did not attract the
requirement of the royal recommendation, saying:
Should an increase be necessary as a result of
these new powers, the necessary allocation of money would have to be sought by
means of an appropriation bill because I was unable to find any provision for
money in Bill S-3.
This ruling departs from
previous rulings that have recognized that a provision may constitute an
appropriation even though it does not expressly allocate money to undertake the
activities that the provision would authorize. For example, previous
Speakers of the House of Commons have ruled that provisions establishing
governmental bodies,
1 increasing their membership 2 or providing for
the appointment of officers and employees 3 have required the royal recommendation,
even though they were not accompanied by provisions expressly appropriating
public money. There is also a ruling of the Speaker of the Senate on February
27, 1991 dealing with a provision which, like that in Bill S-3, would have
added new powers and responsibilities to those already conferred on a public
office-holder. The provision was in Bill S-18, entitled An Act to
further the aspirations of the aboriginal peoples of Canada. Relying
on the 21st edition of Erskine May, the Speaker ruled:
The Chair is of the opinion that clauses 8(2)
and (3) clearly impose new statutory duties on the Minister of Indian and
Northern Affairs, and hence on the department. They therefore infringe
upon the financial initiative of the Crown and are not in order. 4
Bill S-4: An Act to
Amend the Canada Shipping Act (Maritime Liability)
A second ruling of the Speaker
of the House of Commons casts even more doubt on the application of the requirement
to indirect appropriations. On February 12, 1998, he ruled on Bill S-4, which
had also been introduced in and passed by the Senate before its introduction in
the House. Its purpose was to increase the limits on shipowners’ liability and
the compensation payable for maritime claims, particularly those relating to
oil pollution. It was argued that the increase would fall on the Crown
and amounted to an appropriation requiring the royal recommendation. The
Speaker rejected this argument on the basis that this charge was not new
because the existing law (the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act)
already provided for the payment of money to satisfy civil judgments against
the Crown. Although it is easy to agree that the royal recommendation was
not required, the reasoning of the Speaker’s decision bears analysis in
terms of both its characterization of the existing law and its premise that the
bill would have increased the Crown’s liability.
The Crown Liability and
Proceedings Act provides a mechanism for recovering judgments against the
Crown. Subsection 30(1) requires the Minister of Finance to
authorize the payment of judgments out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
It is a continuing statutory appropriation that does not have to be
renewed or supplemented by any further legislation in order to be
effective. However, it is not a self-contained appropriation because it
does not state a particular dollar amount. Instead, the amounts
appropriated depend on the Crown’s liability to pay court judgments, which in
turn depends on the law governing its civil liability. A law that
increases this liability effectively increases the amount that would be
otherwise appropriated. It would seem to fit one of the principal
situations in which many previous Speaker’s decisions have recognized that the
recommendation is required. These decisions relate largely to amendments
to bills and are summarized as follows in the 6th edition of
Beauchesne’s Parliamentary Rules and Forms:
... an amendment infringes the financial
initiative of the Crown not only if it increases the amount but also if it
extends the objects and purposes ... expressed in the communication by which
the Crown has demanded or recommended a charge.
If the result of Bill S-4 were
to increase the Crown’s civil liability, then it would clearly extend the
existing statutory appropriation under the Crown Liability and Proceedings
Act. However, this premise is questionable. The provisions in
Bill S-4 applied generally to ship owners and were not targeted
exclusively at the Crown. Since the Crown is not in the business of
merchant shipping, one wonders how the bill could have had any significant
impact on its liability. It is also worth noting that subsection
677(9) of the Canada Shipping Act specifically exempts ships owned
by the Crown from civil liability for oil pollution. Thus, there seems
little reason to think that Bill S-4 would have imposed any significant charges
on public money.
Bill S-13: Tobacco
Industry Responsibility Act
Bill S-13 proposed the
incorporation of a non-profit foundation (the Canadian Tobacco Industry
Community Responsibility Foundation). It also proposed to authorize
the Foundation to collect a levy on the sale or other disposition of tobacco
products and to use the proceeds for a variety of purposes, principally related
to reducing the use of tobacco products by young persons in Canada. Like the
bills discussed, it too was first introduced in the Senate where the Speaker
decided that the provisions authorizing the use of this money did not amount to
an appropriation requiring the royal recommendation.
The Speaker began his ruling by
stating that:
The fundamental purpose of the requirement for a
Royal Recommendation is to limit the authority for appropriating money from the
Consolidated Revenue Fund to the Government.
He also noted the definitions of
“appropriation”, “Consolidated Revenue Fund” and “public money” in section 2 of
the Financial Administration Act, observing that the definition of
“public money” is cast in terms of “all money belonging to Canada”. The
decision turns on this point since clause 33(1) of the bill stated that “the
Foundation is not an agent of Her Majesty and its funds are not public funds of
Canada.” The Speaker then addressed the question of whether the levy was a tax.
This is important because section 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867
(which imposes the requirement of a royal recommendation) expressly applies to
the appropriation of “any tax or impost”. He found that the levy did not
constitute a tax because it was “imposed on the tobacco industry alone ...
to meet an industry purpose beneficial to it.” This conclusion was based
on the language of the bill, which said that its purpose was:
to enable and assist the Canadian tobacco industry
to carry out its publicly-stated objective of reducing the use of tobacco
products by young persons throughout Canada.
This ruling is significant in at
least two ways. First, it recognizes that not all money payable under
statutory authority is public money or, as section 54 of the Constitution
Act, 1867 puts it, “public revenue or ... any tax or impost”. Second,
it recognizes that the definitions of the Financial Administration Act
can be important indicators of the scope of the requirement for a royal
recommendation. This provides guidance on determining these questions and
it suggests that careful drafting may provide persuasive arguments for avoiding
the requirement. However, the strength of this guidance is thrown into question
by a subsequent ruling on the bill by the Speaker of the House of Commons.
When the bill reached the House
of Commons, the Government House Leader objected that it imposed a tax and,
accordingly, should have originated in that House (as required by section 53 of
the Constitution Act, 1867 and Standing Order 80) and should have been
preceded by the adoption of a ways and means motion. The debate focused
on whether the levy was imposed for the benefit of the tobacco industry. The
Speaker decided it was not. Although he noted both the stated purpose of
the bill as well as the provision that the levy was not payable into the
Consolidated Revenue Fund, he concluded:
Surely the lack of credibility referred to [in
the bill] is a function of our common sense understanding of the self-interest
of the tobacco industry, namely that, as a commercial enterprise, its primary
goal is to expand its markets and thereby to increase profits. Young people
would constitute the future growth potential for the industry’s market.
How could it be of benefit to the industry to reduce smoking among the
very people who constitute its growth market? It is this implausible
proposition that underlies the credibility problem to which the bill refers.
The differing results in the two
Speakers rulings turn on how each of them determined the purpose of the bill.
The Senate Speaker was prepared to rely on what the bill said, whereas
the Commons Speaker took a substantive approach, relying on “our common sense
understanding” and posing the question “Why is legislation like this
required?”. The differing approaches raise important questions that go to
the heart of the Speaker’s role.
The textual approach of the
Senate Speaker operates at a distance from the bill, avoiding comment on its
merits. This allows the Speaker to maintain the impartiality that is so
crucial to his office by leaving the merits to be judged by the members.
However, it also leaves open the possibility of form triumphing over
substance, a possibility that clearly worried the Commons Speaker. This concern
for substance is laudable and it is also demonstrated by the courts when they
must determine the purposes of legislation or the character of amounts required
to be paid under it. But it requires a thorough understanding of the context
of the legislation and how it is likely to operate. Deciding these issues
at a preliminary stage in parliamentary proceedings on the basis of
“common sense” may not necessarily do them justice. For example,
Bill S-13 was intended to operate in the context of the prohibitions of the Tobacco
Act on furnishing tobacco products to young persons. Steps to
dissuade them from tobacco use would arguably not be contrary to the interests
of the tobacco industry because sales to young persons are already illegal.
Re Eurig Estate
It may come as a surprise to
many to find that the Speakers are not the only ones who may rule on procedural
matters relating to financial legislation. On October 23, 1998, the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled on Re Eurig Estate5, a case
involving the imposition of probate fees by regulations under the Ontario Administration
of Justice Act. A majority of the Court held that the fees were taxes
and that their imposition by regulation contravened section 53 of the Constitution
Act, 1867 because they originated in a regulation of the
Lieutenant-Governor in Council, rather than in a bill passed by the Legislative
Assembly. Justice Major wrote:
[para 30] In my view, the rationale underlying
s. 53 is somewhat broader. The provision codifies the principle of no
taxation without representation, by requiring any bill that imposes a tax to
originate with the legislature. My interpretation of s. 53 does not
prohibit Parliament or the legislatures from vesting any control over the details
and mechanism of taxation in statutory delegates such as the Lieutenant
Governor in Council. Rather, it prohibits not only the Senate, but also
any other body other than the directly elected legislature, from imposing a tax
on its own accord.
He also stated that section 53
“is a constitutional imperative that is enforceable by the courts.” This
statement may apply equally to the requirement of a royal recommendation under
section 54 Constitution Act, 1867, although the financial initiative of
the Crown is perhaps less well entrenched than the principle of no taxation
without representation.
The Supreme Court’s decision
confirms an overlap of jurisdiction between the Speakers and the courts on the
procedural issues addressed by these sections of the Constitution.
Speakers have often noted this overlap, as indeed the Commons Speaker did
in ruling on Bill S-13:
though this tax question might be characterized
as a question of law and in another context outside this Chamber might be
raised and considered as a question of law, in this context it is considered
only as an integral part of a question on procedure and parliamentary
privilege.
It is less clear whether the
Speakers are in any sense bound by the rulings of the courts on sections 53 and
54. Although the courts clearly cannot dictate how Parliament conducts
its proceedings, they hold over it the possibility of invalidating legislation
that is enacted in contravention of what the courts consider sections 53 and 54
to require. This is a remarkable development, especially given that in
Australia the High Court has avoided this overlap by ruling that the courts
have no power to enforce comparable provisions in its Constitution, their
jurisdiction being confined to law, not “proposed laws”. 6
Conclusion
The Commons Speaker’s rulings on
Bill S-3 and Bill S-4 suggest a significant shift away from the approach taken
to the royal recommendation by previous Speakers in both the House of Commons
and the Senate. The ruling on Bill S-3 seems to reject the application of
the requirement to indirect appropriations, moving toward the approach found in
parliaments such as that of the Commonwealth of Australia and advocated
by several commentators on the situation in the Canadian Parliament. 7 This approach would
make it simpler to decide whether a royal recommendation is required and it
would also expand the scope for private-members initiatives. However, it would
also weaken the Crown’s control over government finances and public spending.
As for the ruling on Bill S-4,
it reaches a sensible result, but its reasoning betrays some of the confusion
that lurks about the royal recommendation. I would suggest that the Crown
Liability and Proceedings Act does not amount to a pre-existing
appropriation for matters provided for in Bill S-4. It would instead make
a direct appropriation out of any provision increasing the Crown’s civil
liability. The better argument for rejecting the application of the royal
recommendation in this case is that the provisions of Bill S-4 simply would not
have imposed any substantial charge on public money because they applied to
private sector activities that the Crown does not generally engage in.
The rulings on Bill S-13
demonstrate very different approaches to distinguishing taxes from industry
levies. The approach of the Senate Speaker is grounded in a careful
analysis of the language of the bill and suggests a critical regard for the
procedural requirements of origination and the royal recommendation, which
limit the ability of senators to introduce bills. In contrast, the
approach of the Speaker of the House of Commons is substantive in nature and is
obviously motivated by concern for the right of that House to originate
financial measures.
The merits of each approach are
debatable, but it is ironic that the Supreme Court may have tipped them in
favour of the substantive approach. Its decision in Re Eurig Estate
poses a host of questions about the relationship between the courts and
parliamentary bodies because it holds that the courts may determine those
questions of parliamentary procedure that have been constitutionalized in
sections 53 and (probably) 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867. This means
that the Speaker now plays a potentially important role in ensuring that bills
conform to these provisions, not only as a matter of parliamentary procedure,
but also incidentally as a matter of constitutional law. Given that the
courts tend to adopt a substantive approach to questions of legislative purpose
and the character of taxes, the Speakers may be able to play a more effective
role by taking the same approach.
Although this is one conclusion
to be drawn from Re Eurig Estate, it is nevertheless profoundly
disturbing. In countless decisions, Speakers have indicated that they
have no jurisdiction to decide legal questions. Until the Supreme Court
decision, this has posed little problem because the procedural context of
Speakers’ decisions has been quite separate from the context in which these
questions arise in the courts, for example in relation to the division of
powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures. However, with Re
Eurig Estate, we now have exactly the same questions being decided both by
the Speakers and the courts. This raises many concerns.
It is possible that conflict may
occur between the Speakers and the courts if, for example, they reach different
results on the characterization of taxes. Indeed, given the disagreement
between the Speakers on Bill S-13, it is surely not difficult to imagine that
the courts may reach different conclusions as well. This is particularly
likely because the judicial concept of a tax is rooted in constitutional law cases
on the division of powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures.8 The courts have taken
little account of how taxes have been characterized for the purposes of
parliamentary procedure. In addition, they have had even less to do with
the royal recommendation and the definition of an appropriation. In light
of the uncertainty surrounding what is, in effect, a new basis for invaliditing
legislation, both past and future, one can only hope that they will have due
regard for Speakers’ rulings on these matters.
Notes
1. House of Commons, Debates,
July 11, 1988 p. 17367 and March 28, 1969, p. 7265.
2. House of Commons, Debates,
December 10, 1963 p. 5665.
3. House of Commons Journals,
November 9, 1978 pp. 130-1 and February 20, 1979 pp. 393-5.
4. Senate Journals, February 27, 1991 p.
2262-2264.
5. [1998] 2 SCJ, No. 72.
6. Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975)
ALR 277 (HC) p. 347.
7. See J. Small, “Money Bills and
the Use of the Royal Recommendation in Canada: Practice versus Principle?”
(1995), 27 Ottawa Law Review p. 33 and R.R. Walsh, “Some Thoughts on
Section 54 and the Financial Initiative of the Crown” (1994), 17 Canadian
Parliamentary Review p. 22.
8. Lawson v. Interior Tree Fruit and
Vegetable Committee of Direction [1931] SCR 357.