PDF
Jerome H. Black
This article focuses on visible minority candidates who ran in the 2006
federal election. Its immediate purpose is to report on their numbers,
both in absolute terms and as well relative to the growing visible minority
population at large. A broader objective includes situating the figures
through comparisons with earlier elections and especially the 2004 contest,
which saw a noticeable increase in the incidence of visible minority candidates.
Another larger goal is to gain some understanding of the relationship between
the underrepresentation of visible minority candidates and MPs. This is
accomplished through a consideration of party distinctions and of the diversity
and competitiveness of constituencies contested by visible minority candidates.
One of the conclusions is that more visible minority candidates need to
be nominated in ridings that are relatively homogeneous in ethnoracial
terms.
In April 2008, Statistics Canada released figures from the 2006 census
that measured the countrys ethnic and visible minority populations. The
numbers provide an important basis for updating judgments about the extent
of minority diversity among the political elite through comparisons with
the incidence of minorities in the population at large. The data are particularly
valuable for gauging the representation of visible minorities, the most
distinctive category of minorities. To no ones surprise, given recent
Canadian immigration trends, visible minorities significantly increased
their numbers in the half-decade since the previous census. In 2001, they
numbered a little less than four million and made up 13.4% of the population;
five years on, they were more than five million strong and had come to
comprise a sizeable 16.2% of the nations residents. Further, the demographic
trajectory for visible minorities is clearly one of continuing growth and
an ever-increasing slice of the population pie. In light of such present
and future demographic realities, it is all the more important to determine
whether changes in the ethnoracial origins of the political elite reflect
what is happening within the general public.
This paper uses the 2006 census data to benchmark candidate figures, specifically,
the number of visible minorities who competed as candidates for the five
major parties in the 2006 federal election. Candidates are, of course,
a natural group to study because they make up the pool from which MPs are
elected. This necessary condition is particularly significant for traditional
outgroups since one important way of understanding their limited presence
among the ranks of office-holders begins with noting (and ultimately explaining)
their underrepresentation among office-seekers. Furthermore, as will be
pointed out, the 2006 contest is particularly interesting as a follow-on
examination given developments that surrounded the federal election in
2004.
The first section below provides the fundamentals the number and percentage
of candidates of visible minority origins who ran in 2006. It starts out,
however, offering wider views by portraying the candidate figures for the
elections covering the 1993-2004 interval, and, as well, by providing information
on visible minorities elected as MPs. The following section examines how
many visible minorities ran in each of the five parties as part of their
candidate teams. Partisan implications are also pertinent in considering
the kinds of ridings that visible minorities contested. The penultimate
section, therefore, looks at both constituency diversity and competitiveness.
The conclusion provides an opportunity for some reiteration and reflection
on the relationship between visible minority candidacies and their underrepresentation
in Parliament.
Visible Minority MPs and Candidates, 1993-2006
In absolute terms, visible minorities have increased their presence in
the House of Commons over the course of recent elections, but they have
not achieved any corresponding gains when their growing share of the population
is taken into account. Section a of Table 1 highlights the continuing
representational deficit of visible minority MPs by reproducing from earlier
studies data for the four general elections over the 1993-2004 period.1
They serve as a reminder that the general pattern has been one of small
increments in the number and percentage of visible minority MPs. By the
2004 election, a record 22 visible minorities had captured 7.1% of the
available seats in the 38th Parliament. At the same time, measures of their
representation based on population benchmarks proportionality ratios
derived from dividing the percentage of visible minority MPs by the percentage
of such minorities nation-wide reveal little alteration over the eleven-year
interval. The ratio stood at .48 in 2004, which was effectively where it
was in 1993. With less than two dozen men and women elected in 2004, visible
minorities had not quite reached the half-way mark towards full proportionality.
Table 1 Visible Minority MPs and Candidates, 1993-2006
|
1993
|
1997
|
2000
|
2004
|
2006
|
Percentage of Visible Minorities in Population
|
9.4
|
11.2
|
13.4
|
14.9
|
16.2
|
a) MPs
|
|
Number
|
13
|
19
|
17
|
22
|
24
|
Percentage
|
4.4
|
6.3
|
5.6
|
7.1
|
7.8
|
Ratio to population
|
.47
|
.56
|
.42
|
.48
|
.48
|
b) Candidates
|
|
|
|
|
|
Percentage
|
4.1a 3.5b
|
4.1a
|
4.7a
|
8.3c 9.3d
|
7.8 9.0d
|
Ratio to population
|
.44 .37
|
.37
|
.35
|
.56 .62
|
.48 .56
|
Parties examined for the candidate data in 1993, 1997 and 2000 include
the BQ, Liberal, Progressive Conservative, NDP and Reform/Canadian Alliance.
In 2004 and 2006, the parties include the BQ, Conservative, Liberal, NDP
and Green (unless specifically excluded).
a Livianna S. Tossutti and Tom Pierre Najem, Minorities and Elections
in Canadas Fourth Party System, Canadian Ethnic Studies, Vol. 34, No.
1, 2002, pp. 85-112.
b Jerome H. Black, Entering the Political Elite in Canada: The Case of
Minority Women as Parliamentary Candidates and MPs, The Canadian Review
of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2000, pp. 143-66.
c Jerome H. Black and Bruce M. Hicks, Visible Minorities in the 2004 Federal
Election, Canadian Parliamentary Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2006, pp. 26-31.
d Excluding Green Party.
This pattern of qualified progress is also true of the 2006 election. On
the one hand, with two more visible minorities winning their way into the
39th Parliament, another record was set the resulting 24 individuals
comprised 7.8% of the Houses membership.2 On the other hand, this accomplishment
was still too modest to do more than keep pace with rising visible minority
population numbers. Based on the 2006 census figure referenced above (16.2%),
it would have taken the election of about 50 visible minorities to achieve
a level of representation on par with their population incidence. As it
was, the proportionality ratio was exactly where it was when the previous
parliament was convened.
Section b of Table 1 pertains to candidacies, and it suggests that parliamentary
underrepresentation does in a real sense start at the candidate level,
although the candidate-population deficits are different. Here, too, data
for the elections between 1993 and 2004 have been reassembled from previously
published material.3 As is quite evident, visible minorities were thinly
represented among the ranks of candidates for the first three elections
of that period, typically making up less than 5 percent of those who competed
on behalf of the principal parties (and the accompanying proportionality
ratios were below even those for visible minority MPs). The 2004 election
marked somewhat of a break in that pattern. That election witnessed 108
visible minority candidates, that is, 8.3% of all major party contenders,
the Greens included; if that party is set to the side, a stance taken in
the earlier studies when the party was virtually non-existent, the respective
figures are 93 and 9.3%. Either way, the augmentation is large enough to
move the proportionality ratio above what it was in connection with visible
minority MPs. The most straightforward interpretation of this increase
is that the parties purposefully fielded more minority candidates in a
bid to attract more votes in the growing immigrant and minority communities.
Such votes, concentrated in the critical urban and suburban centres, mattered
more in the enhanced competitive environment that surrounded the 2004 contest,
above all in the wake of the unification of the Alliance formation with
the old Progressive Conservative party. At the same time, the new Conservative
party openly committed itself to wooing minority and immigrant voters in
a purposeful effort to draw such voters away from the Liberals.
This line of reasoning could be the basis for presuming that a new record
number of visible minorities were nominated for the 2006 election because
the chase for minority votes became more urgent in an election that was
even more competitive than usual. After all, the minority Liberal government,
elected in 2004, had subsequently faced an almost daily threat of defeat
over the course of its seventeen-month tenure, and headed into the election
with the sponsorship scandal still hanging in the air. Although polls showed
the Liberals with a modest lead as the campaign got underway, it was clear
to most observers that they were vulnerable and that the Conservatives
had a real chance to defeat them.
As Table 1 reveals, this inference is not sustained. The parties actually
ran fewer visible minority candidates in 2006 than in 2004 in particular,
they nominated six fewer, that is, 102 instead of 108. With the Greens
excluded, the fall-off across the two elections is a bit less, a decline
of two. Since the change is not particularly large, however captured, perhaps
it is best to emphasize not so much the decrease between the two elections
as the lack of (continuing) upward movement.
Visible Minority Candidates and Parties, 2004 and 2006
Taken at face value, this suggests that the parties did not exert any additional
effort to run more visible minority candidates in the 2006 election. Table
2 addresses the question of whether all of the parties or just some of
them failed in this regard. Once again, previously published figures from
the 2004 election are displayed to provide a basis for comparison.4 They
are a reminder of the particularly notable fact that it was the new Conservative
party that ran the largest number of visible minority candidates in that
election 33 individuals, who made up 10.7% of its candidate team. The
Conservatives did not, however, distinguish themselves so in 2006. They
ran eight fewer visible minority candidates and these 25 individuals comprised
8.1% of their candidates. Displacing them were the Liberals who were able
to reclaim the position as the party that tended to nominate the most visible
minorities, though in some cases only by a small margin.5
They improved
upon the 26 who carried the partys banner in the 2004 election by running
34 in 2006. As for the other three parties, the NDP and the Greens nominated
fewer and the Bloc nominated more visible minority candidates. It turns
out, then, that the overall lack of increase in the number of visible minority
candidates from 2004 to 2006 masks some partisan variability. Three of
the five parties nominated fewer such individuals. The biggest drop is
associated with the Conservative party. On the other side of the ledger,
the Liberals ran enough additional visible minority candidates to offset
the Conservative decrease.
Table 2 Visible Minority Candidates by Party, 2004 and 2006
|
|
BQ
|
Cons.
|
Green
|
Lib.
|
NDP
|
2004
|
Number
|
5
|
33
|
15
|
26
|
29
|
|
Percentage
|
6.7
|
10.7
|
4.9
|
8.4
|
9.4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2006
|
Number
|
8
|
25
|
11
|
34
|
24
|
|
Percentage
|
7.8
|
8.1
|
3.6
|
11.0
|
7.8
|
Constituency Diversity and Competitiveness
While the number and percentage of visible minority candidates that a party
nominates are straightforward and useful indicators of commitment to candidate
diversity, so, too, is the kind of ridings in which they are nominated.
The association of visible minority candidates with constituencies that
have diverse populations (measured variously by large numbers of visible
minorities, immigrants, and/or individuals with non-English, non-French
mother tongues) is one that is well-documented.6 The link might be partially
explained by simple supply considerations; thus, visible minority individuals
might be expected to run for office in ridings in which they reside and,
as well, where they would benefit from their minority community and organizationally-relevant
connections and resources. But demand factors probably also play a role.
Thus, some party officials, variously at the local or supra-local level,
might search out or encourage visible minority candidates, believing that
they attract votes in designated ethnoracially mixed ridings. Some within
the upper echelons of the party might also be concerned about sending a
more general message to voters about the partys inclusiveness, as reflected
in the overall diversity of the candidate team.
Regardless of the underlying explanatory factors, the relationship between
candidate origin and constituency diversity is exceptionally strong. In
the 2004 election, a very substantial 44% of all of visible minority office-seekers
ran in ridings where visible minorities had a heavy presence operationalized
here as comprising 31% or more of the constituency population. By comparison,
only 10% of their non-visible minority counterparts ran in such ridings
a gap of 34 points. The difference is even larger if constituencies where
visible minorities comprised 21% to 30% of the population are added to
the mix: 59% versus 18%, for a gap of 41 points. For the 2006 election,
the data (not shown in a table) indicate that the association was almost
as strong.7 Forty-two percent of visible minority candidate competed where
visible minorities comprised 31% or more of the population, which rises
to 54% in ridings where they made up 21% or more; this was true of only
10% and 18%, respectively, for their white counterparts (differences of
32 and 36 points, respectively). Moreover, the visible minority candidacy-constituency
diversity connection held across all parties for the 2006 election, as
it had in 2004 (data not shown in table). As in 2004, the Conservatives
were most likely to nominate visible minorities in ethnoracially heterogeneous
ridings.8
Sixty percent of their visible minority candidates ran in the
most diverse districts in 2006. By comparison, the percentages for the
other parties vary from 25% for the Bloc, to 35% and 38% for the Liberals
and NDP, respectively, to 46% for the Greens.
Still, by most standards any truly serious commitment to facilitating visible
minority access to the political elite would entail ensuring that they
have reasonable prospects of getting elected; at the very least, they ought
to have the same chance of getting elected as other office-seekers. In
the 2004 election, visible minority candidates for the Conservatives and
the Liberals were as likely to be nominated in winnable or competitive
ridings as their non-visible minority counterparts. Was this equality evident
in 2006 as well?
Section a of Table 3 lays out the broadest perspective, ignoring for
the moment party distinctions by displaying the distributions of visible
minority and white candidates across six different competitive circumstances.
How the parties fared in the constituencies in 2004 is taken as an index
of their relative competitiveness going into the 2006 election. As can
be seen, the pattern is more or less one of continuing balance in the placement
of visible minority candidates. Twenty-two percent contested ridings where
their party had won in 2004 (by one of the three margins shown), a figure
that is only slightly below that of their non-visible minority counterparts
(25%). After adding in those ridings where the candidates parties had
lost the election by a margin of 10% or less, the relevant figures are
30% and 35% a gap but not a major one.
Table 3 Visible and Non-Visible Minority Candidates by Party Competitiveness,
2006
|
Percent Lost by in 2004
|
Percent Won by in 2004
|
|
|
21+
|
11-20
|
0-10
|
0-10
|
11-20
|
21+
|
(N)
|
(a) All Candidates
VM Candidates (%)
Non-VM Candidates (%)
|
60
59
|
11
7
|
8
10
|
11
9
|
5
5
|
6
11
|
(102)
(1205)
|
(b) New Candidates Only
VM Candidates (%)
Non-VM Candidates (%)
|
75
78
|
14
8
|
8
9
|
2
2
|
-
1
|
2
2
|
(64)
(700)
|
(c) New Candidates Only
Bloc Québécois:
VM Candidates (%)
Non-VM Candidates (%)
|
50
36
|
-
14
|
50
21
|
-
-
|
-
7
|
-
21
|
(4)
(14)
|
Conservative:
VM Candidates (%)
Non-VM Candidates (%)
|
75
63
|
19
15
|
6
15
|
-
3
|
-
1
|
-
4
|
(16)
(157)
|
Section b drills further down into the data by examining the competitive
circumstances for new contestants only that is, men and women who had
not competed in 2004. Putting repeat contestants to the side controls for
recruitment effects that were bound up with the 2004 election and that
would have naturally spilled over into the 2006 election (since candidates
who ran in 2004, especially sitting MPs, were likely to be renominated).
Such a stance tightens the focus on recruitment that was specific to the
2006 election and provides a better sense of the direction that the parties
took in that contest. It turns out that there were 764 candidates for the
five parties who had not competed in 2004, and heading into 2006 they overwhelmingly
faced less-than-ideal competitive circumstances. Only 34 individuals (or
4.5%) contested constituencies where their party had won in 2004, and a
further 71 (or 9.3%) contested ridings where their party had lost by 10%
or less. Such widespread poor electoral placement goes some way to explain
why the increase in the number of visible minority MPs was quite minimal
in 2006.
It does not, however, speak directly to the question of whether there was
any unfairness with regard to the positioning of visible minority candidates.
The entries in the table indicate no apparent imbalance between the competitive
status of constituencies contested by visible minority candidates and those
where white contestants made their challenge. Among the former, 4% ran
in ridings won by their party, while among the latter, 5% did so; for potentially
winnable ridings (where their party finished 10% or less behind the winner),
the percentages are virtually the same (8% and 9%, respectively).
It is only when party affiliation is taken into account that differences
between visible minority and white candidates emerge. Section c displays
the relevant distributions for candidacies within the Bloc, Conservative
and Liberal parties. (The Greens had no constituencies where their candidates
finished within 21 percentage points of the winner and the NDP had only
a handful of open constituencies where the party was even remotely viable.)
As can be seen, balance in the placement of visible minority candidates
is not indicated for either the Conservative party or the Bloc. Especially
striking is how the Conservatives, the party that ran the most visible
minority candidates in 2004, had zero new visible minority candidates competing
in the 2006 election in ridings that they had previously held, yet they
had nominated 8% of their white counterparts in such desirable ridings.
Taking note of those potentially winnable districts that had been previously
lost by 10% or less also indicates an unfavourable gap for visible minority
candidates: 6% ran in such ridings, while 15% of non-visible minorities
did so. Altogether the difference is 23% versus 6%. As for the Bloc, while
it did marginally increase visible minorities among its candidate team
in 2006, none of the four new candidates were positioned in ridings previously
won by the party. At the same time, 28% of their new non-visible minority
candidates were so placed. Somewhat mitigating this imbalance is the fact
that two visible minority candidates were placed in ridings where the party
was within 10% of the winner in 2004. In contrast, the Liberal party nominated
near equal numbers of visible and non-visible minority candidates in ridings
previously won by the party (10% and 12%, respectively). The Liberals did,
however, privilege white candidates over visible minority candidates in
areas where the party lost but finished within shooting distance of the
winner (25% vs. 5%, respectively).
Reflections
According to the 2006 census, a little more than one in six Canadians have
origins associated with visible minority categories. At the same time,
only about one of every 13 MPs who were elected that same year have such
backgrounds. This disparity in representation finds a degree of explanation
in the equally limited presence of visible minorities among the candidate
pool, also in the order of about one in 13. An examination of the 2006
election also indicates that there is no inevitability that ever-more visible
minorities will be nominated by the main parties. The election of 2004
saw a noticeable jump in their numbers, an increase that seemed explicable
by their growing strength in the general population and heightened partisan
rivalry for their votes. However, no such increment took place over the
2004-2006 interval, even though there was arguably a greater degree of
party competition. At best, it can said that the parties nominated roughly
the same number of visible minority candidates. With such little change,
it is not surprising that that only a couple more visible minority MPs
were elected in 2006 compared to 2004. Also very much relevant is the fact
that new candidates both visible and non-visible minority candidates
alike were likely to be nominated in ridings with poor electoral prospects.
Looking at party distinctions with regard to candidacies is also helpful
in explaining why there was only a modest improvement in visible minority
MP representation. Among the five main parties, only the Bloc and the Liberals
nominated more visible minority candidates in 2006 than in 2004. The Liberals,
in particular, stand out. Not only did they nominate the most visible minorities,
but these candidates confronted winnable contests on par with those faced
by their white counterparts. This was not the case with the other parties.
Most telling of all, the Conservatives not only ran fewer visible minority
candidates this time around, but they also placed nearly all of them in
far-from-winnable districts. This was consequential because as the winning
party (even in the context of a minority government victory) they afforded
the best opportunity for more visible minorities to enter Parliament. Correspondingly,
the Liberal partys second-place finish tempered the impact of that partys
more favourable approach to visible minority candidacies.
Finally, the fairly strong tendency among the parties to nominate visible
minorities in diverse ridings might also play a role in hampering the election
of more visible minority MPs. Of course, in many cases visible minorities
gain distinctive advantages (both in the nomination process and in the
general election) when they compete in such ridings. The other side of
the coin, however, is that such placement appears to diminish significantly
the number of competitive ridings in which they might otherwise be nominated.
Indeed, the figures are quite dramatic. Going into the 2006 election, there
were 133 constituencies where Conservative candidates were competitive
(defined as ridings that the party had either won or lost by 10% or less
in 2004). Yet, relatively few of these districts are ethnoracially diverse;
for instance, only 15 had visible minority populations of 21% or more.
As for the subset of 35 (competitive) ridings that were contested only
by new Conservative candidates, only seven had populations characterized
by this level of diversity. Given that the best chances for Conservative
candidates were in relatively homogeneous districts, the partys exceptionally
strong tendency to run visible minorities in diverse ridings acted as a
notable constraint. Of course, it is the Liberal partys long-standing
domination of many of the countrys urban centres that helps explain why
the Conservative party lags behind in such areas. At the same time, and
perhaps somewhat ironically, because of that Liberal ascendancy, there
are relatively few openings in that party for additional visible minority
candidates to compete in ridings that are both diverse and winnable. Among
the 51 competitive constituencies contested by Liberal candidates who were
new in 2006, only six ridings had populations where visible minorities
formed 21% or more of the population. So for the Liberals as well, the
greatest opportunity for adding more visible minority MPs lay with their
nomination in less diverse constituencies.
That being said, the appropriate inference to draw about these patterns
is not that there is anything wrong with nominating visible minorities
in heterogeneous ridings. As emphasized earlier, in many cases visible
minority candidates and their parties benefit from such placement. Moreover,
there are major strands of representation theory that posit that social
groups can only be effectively or authentically represented by group-based
legislators (since it is argued only they can truly and uniquely understand
and empathize with the needs and aspirations of the group). Put simply,
visible minority MPs provide a closer fit with their communities within
the constituency. The relevant point, however, is that the candidate diversity-constituency
diversity pattern should not be the only or even dominant model of representation.9
Having visible minorities running and winning in areas comprised predominantly
of individuals of majority background would constitute another layer of
representation in the Canadian political system.10 If so inclined, such
MPs could respond to minority concerns that are more general in nature
and extend beyond constituency-specific matters, but at the same time they
could defend the particular interests of their geographical constituency
just as currently sitting visible minority MPs do not ignore the concerns
of majority individuals in their ethnoracially diverse ridings. Moreover,
to the extent that visible minority MPs are also substantially associated
with homogeneous constituencies, this would signal that minorities have
achieved a higher level of integration into the Canadian political process,
a situation to which a multicultural country could point with considerable
pride.
Notes
1. Jerome H. Black and Bruce M. Hicks, Visible Minority Candidates in
the 2004 Federal Election, Canadian Parliamentary Review, Vol. 29, No.
2, 2006, pp. 26-31.
2. Various methods were used to determine those candidates (and MPs) who
are visible minorities. A little over one-third of the candidates in 2006
had also contested the 2004 election and thus their origins had already
been categorized as part of research into that election; see Black and
Hicks, Visible Minorities in the 2004 Federal Election, for a reference
about the specific methods employed. The backgrounds of those newly competing
in 2006 were established by three approaches: last name analysis, searches
of biographical records and, importantly, an examination of available photos.
Candidate, party and election web sites provided the bulk of material for
the latter two methods.
3. See Black and Hicks, op. cit.
4. Ibid.
5. Livianna S. Tossutti and Tom Pierre Najem, Minorities and Elections
in Canadas Fourth Party System: Macro and Micro Constraints and Opportunities, Canadian Ethic Studies Vol 34, No. 1, 2002, pp. 85-112.
6. In addition to Black and Hicks, Visible Minority Candidates in the
2004 Federal Election, see also Tossutti and Najem, Minorities and Elections
in Canadas Fourth Party System.
7. Using immigration or other mother tongue speakers as measures of diversity
produces results similar to those shown here.
8. See Black and Hicks, op. cit.
9. Currently, 15 of the 24 visible minority MPs (63%) represent constituencies
where visible minorities make up 21% or more of the population.
10. Helpfully, voter prejudice does not seem to be a factor. The evidence,
at least based on the 1993 election, is that mainstream Canadian voters
do not discriminate against visible minority candidates. See Jerome H.
Black and Lynda Erickson, The Ethnoracial Origins of Candidates and Electoral
Performance: Evidence from Canada, Party Politics Vol. 12, No. 4, July
2006, pp. 541-61.
|